The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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Liquidity Changes Following Stock Splits

Published: 3/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02075.x  |  Cited by: 168

THOMAS E. COPELAND


A MODEL OF ASSET TRADING UNDER THE ASSUMPTION OF SEQUENTIAL INFORMATION ARRIVAL*

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01966.x  |  Cited by: 25

Thomas E. Copeland Economics


Partial Revelation of Information in Experimental Asset Markets

Published: 3/1991,  Volume: 46,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03752.x  |  Cited by: 45

THOMAS E. COPELAND, DANIEL FRIEDMAN

We develop a model of market efficiency assuming private information is partially revealed to uninformed traders via the behavior of those who are informed. This partial revelation of information (PRE) model is tested in fourteen computerized double auction laboratory markets. It explains the market value and allocation of purchased information, and asset allocations, better than either a fully revealing information model (FRE strong‐form efficiency) or a nonrevealing expectations model; but it takes second place to FRE in explaining asset prices. We conjecture that refined versions of PRE may provide insight into “technical analysis” and minibubbles in securities markets.


The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study

Published: 7/1987,  Volume: 42,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04585.x  |  Cited by: 72

THOMAS E. COPELAND, DANIEL FRIEDMAN

A complete understanding of security markets requires a simultaneous explanation of price behavior, trading volume, portfolio composition (ie., asset allocation), and bid‐ask spreads. In this paper, these variables are observed in a controlled setting—a computerized double auction market, similar to NASDAQ. Our laboratory allows experimental control of information arrival—whether simultaneously or sequentially received, and whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We compare the price, volume, and share allocations of three market equilibrium models: telepathic rational expectations, which assumes that traders can read each others minds (strong‐form market efficiency); ordinary rational expectations, which assumes traders can use (some) market price information, (a type of semi‐strong form efficiency); and private information, where traders use no market information. We conclude 1) that stronger‐form market models predict equilibrium prices better than weaker‐form models, 2) that there were fewer misallocation forecasts in simultaneous information arrival (SIM) environments, 3) that trading volume was significantly higher in SIM environments, 4) and that bid‐ask spreads widen significantly when traders are exposed to price uncertainty resulting from information heterogeneity.


Information Effects on the Bid‐Ask Spread

Published: 12/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03834.x  |  Cited by: 908

THOMAS E. COPELAND, DAN GALAI

An individual who chooses to serve as a market‐maker is assumed to optimize his position by setting a bid‐ask spread which maximizes the difference between expected revenues received from liquidity‐motivated traders and expected losses to information‐motivated traders. By characterizing the cost of supplying quotes, as writing a put and a call option to an information‐motivated trader, it is shown that the bid‐ask spread is a positive function of the price level and return variance, a negative function of measures of market activity, depth, and continuity, and negatively correlated with the degree of competition. Thus, the theory of information effects on the bid‐ask spread proposed in this paper is consistent with the empirical literature.


Repo over the Financial Crisis

Published: 2/10/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13406  |  Cited by: 3

ADAM COPELAND, ANTOINE MARTIN

This paper uses new data to provide a comprehensive view of repo activity during the 2007 global financial crisis. We show that activity declined much more in the bilateral segment of the market than in the tri‐party segment. Surprisingly, a large share of the decline in activity is driven by repos backed by Treasury securities. Further, a disproportionate share of the decline in repo activity is connected to securities dealer's market‐making activity. In particular, the evidence suggests that at least part of the decline is not driven by clients pulling away from securities dealers because of counterparty credit concerns.


Beta Changes around Stock Splits: A Note

Published: 9/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02618.x  |  Cited by: 44

M. J. BRENNAN, T. E. COPELAND


Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri‐Party Repo Market

Published: 11/10/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12205  |  Cited by: 235

ADAM COPELAND, ANTOINE MARTIN, MICHAEL WALKER

The repo market has been viewed as a potential source of financial instability since the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis, based in part on findings that margins increased sharply in a segment of this market. This paper provides evidence suggesting that there was no system‐wide run on repo. Using confidential data on tri‐party repo, a major segment of this market, we show that, the level of margins and the amount of funding were surprisingly stable for most borrowers during the crisis. However, we also document a sharp decline in the tri‐party repo funding of Lehman in September 2008.


The Information Content of Municipal Bond Rating Changes: A Note

Published: 6/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02514.x  |  Cited by: 75

ROBERT W. INGRAM, LEROY D. BROOKS, RONALD M. COPELAND*


DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02115.x  |  Cited by: 0

THOMAS MAYER


FINDING THE OPTIMAL MONETARY STRATEGY WITH INFORMATION CONSTRAINTS

Published: 12/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03022.x  |  Cited by: 2

Thomas Havrilesky


AN INVESTIGATION OF MONETARY POLICY ACTION*

Published: 12/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00284.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Havrilesky


ADVANCE SALES OF GOVERNMENT SECURITY ISSUES

Published: 6/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00383.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Mayer


The Value of Bank Lending

Published: 5/28/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13465  |  Cited by: 2

THOMAS FLANAGAN

Using a novel data set of realized syndicated loan cash flows and a risk‐adjustment methodology adapted from the private equity literature, I provide a measure of risk‐adjusted returns for bank loan cash flows. Banks, on average, generate 180 basis points in gross risk‐adjusted returns and add $75 million of value annually to their loan portfolios. Banks earn higher returns when they lend to financially constrained borrowers, and the risk‐adjusted performance of bank loan portfolios exhibits persistence. However, banks require higher risk‐adjusted returns when facing their own financing frictions, and shareholders earn nearly zero net risk‐adjusted returns once bank staff are compensated for their lending effort. Overall, these findings suggest that banks provide valuable services to mitigate borrowers' financing frictions, and the present value of loan cash flows pays for the costs of providing these services.


IS THE PORTFOLIO CONTROL OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS JUSTIFIED?*

Published: 5/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04283.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Mayer


POSITIVE POLICY DESIGN AND THE CHICAGO MONETARY REFORMS*

Published: 6/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00381.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Velk


INTEREST PAYMENTS ON REQUIRED RESERVE BALANCES*

Published: 3/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02960.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Mayer


THE OUTLOOK FOR CORPORATE BONDS IN 1964

Published: 5/1964,  Volume: 19,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00778.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas R. Atkinson


PORTFOLIO REGULATIONS OF SELECTED FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES: SOME PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE*

Published: 5/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04282.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas G. Gies


Asset Sales, Investment Opportunities, and the Use of Proceeds

Published: 2/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00726.x  |  Cited by: 177

THOMAS W. BATES

This study examines the allocation of cash proceeds following 400 subsidiary sales between 1990 and 1998. Retention probabilities are increasing in the divesting firm's contemporaneous growth opportunities and expected investment. Retaining firms, however, also systematically overinvest relative to an industry benchmark. Shareholder returns to retention decisions are positively correlated with growth opportunities and benchmarked investment, but negatively correlated with benchmarked investment for firms with poor growth opportunities. Shareholder returns to debt distributions are increasing in industry‐benchmarked leverage. Overall, the results of this study cohere with the hypothesized trade‐off between the investment efficiencies associated with retained proceeds and the agency costs of managerial discretion and debt.


A TWO‐PERIOD BALANCE SHEET MODEL FOR BANKS*

Published: 12/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01767.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas M. Supel


Difference Systems in Financial Futures Markets

Published: 12/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03611.x  |  Cited by: 26

THOMAS ERIC KILCOLLIN

Many financial futures markets allow substitutions for the par grade of security at delivery. Substitutes are deliverable at premiums or discounts—“differences” in commodities parlance—to the futures price. The rule that establishes these differences is called a difference system. This paper characterizes financial futures market equilibrium with yield‐based difference systems and investigates particular systems in use. The major finding is that currently used difference systems effectively limit deliverable supply in the futures markets and lead to futures prices which understate the cash market price of the par security.


COMPARATIVE INVESTMENT POLICY AND PERFORMANCE OF NATIONAL UNIONS' GENERAL AND SPECIAL FUNDS*

Published: 12/1965,  Volume: 20,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02943.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas J. Kewley


AN ANALYSIS OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE MINNESOTA PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX*

Published: 9/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04312.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas F. Hady


FREEDOM FOR BANKS

Published: 5/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01811.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas I. Storrs


COMMERCIAL‐BANK TREATMENT OF BAD‐DEBT LOSSES: RELATIONSHIP TO ECONOMIC AND ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS OF INCOME MEASUREMENT AND EFFECTS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX REQUIREMENTS*

Published: 3/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb04840.x  |  Cited by: 0

John Thomas Burke


The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: A Dynamic Model with Information Production

Published: 3/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04710.x  |  Cited by: 250

THOMAS J. CHEMMANUR

This paper presents an information‐theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High‐value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low‐value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high‐value firms.


INTERGOVERNMENT FISCAL RELATIONS IN TEXAS*

Published: 3/1956,  Volume: 11,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb00692.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Ellwood McMillan


THE DEMAND FOR MORTGAGE LOANS AND THE CONCOMITANT DEMAND FOR HOME LOAN BANK ADVANCES BY SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS*

Published: 6/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01722.x  |  Cited by: 1

Thomas F. Morrissey


Corporate Debt and Corporate Taxes: An Extension

Published: 9/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03519.x  |  Cited by: 29

THOMAS E. CONINE


A Discrete Time Option Model Dependent on Expected Return: A Note

Published: 6/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05052.x  |  Cited by: 3

THOMAS J. O'BRIEN


Reserve Requirements and the Structure of the CD Market: A Note*

Published: 9/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04894.x  |  Cited by: 0

THOMAS A. LAWLER


A PORTFOLIO THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL SHORT‐TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS*

Published: 12/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01716.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas D. Willett


Consumption Betas and Backwardation in Commodity Markets

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03653.x  |  Cited by: 21

THOMAS B. HAZUKA

This paper examines the relationship between commodity consumption betas and realized commodity futures contract risk premiums. A linear relationship between risk premiums and consumption betas is developed based on a consumption oriented CAPM. The parameters of this linear model are estimated using fourteen commodities.


THE CORPORATE DIVIDEND DECISION: A CROSS‐SECTION STUDY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND INVESTMENT*

Published: 9/1969,  Volume: 24,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb00404.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas F. Pogue


AN EVALUATION OF CREDIT CONTROL TOOLS*

Published: 3/1957,  Volume: 12,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04108.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas Irwin Storrs


THE EFFECT OF PORTFOLIO SIZE ON PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*

Published: 6/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01874.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas A. Ulrich


FINANCIAL RISK AND THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX: COMMENT

Published: 12/1978,  Volume: 33,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03432.x  |  Cited by: 1

Thomas W. Epps


CONSUMER SENSITIVITY TO THE PRICE OF CREDIT

Published: 5/1964,  Volume: 19,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb00765.x  |  Cited by: 4

F. Thomas Juster


OUTLOOK FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECURITIES

Published: 5/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04276.x  |  Cited by: 0

Thomas R. Atkinson


THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES: A TEST OF THE EXPECTATIONS HYPOTHESIS

Published: 6/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01848.x  |  Cited by: 6

Thomas F. Cargill


RISK, RETURN AND THE COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE OF COMMERCIAL BANKING*

Published: 9/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00572.x  |  Cited by: 0

John Thomas Emery


The Risk‐Adjusted Cost of Financial Distress

Published: 11/28/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01286.x  |  Cited by: 321

HEITOR ALMEIDA, THOMAS PHILIPPON

Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk‐adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB‐rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000). Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively.


The Effect of Three Mile Island on Electric Utility Stock Prices: A Note

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02297.x  |  Cited by: 82

JOANNE HILL, THOMAS SCHNEEWEIS


Did Banks Pay Fair Returns to Taxpayers on TARP?

Published: 6/24/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13367  |  Cited by: 11

THOMAS FLANAGAN, AMIYATOSH PURNANANDAM

Financial institutions received investments under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in a bad state of the world but repaid them in a relatively good state. We show that the recipients paid considerably lower returns to taxpayers compared to private‐market securities with similar risk over the same investment horizon, resulting in a subsidy of over $50 billion on the preferred equity investment by the government. Ex‐post renegotiation of contract terms limited the upside gains received by taxpayers in good times and contributed to the subsidy. These findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future bailouts. Our simple methodology for calculating the subsidy can be applied to evaluate the financial costs of other bailouts.


A Catastrophe Model of Bank Failure

Published: 12/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02203.x  |  Cited by: 21

THOMAS HO, ANTHONY SAUNDERS

Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early‐warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area.


Equity Premia as Low as Three Percent? Evidence from Analysts' Earnings Forecasts for Domestic and International Stock Markets

Published: 10/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00384  |  Cited by: 1301

James Claus, Jacob Thomas

The returns earned by U.S. equities since 1926 exceed estimates derived from theory, from other periods and markets, and from surveys of institutional investors. Rather than examine historic experience, we estimate the equity premium from the discount rate that equates market valuations with prevailing expectations of future flows. The accounting flows we project are isomorphic to projected dividends but use more available information and narrow the range of reasonable growth rates. For each year between 1985 and 1998, we find that the equity premium is around three percent (or less) in the United States and five other markets.


The Golden Mean: The Risk‐Mitigating Effect of Combining Tournament Rewards with High‐Powered Incentives

Published: 7/23/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13169  |  Cited by: 3

DUNHONG JIN, THOMAS NOE

The rewards received by financial managers depend on both relative performance (e.g., fund inflows based on fund rankings, promotions based on peer comparisons) and absolute performance (e.g., bonus payments for meeting accounting targets, hedge‐fund incentive fees). Both relative and absolute performance rewards engender risk‐taking. In this paper, we show that these two sources of risk‐taking, relative and absolute performance rewards, mitigate the risk‐taking incentives produced by the other. This mutual incentive‐reduction effect generates a number of novel predictions about the relationship of managerial risk‐taking with the structure of relative and absolute performance rewards.


The Effects of Inflation and Money Supply Announcements on Interest Rates

Published: 9/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03901.x  |  Cited by: 71

THOMAS URICH, PAUL WACHTEL

This paper examines the impact of the money supply and inflation rate announcements on interest rates. Survey data on expectations of the money supply and consumer and producer price indexes are used to distinguish anticipated and unanticipated components of the announcements. This distinction is used to test for the efficiency of the financial market response to the announcements of new information. The results indicate that the unanticipated components of the announced changes in the Producers Price Index and in the money supply have an immediate positive effect on short‐term interest rates. The Consumer Price Index announcement has no apparent effect. There is no evidence of a delayed announcement effect. However, there is some indication of a liquidity effect of the money supply change on interest rates. This takes place when reserves are changing and several weeks prior to the information announcement.


Venture Capital and the Professionalization of Start‐Up Firms: Empirical Evidence

Published: 2/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00419  |  Cited by: 1732

Thomas Hellmann, Manju Puri

This paper examines the impact venture capital can have on the development of new firms. Using a hand‐collected data set on Silicon Valley start‐ups, we find that venture capital is related to a variety of professionalization measures, such as human resource policies, the adoption of stock option plans, and the hiring of a marketing VP. Venture‐capital‐backed companies are also more likely and faster to replace the founder with an outside CEO, both in situations that appear adversarial and those mutually agreed to. The evidence suggests that venture capitalists play roles over and beyond those of traditional financial intermediaries.