The Journal of Finance

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL

Published: 06/01/1978   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02027.x

Andrew H. Chen

MULTI‐NATIONAL BANKS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

Published: 05/01/1973   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01788.x

Andrew F. Brimmer

Money Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution

Published: 09/01/1984   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03889.x

ANDREW B. LYON

This paper analyzes the effects of a share valuation technique, amortized cost valuation, on institutional money market funds (MMFs) and their investors. The possibility of arbitrage between securities priced at market value and amortized MMFs is investigated. It is found that significant dilution has taken place as a result of this valuation technique. Losses per share have been about 10 basis points per year. Evidence that arbitrageurs will take advantage of a misvaluation of the MMF and cause losses to other shareholders may suggest that some investors should reconsider the desirability of amortized MMFs for their investments.

Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00625.x

Andrea L. Eisfeldt

This paper analyzes a model in which long‐term risky assets are illiquid due to adverse selection. The degree of adverse selection and hence the liquidity of these assets is determined endogenously by the amount of trade for reasons other than private information. I find that higher productivity leads to increased liquidity. Moreover, liquidity magnifies the effects of changes in productivity on investment and volume. High productivity implies that investors initiate larger scale risky projects which increases the riskiness of their incomes. Riskier incomes induce more sales of claims to high‐quality projects, causing liquidity to increase.

The Limits of Arbitrage

Published: 04/18/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x

Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny

Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.

Financial Protectionism? First Evidence

Published: 06/20/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12184

ANDREW K. ROSE, TOMASZ WIELADEK

We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.

Investor Sentiment and the Closed‐End Fund Puzzle

Published: 03/01/1991   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03746.x

CHARLES M. C. LEE, ANDREI SHLEIFER, RICHARD H. THALER

This paper examines the proposition that fluctuations in discounts of closed‐end funds are driven by changes in individual investor sentiment. The theory implies that discounts on various funds move together, that new funds get started when seasoned funds sell at a premium or a small discount, and that discounts are correlated with prices of other securities affected by the same investor sentiment. The evidence supports these predictions. In particular, we find that both closed‐end funds and small stocks tend to be held by individual investors, and that the discounts on closed‐end funds narrow when small stocks do well.

Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00180

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Andrew A. Samwick

We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance‐based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.

Sell‐Side School Ties

Published: 07/15/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01574.x

LAUREN COHEN, ANDREA FRAZZINI, CHRISTOPHER MALLOY

We study the impact of social networks on agents’ ability to gather superior information about firms. Exploiting novel data on the educational background of sell‐side analysts and senior corporate officers, we find that analysts outperform by up to 6.60% per year on their stock recommendations when they have an educational link to the company. Pre‐Reg FD, this school‐tie return premium is 9.36% per year, while post‐Reg FD it is nearly zero. In contrast, in an environment that did not change selective disclosure regulation (the U.K.), the school‐tie premium is large and significant over the entire sample period.

Money Doctors

Published: 07/03/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12188

NICOLA GENNAIOLI, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT VISHNY

We present a new model of investors delegating portfolio management to professionals based on trust. Trust in the manager reduces an investor's perception of the riskiness of a given investment, and allows managers to charge fees. Money managers compete for investor funds by setting fees, but because of trust, fees do not fall to costs. In equilibrium, fees are higher for assets with higher expected return, managers on average underperform the market net of fees, but investors nevertheless prefer to hire managers to investing on their own. When investors hold biased expectations, trust causes managers to pander to investor beliefs.

Is Proprietary Trading Detrimental to Retail Investors?

Published: 02/02/2018   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12609

FALKO FECHT, ANDREAS HACKETHAL, YIGITCAN KARABULUT

We study the conflict of interest that arises when a universal bank conducts proprietary trading alongside its retail banking services. Our data set contains the stock holdings of every German bank and those of their corresponding retail clients. We investigate (i) whether banks sell stocks from their proprietary portfolios to their retail customers, (ii) whether those stocks subsequently underperform, and (iii) whether retail customers of banks engaging in proprietary trading earn lower portfolio returns than their peers. We present affirmative evidence for all three questions and conclude that proprietary trading can, in fact, be detrimental to retail investors.

An Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps

Published: 07/01/1986   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04527.x

JAMES BICKSLER, ANDREW H. CHEN

Interest rate swaps, a financial innovation in recent years, are based upon the principle of comparative advantage. An interest rate swap is a useful tool for active liability management and for hedging against interest rate risk. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple economic analysis of interest rate swaps. Alternative uses of and the appropriate valuation procedure for interest rate swaps are described.

A Bayesian Approach to Real Options: The Case of Distinguishing between Temporary and Permanent Shocks

Published: 09/21/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01599.x

STEVEN R. GRENADIER, ANDREY MALENKO

Traditional real options models demonstrate the importance of the “option to wait” due to uncertainty over future shocks to project cash flows. However, there is often another important source of uncertainty: uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks. Adding Bayesian uncertainty over the permanence of past shocks augments the traditional option to wait with an additional “option to learn.” The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that in standard models. For example, investment may occur at a time of stable or decreasing cash flows, respond sluggishly to cash flow shocks, and depend on the timing of project cash flows.

A DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING APPROACH TO THE VALUATION OF WARRANTS*

Published: 12/01/1969   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01708.x

Andrew Houng‐Yhi Chen

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor

Published: 09/01/1995   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x

RAGHURAM RAJAN, ANDREW WINTON

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.

How to Discount Cashflows with Time‐Varying Expected Returns

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00715.x

ANDREW ANG, JUN LIU

While many studies document that the market risk premium is predictable and that betas are not constant, the dividend discount model ignores time‐varying risk premiums and betas. We develop a model to consistently value cashflows with changing risk‐free rates, predictable risk premiums, and conditional betas in the context of a conditional CAPM. Practical valuation is accomplished with an analytic term structure of discount rates, with different discount rates applied to expected cashflows at different horizons. Using constant discount rates can produce large misvaluations, which, in portfolio data, are mostly driven at short horizons by market risk premiums and at long horizons by time variation in risk‐free rates and factor loadings.

Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence

Published: 09/04/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01272.x

SHMUEL BARUCH, G. ANDREW KAROLYI, MICHAEL L. LEMMON

We develop a new model of multimarket trading to explain the differences in the foreign share of trading volume of internationally cross‐listed stocks. The model predicts that the trading volume of a cross‐listed stock is proportionally higher on the exchange in which the cross‐listed asset returns have greater correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. We find robust empirical support for this prediction using stock return and volume data on 251 non‐U.S. stocks cross‐listed on major U.S. exchanges.

Frailty Correlated Default

Published: 09/28/2009   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01495.x

DARRELL DUFFIE, ANDREAS ECKNER, GUILLAUME HOREL, LEANDRO SAITA

The probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated under the standard assumption that default correlation arises only from exposure to observable risk factors. At the high confidence levels at which bank loan portfolio and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) default losses are typically measured for economic capital and rating purposes, conventionally based loss estimates are downward biased by a full order of magnitude on test portfolios. Our estimates are based on U.S. public nonfinancial firms between 1979 and 2004. We find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate available model of firm‐by‐firm default probabilities.

Valuation and Control in Venture Finance

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00337

Andrei A. Kirilenko

This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

Is the Real Interest Rate Stable?

Published: 12/01/1988   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03958.x

ANDREW K. ROSE

Univariate time‐series models for consumption, nominal interest rates, and prices each appear to have a single unit root before 1979. If nominal interest rates have a unit root but inflation and inflation forecast errors do not, then ex ante real interest rates have a unit root and are therefore nonstationary. This deduction does not depend on the properties of the unobservable ex post observed real return, which combines the ex ante real interest rate and inflation‐forecasting errors. The unit‐root characteristic of real interest rates is puzzling from at least two perspectives: many models imply that the growth rate of consumption and the real interest rate should have similar time‐series characteristics; also, nominal returns for other assets (e.g., stocks and bonds) appear to have different times‐series properties from those of treasury bills.