The Journal of Finance

Why Do Firms Evade Taxes? The Role of Information Sharing and Financial Sector Outreach

Published: 11/18/2013   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12123

THORSTEN BECK, CHEN LIN, YUE MA

Tax evasion is a widespread phenomenon across the globe and even an important factor in the ongoing sovereign debt crisis. We show that firms in countries with better credit information–sharing systems and higher branch penetration evade taxes to a lesser degree. This effect is stronger for smaller firms, firms in smaller cities and towns, firms in industries relying more on external financing, and firms in industries and countries with greater growth potential. This effect is robust to instrumental variable analysis, controlling for firm fixed effects in a smaller panel data set of countries, and many other robustness tests.

Regulatory Arbitrage and International Bank Flows

Published: 09/12/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01774.x

JOEL F. HOUSTON, CHEN LIN, YUE MA

We study whether cross‐country differences in regulations have affected international bank flows. We find strong evidence that banks have transferred funds to markets with fewer regulations. This form of regulatory arbitrage suggests there may be a destructive “race to the bottom” in global regulations, which restricts domestic regulators’ ability to limit bank risk‐taking. However, we also find that the links between regulation differences and bank flows are significantly stronger if the recipient country is a developed country with strong property rights and creditor rights. This suggests that, while differences in regulations have important influences, without a strong institutional environment, lax regulations are not enough to encourage massive capital flows.

The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging

Published: 09/21/2011   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01683.x

MURILLO CAMPELLO, CHEN LIN, YUE MA, HONG ZOU

We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand‐collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax‐based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels—cost of borrowing and investment restrictions—through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The analysis shows that hedging has a first‐order effect on firm financing and investment, and provides new insights into how hedging affects corporate value. More broadly, our study contributes novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.

The Legal Origins of Financial Development: Evidence from the Shanghai Concessions

Published: 10/03/2023   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13284

ROSS LEVINE, CHEN LIN, CHICHENG MA, YUCHEN XU

The primary challenge to assessing the legal origins view of comparative financial development is identifying exogenous changes in legal systems. We assemble new data on Shanghai's British and French concessions between 1845 and 1936. Two regime changes altered British and French legal jurisdiction over their respective concessions. By examining the changing application of different legal traditions to adjacent neighborhoods within the same city and controlling for military, economic, and political characteristics, we offer new evidence consistent with the legal origins view: the financial development advantage in the British concession widened after Western legal jurisdiction intensified and narrowed after it abated.