The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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The World Price of Insider Trading

Published: 2/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00416  |  Cited by: 916

Utpal Bhattacharya, Hazem Daouk

The existence and the enforcement of insider trading laws in stock markets is a phenomenon of the 1990s. A study of the 103 countries that have stock markets reveals that insider trading laws exist in 87 of them, but enforcement—as evidenced by prosecutions—has taken place in only 38 of them. Before 1990, the respective numbers were 34 and 9. We find that the cost of equity in a country, after controlling for a number of other variables, does not change after the introduction of insider trading laws, but decreases significantly after the first prosecution.


Do Women Receive Worse Financial Advice?

Published: 7/5/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13366  |  Cited by: 23

UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, AMIT KUMAR, SUJATA VISARIA, JING ZHAO

We arranged for trained undercover men and women to pose as potential clients and visit all 65 local financial advisory firms in Hong Kong. At financial planning firms, but not at securities firms, women were more likely than men to receive advice to buy only individual or only local securities. Female clients who signaled high confidence, high risk tolerance, or a domestic outlook were especially likely to receive this suboptimal advice. Our theoretical model explains these patterns as a result of statistical discrimination interacting with advisors’ incentives. Taste‐based discrimination is unlikely to explain the results.


Conflicting Family Values in Mutual Fund Families

Published: 1/11/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01797.x  |  Cited by: 152

UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, JUNG H. LEE, VERONIKA K. POOL

We analyze the investment behavior of affiliated funds of mutual funds (AFoMFs), which are mutual funds that can only invest in other funds in the family, and are offered by most large families. Though never mentioned in any prospectus, we discover that AFoMFs provide an insurance pool against temporary liquidity shocks to other funds in the family. We show that, though the family benefits because funds can avoid fire sales, the cost of this insurance is borne by the investors in the AFoMFs. The paper thus uncovers some of the hidden complexities of fiduciary responsibility in mutual fund families.


The (Missing) Relation between Acquisition Announcement Returns and Value Creation

Published: 4/7/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70038  |  Cited by: 5

ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, RUIDI HUANG, STACEY JACOBSEN

Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) computed around acquisition announcements are widely considered to be market‐based assessments of expected value creation. We show, however, that announcement returns do not correlate with commonly used and new measures of ex post outcomes. A simple characteristics‐based model using standard information known at the announcement date can predict these outcomes reasonably well, yet CAR even fails to capture the predictions from this model. Evidence suggests that information about the stand‐alone acquirer dominates CAR, making it virtually impossible to extract deal‐related information. We conclude that CAR is an unreliable measure of expected value creation.


Notes on Multiperiod Valuation and the Pricing of Options: A Reply

Published: 3/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03883.x  |  Cited by: 1

SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA


Notes on Multiperiod Valuation and the Pricing of Options

Published: 3/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03541.x  |  Cited by: 25

SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA

A mean‐variance risk‐return tradeoff relationship is derived for the diffusion process limiting case of a state‐preference model, with aggregate consumption serving as a pivotal variable. The model is compared to other recent models along the dimensions of generality and tractable implementation. The incorporation of stochastic interest rates in general equilibrium and arbitrage‐based valuation models is examined, and an extension to earlier methods is discussed, in connection with the implementation of “robust” general valuation procedures.


Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard

Published: 5/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03559.x  |  Cited by: 35

SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA


PROJECT VALUATION WITH MEAN‐REVERTING CASH FLOW STREAMS

Published: 12/1978,  Volume: 33,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03422.x  |  Cited by: 44

Sudipto Bhattacharya


Discussion

Published: 5/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02096.x  |  Cited by: 0

SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA


Insider Trading, Investment, and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis

Published: 6/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00359  |  Cited by: 51

Sudipto Bhattacharya, Giovanna Nicodano

We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto efficient, because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff‐relevant information via prices—arising from insider trading—benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving risk‐sharing among them.


On Timing and Selectivity

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04536.x  |  Cited by: 146

ANAT R. ADMATI, SUDIPTO BHATTACHARYA, PAUL PFLEIDERER, STEPHEN A. ROSS

The dichotomy between timing ability and the ability to select individual assets has been widely used in discussing investment performance measurement. This paper discusses the conceptual and econometric problems associated with defining and measuring timing and selectivity. In defining these notions we attempt to capture their intuitive interpretation. We offer two basic modeling approaches, which we term the portfolio approach and the factor approach. We show how the quality of timing and selectivity information can be identified statistically in a number of simple models, and discuss some of the econometric issues associated with these models. In particular, a simple quadratic regression is shown to be valid in measuring timing information.