The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Search results: 5.
Big Bad Banks? The Winners and Losers from Bank Deregulation in the United States
Published: 9/21/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01589.x | Cited by: 3195
THORSTEN BECK, ROSS LEVINE, ALEXEY LEVKOV
We assess the impact of bank deregulation on the distribution of income in the United States. From the 1970s through the 1990s, most states removed restrictions on intrastate branching, which intensified bank competition and improved bank performance. Exploiting the cross‐state, cross‐time variation in the timing of branch deregulation, we find that deregulation materially tightened the distribution of income by boosting incomes in the lower part of the income distribution while having little impact on incomes above the median. Bank deregulation tightened the distribution of income by increasing the relative wage rates and working hours of unskilled workers.
Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach
Published: 3/17/2014, Volume: 69, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12123 | Cited by: 191
THORSTEN BECK, CHEN LIN, YUE MA
Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.
Financial and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter?
Published: 2/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00727.x | Cited by: 1746
THORSTEN BECK, ASLI DEMIRGÜÇ‐KUNT, VOJISLAV MAKSIMOVIC
Using a unique firm‐level survey database covering 54 countries, we investigate the effect of financial, legal, and corruption problems on firms' growth rates. Whether these factors constrain growth depends on firm size. It is consistently the smallest firms that are most constrained. Financial and institutional development weakens the constraining effects of financial, legal, and corruption obstacles and it is again the small firms that benefit the most. There is only a weak relation between firms' perception of the quality of the courts in their country and firm growth. We also provide evidence that the corruption of bank officials constrains firm growth.
Managerial Incentives in a Stock Market Economy
Published: 12/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03609.x | Cited by: 14
PAUL J. BECK, THOMAS S. ZORN
This study presents an analysis of the managerial incentive problem in a stock market economy in which incentive contracts are structured in terms of security ownership. In our model, the manager's ownership share signals effort and is determined endogenously as the solution to a special portfolio decision problem. Managerial investment in the firm is evaluated under various security pricing arrangements. Our analysis indicates that, in general, stockholders should sell shares to a manager at a discount to ensure a Pareto efficient ownership (incentive) structure. However, efficient pricing (discount) schedules generally are nonlinear and, in many respects, isomorphic to discriminating price functions which have been considered in neoclassical models of monopoly.
Pockets of Predictability: A Replication
Published: 8/25/2025, Volume: 80, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13484 | Cited by: 8
NUSRET CAKICI, CHRISTIAN FIEBERG, TOBIAS NEUMAIER, THORSTEN PODDIG, ADAM ZAREMBA
Farmer, Schmidt, and Timmermann (FST) document time‐variation in market return predictability, identifying “pockets” of significant predictability through kernel regressions. However, our analysis reveals a critical discrepancy between the method outlined by FST and the code actually implemented. Instead of using a one‐sided kernel, which guarantees out‐of‐sample forecasts, they perform in‐sample estimation with a two‐sided kernel. As a result, future information leaks into the forecasting model, undermining its reliability. Rectifying this error qualitatively alters the findings, invalidating most conclusions of the FST study. Thus, attempts to exploit such “pockets”—should they exist—offer little help in forecasting market returns.