The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1878–1958*
Published: 12/01/1961 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb04240.x
David J. Ott
PREMIUMS ON CONVERTIBLE BONDS: COMMENT
Published: 09/01/1970 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00567.x
David Tell Duvel
The Price Elasticity of Demand for Whole Life Insurance
Published: 03/01/1985 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04946.x
DAVID F. BABBEL
In this study a real price index is created for whole life insurance sold in the United States from 1953 to 1979. New purchases of whole life insurance are shown to be negatively related to changes in this cost index, contrary to what has been widely accepted in the insurance literature, but consistent with economic theory. The existence of strong price elasticity of demand for whole life insurance does not ensure, however, that the insurance industry manifests a high degree of price competition.
Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends
Published: 12/01/1990 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03722.x
DAVID J. DENIS
This paper examines defensive payouts announced in response to hostile corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. Regardless of payout type, those firms remaining independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest experience an abnormal share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are substantial post‐contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and abnormally high rates of top management turnover.
The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating
Published: 11/25/2009 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01513.x
DAVID C. CICERO
I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.
COMMODITY TAXATION AND EQUITY
Published: 12/01/1961 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb04238.x
David G. Davies
Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining
Published: 05/07/2010 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x
DAVID A. MATSA
I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm‐level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.
IPO Underpricing over the Very Long Run
Published: 05/20/2009 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01468.x
DAVID CHAMBERS, ELROY DIMSON
A central measure of the efficiency of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market is the extent to which issues are underpriced. We present new and comprehensive evidence covering British IPOs since World War I. During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period from 1946 to 1986, and even more after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986. The post‐WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to changes in firm composition, and occurred in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters.
Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers
Published: 03/31/2007 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00202
G. David Haushalter
This paper studies the hedging policies of oil and gas producers between 1992 and 1994. My evidence shows that the extent of hedging is related to financing costs. In particular, companies with greater financial leverage manage price risks more extensively. My evidence also shows that the likelihood of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs and to the basis risk associated with hedging instruments. Larger companies and companies whose production is located primarily in regions where prices have a high correlation with the prices on which exchange‐traded derivatives are based are more likely to manage risks.
Portfolio Disclosures and Year‐End Price Shifts
Published: 04/18/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01121.x
DAVID K. MUSTO
Commercial paper sells at an extra discount if it matures in the next calendar year but Treasury bills do not. The discount is apparent in downward price shifts before the year‐end, and upward price shifts at the turn of the year that are significantly correlated with the simultaneous returns to small stocks, and that cannot reflect tax‐loss selling. Cross‐sectional and time‐series tests on prices, as well as low of funds evidence on trades by institutional investors, indicate that both the debt and equity patterns reflect agency problems related to portfolio disclosures.
REPLY
Published: 12/01/1959 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00143.x
David E. Novack