The Journal of Finance

“Time for a Change”: Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks

Published: 09/21/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01596.x

VASSO IOANNIDOU, STEVEN ONGENA

This paper studies loan conditions when firms switch banks. Recent theoretical work on bank–firm relationships motivates our matching models. The dynamic cycle of the loan rate that we uncover is as follows: a loan granted by a new (outside) bank carries a loan rate that is significantly lower than the rates on comparable new loans from the firm's current (inside) banks. The new bank initially decreases the loan rate further but eventually ratchets it up sharply. Other loan conditions follow a similar economically relevant pattern. This bank strategy is consistent with the existence of hold‐up costs in bank–firm relationships.

(Why) Do Central Banks Care about Their Profits?

Published: 06/22/2023   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13257

IGOR GONCHAROV, VASSO IOANNIDOU, MARTIN C. SCHMALZ

We document that central banks are discontinuously more likely to report slightly positive profits than slightly negative profits, especially when political pressure is greater, the public is more receptive to extreme political views, and central bank governors are eligible for reappointment. The propensity to report small profits over small losses is correlated with higher inflation and lower interest rates. We conclude that there are agency problems at central banks, which give rise to discontinuous profit incentives that correlate with central banks’ policy choices and outcomes. These findings inform the debate about the political economy of central banking and central bank design.