The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Risk Sharing and Asset Prices: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Published: 6/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00663.x | Cited by: 250
Anusha Chari, Peter Blair Henry
When countries liberalize their stock markets, firms that become eligible for foreign purchase (investible), experience an average stock price revaluation of 15.1%. Since the historical covariance of the average investible firm's stock return with the local market is roughly 200 times larger than its historical covariance with the world market, liberalization reduces the systematic risk associated with holding investible securities. Consistent with this fact: (1) the average effect of the reduction in systematic risk is 6.8 percentage points, or roughly two fifths of the total revaluation; and (2) the firm‐specific revaluations are directly proportional to the firm‐specific changes in systematic risk.
Adverse Selection in a Model of Real Estate Lending
Published: 6/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb05069.x | Cited by: 40
V. V. CHARI, RAVI JAGANNATHAN
We provide a rationale for the presence of points in mortgage loan contracts. Our analysis builds on two key features. First, insurance markets are unavailable for labor income. Second, the “due‐on‐sale” clause allows banks to offer loan contracts which partially insure against fluctuations in labor income. If explicit prepayment penalties are prohibited by law, points serve effectively as prepayment penalties. We also examine environments where such penalties are not prohibited and show that points will be used if interest rates cannot depend on the size of the loan.
Banking Panics, Information, and Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Published: 7/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04606.x | Cited by: 372
V. V. CHARI, RAVI JAGANNATHAN
This paper shows that bank runs can be modeled as an equilibrium phenomenon. We demonstrate that some aspects of the intuitive “story” that bank runs start with fears of insolvency of banks can be rigorously modeled. If individuals observe long “lines” at the bank, they correctly infer that there is a possibility that the bank is about to fail and precipitate a bank run. However, bank runs occur even when no one has any adverse information. Extra market constraints such as suspension of convertibility can prevent bank runs and result in superior allocations.