The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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DISCUSSION
Published: 07/01/1984 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03679.x
RONALD W. MASULIS
PROFIT PLANNING IN COMMERCIAL BANKS*
Published: 09/01/1966 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00264.x
Ronald L. Olson
ON ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN CREDIT UNIONS
Published: 09/01/1978 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02049.x
Ronald S. Koot
Are All Inside Directors the Same? Evidence from the External Directorship Market
Published: 05/23/2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01653.x
RONALD W. MASULIS, SHAWN MOBBS
Agency theory and optimal contracting theory posit opposing roles and shareholder wealth effects for corporate inside directors. We evaluate these theories using the market for outside directorships to differentiate among inside directors. Firms with inside directors holding outside directorships have better operating performance and market‐to‐book ratios, especially when monitoring is more difficult. These firms make better acquisition decisions, have greater cash holdings, and overstate earnings less often. Announcements of outside board appointments improve shareholder wealth, while departure announcements reduce it, consistent with these inside directors improving board performance and outside directorships being an important source of inside director incentives.
Alternative Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans
Published: 09/01/1993 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04765.x
RONALD BEST, HANG ZHANG
This paper examines the information content of bank loan agreements. We differentiate borrowers according to financial analysts' percentage earnings forecast errors and most recent forecast revisions. The empirical results suggest that banks rely on other indicators as initial screening devices to determine where to best deploy their evaluation and monitoring efforts. If these other indicators are reliable and signal‐improving prospects, banks do little further investigation. However, if the indicators are noisy and signal‐declining prospects, banks have incentives to expend resources to investigate the borrowers, resulting in the production of valuable information.
Mean Reversion across National Stock Markets and Parametric Contrarian Investment Strategies
Published: 12/17/2002 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00225
Ronald Balvers, Yangru Wu, Erik Gilliland
For U.S. stock prices, evidence of mean reversion over long horizons is mixed, possibly due to lack of a reliable long time series. Using additional cross‐sectional power gained from national stock index data of 18 countries during the period 1969 to 1996, we find strong evidence of mean reversion in relative stock index prices. Our findings imply a significantly positive speed of reversion with a half‐life of three to three and one‐half years. This result is robust to alternative specifications and data. Parametric contrarian investment strategies that fully exploit mean reversion across national indexes outperform buy‐and‐hold and standard contrarian strategies.
A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behavior
Published: 06/01/1986 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05049.x
RONALD M. GIAMMARINO, ROBERT L. HEINKEL
Several observed features of takeover contests appear to be inconsistent with value‐maximizing behavior on the part of the agents involved. For instance, managers occasionally resist takeover bids, presumably in order to facilitate competition among bidders. However, counterbids do not always materialize, suggesting that management resistance was not in the best interests of the firm's shareholders. On the other hand, a successful takeover is sometimes accompanied by a decrease in the value of the acquirer's shares. In addition, valuable combinations are occasionally not consummated.