Search results: 50.
Can Taxes Shape an Industry? Evidence from the Implementation of the “Amazon Tax”
Published: 5/24/2018, Volume: 73, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12687 | Cited by: 67
BRIAN BAUGH, ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, HOONSUK PARK
For years, online retailers have maintained a price advantage over brick‐and‐mortar retailers by not collecting sales tax at the time of sale. Recently, several states have required that online retailer Amazon collect sales tax during checkout. Using transaction‐level data, we document that households living in these states reduced their Amazon purchases by 9.4% following the implementation of the sales tax laws, implying elasticities of –1.2 to –1.4. The effect is stronger for large purchases, where purchases declined by 29.1%, corresponding to an elasticity of –3.9. Studying competitors in the electronics field, we find some evidence of substitution toward competing retailers.
Do ETFs Increase Volatility?
Published: 11/18/2018, Volume: 73, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12727 | Cited by: 590
ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, RABIH MOUSSAWI
Due to their low trading costs, exchange‐traded funds (ETFs) are a potential catalyst for short‐horizon liquidity traders. The liquidity shocks can propagate to the underlying securities through the arbitrage channel, and ETFs may increase the nonfundamental volatility of the securities in their baskets. We exploit exogenous changes in index membership and find that stocks with higher ETF ownership display significantly higher volatility. ETF ownership increases the negative autocorrelation in stock prices. The increase in volatility appears to introduce undiversifiable risk in prices because stocks with high ETF ownership earn a significant risk premium of up to 56 basis points monthly.
The (Missing) Relation between Acquisition Announcement Returns and Value Creation
Published: 4/7/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70038 | Cited by: 9
ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, UTPAL BHATTACHARYA, RUIDI HUANG, STACEY JACOBSEN
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) computed around acquisition announcements are widely considered to be market‐based assessments of expected value creation. We show, however, that announcement returns do not correlate with commonly used and new measures of ex post outcomes. A simple characteristics‐based model using standard information known at the announcement date can predict these outcomes reasonably well, yet CAR even fails to capture the predictions from this model. Evidence suggests that information about the stand‐alone acquirer dominates CAR, making it virtually impossible to extract deal‐related information. We conclude that CAR is an unreliable measure of expected value creation.
Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?
Published: 11/12/2013, Volume: 68, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12062 | Cited by: 135
ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, AUGUSTIN LANDIER, RABIH MOUSSAWI
We provide evidence suggesting that some hedge funds manipulate stock prices on critical reporting dates. Stocks in the top quartile of hedge fund holdings exhibit abnormal returns of 0.30% on the last day of the quarter and a reversal of 0.25% on the following day. A significant part of the return is earned during the last minutes of trading. Analysis of intraday volume and order imbalance provides further evidence consistent with manipulation. These patterns are stronger for funds that have higher incentives to improve their ranking relative to their peers.
The Politics of Foreclosures
Published: 11/19/2018, Volume: 73, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12725 | Cited by: 39
SUMIT AGARWAL, GENE AMROMIN, ITZHAK BEN‐DAVID, SERDAR DINC
The U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee considered many important banking reforms in 2009 to 2010. We show that, during this period, foreclosure starts on delinquent mortgages were delayed in the districts of committee members although there was no difference in delinquency rates between committee and noncommittee districts. In these areas, banks delayed the foreclosure starts by 0.5 months (relative to the 12‐month average). The estimated cost of delay to lenders is an order of magnitude greater than the campaign contributions by the political action committees of the largest mortgage servicing banks to the committee members in that period.
A Bayesian Approach to the Optimal Growth Period Problem: A Note
Published: 3/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03639.x | Cited by: 1
ITZHAK VENEZIA
The Effects of Inflation and Taxes on Growth Investments and Replacement Policies
Published: 12/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03838.x | Cited by: 9
MENACHEM BRENNER, ITZHAK VENEZIA
This paper investigates the effect of inflation and taxes on the optimal duration of investments. The main conclusion is that inflation does not always increase the duration of investments. For example, in the case of equipment with a short replacement cycle, increased inflation tends to decrease the duration of the cycle. Contrary to the common theoretical analysis, these results imply that inflation may increase some forms of capital investments.
Earnings Announcements and the Components of the Bid‐Ask Spread
Published: 9/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04078.x | Cited by: 197
ITZHAK KRINSKY, JASON LEE
This study investigates the behavior of the components of the bid‐ask spread around earnings announcements. We find that the adverse selection cost component significantly increases surrounding the announcements, while the inventory holding and order processing components significantly decline during the same periods. Our results suggest that the directional change in the total bid‐ask spread depends on the relative magnitudes of the changes in these three components. Specifically, the decreases in inventory holding costs and order processing costs imply that earnings announcements may have an insignificant impact on the total bid‐ask spread, even when they result in increased information asymmetry.
Effects of the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act: Evidence from Capital Markets
Published: 9/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb04887.x | Cited by: 20
JOSEPH AHARONY, ITZHAK SWARY
This study measures the effects of the 1970 amendment to the Bank Holding Company (BHC) Act on the profitability and risk of BHCs using capital market data. Differences in abnormal returns and risk among three portfolios of bank shares which differ in their regulatory status are examined in various periods preceding and following the enactment. No significant differences in performance and no change in the relative risk of any pair of portfolios were observed. Thus, the null hypothesis that the nonbank expansion provisions of the 1970 amendment had no effect on BHCs' risk and profitability cannot be rejected.
Quarterly Dividend and Earnings Announcements and Stockholders' Returns: An Empirical Analysis
Published: 3/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03466.x | Cited by: 663
JOSEPH AHARONY, ITZHAK SWARY
Returns and Risks of U.S. Bank Foreign Currency Activities
Published: 7/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04530.x | Cited by: 17
THEOHARRY GRAMMATIKOS, ANTHONY SAUNDERS, ITZHAK SWARY
In this paper the risks and returns on U.S. banks' foreign currency positions are analyzed in a portfolio setting when both exchange rate and foreign interest rate risks are present. It is shown that U.S. banks could achieve considerable reductions in risk by optimally selecting their foreign currency positions. Actual foreign currency portfolio returns generated from expected exchange rate changes and exchange rate surprises were positive on average but those generated from interest rate surprises were negative. Although the total portfolio returns were positive, on a risk‐adjusted basis bank return performance was relatively poor. Nevertheless, despite this relatively poor performance, the risk of ruin or failure for a “representative bank” from foreign currency activities was found to be approximately zero when judged in comparison to the capital funds available to large money center banks to cushion such losses.
An Analysis of Risk and Return Characteristics of Corporate Bankruptcy Using Capital Market Data
Published: 9/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb03516.x | Cited by: 78
JOSEPH AHARONY, CHARLES P. JONES, ITZHAK SWARY
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PENSION PLANNING A CHALLENGE TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
Published: 5/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01220.x | Cited by: 0
Ben B. Sutton
The Canadian Tax Reform and Its Effect on Stock Prices: A Note
Published: 12/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03850.x | Cited by: 14
BEN AMOAKO‐ADU
ON THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE THEOREM: REPLY
Published: 6/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00533.x | Cited by: 0
Haim Ben Shahar
Labor‐Technology Substitution: Implications for Asset Pricing
Published: 3/27/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12766 | Cited by: 107
MIAO BEN ZHANG
This paper studies the asset pricing implications of a firm's opportunities to replace routine‐task labor with automation. I develop a model in which firms optimally undertake such replacement when their productivity is low. Hence, firms with routine‐task labor maintain a replacement option that hedges their value against unfavorable macroeconomic shocks and lowers their expected returns. Using establishment‐level occupational data, I construct a measure of firms' share of routine‐task labor. Compared to their industry peers, firms with a higher share of routine‐task labor (i) invest more in machines and reduce more routine‐task labor during economic downturns, and (ii) have lower expected stock returns.
MEASURES OF RISK IN THE STOCK MARKET AND THE VALUATION OF CORPORATE STOCK*
Published: 9/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01433.x | Cited by: 0
Uri Ben‐Zion
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE COST OF CAPITAL: A SUGGESTED EXPOSITION*
Published: 9/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00846.x | Cited by: 2
Haim Ben‐Shahar
A SPECTRAL ANALYSIS OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MONEY STOCK AND CERTAIN ASSET MARKETS*
Published: 9/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02983.x | Cited by: 0
Ben Wilsman Bolch
MULTIDIMENSIONAL RISK AND THE MODIGLIANI‐MILLER HYPOTHESIS: COMMENT
Published: 9/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00933.x | Cited by: 0
Uri Ben‐Zion
BID‐ASKED SPREADS ON THE AMEX AND THE BIG BOARD
Published: 3/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03249.x | Cited by: 88
Ben Branch, Walter Freed
Long‐Run Risk: Is It There?
Published: 4/14/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13126 | Cited by: 46
YUKUN LIU, BEN MATTHIES
This paper documents the existence of a persistent component in consumption growth. We take a novel approach using news coverage to capture investor concern about economic growth prospects. We provide evidence that consumption growth is highly predictable over long horizons—our measure explains between 23% and 38% of cumulative future consumption growth at the five‐year horizon and beyond. Furthermore, we show a strong connection between this predictability and asset prices. Innovations to our measure price 51 standard portfolios in the cross section and our one‐factor model outperforms many benchmark macro‐ and return‐based multifactor models.
REINVESTMENT AND THE RATE OF RETURN ON COMMON STOCKS*
Published: 12/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00279.x | Cited by: 0
Haim Ben‐Shahar, Marshall Sarnat
THE TERM‐STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES AND EXPECTATIONS OF PRICE INCREASE AND DEVALUATION
Published: 6/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01379.x | Cited by: 0
H. Ben‐Shahar, A. Cukierman
Economic Stimulus at the Expense of Routine‐Task Jobs
Published: 10/4/2021, Volume: 76, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13080 | Cited by: 55
SELALE TUZEL, MIAO BEN ZHANG
Do investment tax incentives improve job prospects for workers? We explore states' adoption of a major federal tax incentive that accelerates the depreciation of equipment investments for eligible firms but not for ineligible ones. Analyzing massive establishment‐level data sets on occupational employment and computer investment, we find that when states expand investment incentives, eligible firms immediately increase their equipment and skilled employees; whereas they reduce routine‐task employees after a delay of up to two years. These opposing effects constitute an overall insignificant effect on the firms' total employment and shed light on the nuances of job creation through investment incentives.
Stock Market Crashes and the Performance of Circuit Breakers: Empirical Evidence
Published: 12/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05133.x | Cited by: 92
BENI LAUTERBACH, URI BEN‐ZION
This study examines the behavior of a small stock market with circuit breakers and with a one‐hour preauction order imbalance disclosure, during the October 1987 crash. The crash and its aftershocks lasted for a week and selling pressure was concentrated in higher beta, larger capitalization, and lower leverage firm stocks. Circuit breakers when implemented reduced the next‐day opening order imbalance and the initial price loss; however, they had no effect on the long‐run response. Some price overreaction and reversal phenomena also are documented.
Local Risk, Local Factors, and Asset Prices
Published: 1/12/2017, Volume: 72, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12465 | Cited by: 118
SELALE TUZEL, MIAO BEN ZHANG
Firm location affects firm risk through local factor prices. We find more procyclical factor prices such as wages and real estate prices in areas with more cyclical economies, namely, high “local beta” areas. While procyclical wages provide a natural hedge against aggregate shocks and reduce firm risk, procyclical prices of real estate, which are part of firm assets, increase firm risk. We confirm that firms located in higher local beta areas have lower industry‐adjusted returns and conditional betas, and show that the effect is stronger among firms with low real estate holdings. A production‐based equilibrium model explains these empirical findings.
SIZE, LEVERAGE, AND DIVIDEND RECORD AS DETERMINANTS OF EQUITY RISK
Published: 9/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01018.x | Cited by: 91
Uri Ben‐Zion, Sol S. Shalit
Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00185 | Cited by: 95
Charles Kahn, George Pennacchi, Ben Sopranzetti
Like security prices, retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and “even” fractions. However, explanations for security price clustering are incompatible with deposit rate clustering. A theory based on the limited recall of retail depositors is proposed. It predicts that banks tend to set rates at integers and that rates are “sticky” at these levels. The propensity for integer rates increases with the level of wholesale interest rates and deposit market concentration. When banks set noninteger rates, rates are more likely to be just above, rather than just below, integers. The paper finds substantial empirical support for the theory's implications.
What Explains the Stock Market's Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?
Published: 5/3/2005, Volume: 60, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00760.x | Cited by: 1890
BEN S. BERNANKE, KENNETH N. KUTTNER
This paper analyzes the impact of changes in monetary policy on equity prices, with the objectives of both measuring the average reaction of the stock market and understanding the economic sources of that reaction. We find that, on average, a hypothetical unanticipated 25‐basis‐point cut in the Federal funds rate target is associated with about a 1% increase in broad stock indexes. Adapting a methodology due to Campbell and Ammer, we find that the effects of unanticipated monetary policy actions on expected excess returns account for the largest part of the response of stock prices.
Institutional Investor Attention
Published: 1/16/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70009 | Cited by: 6
ALAN KWAN, YUKUN LIU, BEN MATTHIES
Using data on Internet news reading, we measure fund‐level attention to both aggregate and firm‐specific news and relate it to fund portfolio allocation decisions. In the time series, we find that funds shift attention toward macroeconomic news during periods of high aggregate volatility. Those funds that exhibit stronger attention‐reallocation patterns earn higher future returns. In the cross‐section of fund portfolios, fund attention is positively related to stock holdings. Furthermore, fund attention to a stock increases the value‐add of that position to the fund's performance. This relationship is stronger using fund attention to more value‐relevant news articles.
Testing Rationality in the Point Spread Betting Market
Published: 9/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02617.x | Cited by: 135
JOHN GANDAR, RICHARD ZUBER, THOMAS O'BRIEN, BEN RUSSO
This paper presents empirical tests of market rationality using data from the point spread betting market on National Football League games. Data from this market avoid many common pitfalls of tests of rationality in conventional financial markets. The authors test for rationality with two types of tests, statistical and economic. Results of the tests reveal that the statistical tests cannot reject market rationality while the economic tests do reject market rationality.
Political Polarization Affects Households' Financial Decisions: Evidence from Home Sales
Published: 2/11/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13315 | Cited by: 55
W. BEN MCCARTNEY, JOHN ORELLANA‐LI, CALVIN ZHANG
Political identity and partisanship are salient features of today's society. Using deeds records and voter rolls, we show that current residents are more likely to sell their homes when opposite‐party neighbors move in nearby than when unaffiliated or same‐party neighbors do. This is especially true when the new neighbors are politically active, consistent with an animosity between parties mechanism. We conclude that affective polarization is not limited to purely political settings and affects one of the household's most important financial decisions, their home transactions.
Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance
Published: 5/27/2020, Volume: 75, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12906 | Cited by: 272
DAVID HIRSHLEIFER
I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04539.x | Cited by: 0
DAVID FELDMAN
GROWTH STOCKS AND THE PETERSBURG PARADOX*
Published: 9/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04143.x | Cited by: 13
David Durand
Individual Investors and Volatility
Published: 7/19/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01668.x | Cited by: 318
THIERRY FOUCAULT, DAVID SRAER, DAVID J. THESMAR
We show that retail trading activity has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns, which suggests that retail investors behave as noise traders. To identify this effect, we use a reform of the French stock market that raises the relative cost of speculative trading for retail investors. The daily return volatility of the stocks affected by the reform falls by 20 basis points (a quarter of the sample standard deviation of the return volatility) relative to other stocks. For affected stocks, we also find a significant decrease in the magnitude of return reversals and the price impact of trades.
The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Partially Observable Economy
Published: 7/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04391.x | Cited by: 29
DAVID FELDMAN
This paper investigates the term structure of interest rates in a multiperiod production and exchange economy with incomplete information. Unable to observe their stochastic investment opportunities, investors engage in dynamic Bayesian inference. This results in the endogenous identification of a more complex production function which generates a richer term structure, resembling the one that actual market prices imply. In addition, this paper introduces a characteristic function of the term structure and demonstrates that, in contrast with a fully observable economy, the widely investigated expectations hypothesis holds true only if interest rates are nonstochastic.
Transactions Costs and the Theory of Portfolio Selection
Published: 9/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01964.x | Cited by: 26
David Goldsmith
A Theoretical Model for Valuing Preferred Stock
Published: 9/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02288.x | Cited by: 19
DAVID EMANUEL
This paper develops a model of preferred stock value which includes the possibility of dividends on the preferred stock being omitted. The analytical framework used is based on the option‐hedging methodology of Black and Scholes. Precise valuation formulae are obtained for cumulative and noncumulative preferred stock in a variety of contexts. The values obtained are quite different from those for either riskless or risky perpetual bonds, which have previously been proposed as being similar to preferred stock.
Testing the Efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. Exchange Market under the Assumption of no Risk Premium
Published: 3/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03533.x | Cited by: 45
DAVID LONGWORTH
The efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. exchange market for the current float is examined more extensively than previously. Semi‐strong‐form tests which admit the lagged spot rate as a predictor are considered in addition to the standard weak‐form test. These stronger tests reject the joint null hypothesis of an efficient exchange market and no risk premium for the period ending in October 1976, although not for the entire period. For almost every year the current spot rate provided a better forecast of the future spot rate than did the current forward rate.
STATE OF THE FINANCE FIELD: FURTHER COMMENT
Published: 12/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00322.x | Cited by: 10
David Durand
MERGERS, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE THEORIES OF THE FIRM
Published: 3/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01368.x | Cited by: 0
David Gilbert
Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium
Published: 1/10/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01310.x | Cited by: 211
ALEXANDER DAVID
Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.
Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors
Published: 10/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x | Cited by: 624
DAVID YERMACK
I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross‐sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.
Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements
Published: 6/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04809.x | Cited by: 622
DAVID YERMACK
This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03648.x | Cited by: 0
DAVID EMANUEL
A QUARTERLY SERIES OF CORPORATE BASIC YIELDS, 1952–57, AND SOME ATTENDANT RESERVATIONS*
Published: 9/1958, Volume: 13, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04200.x | Cited by: 3
David Durand
Political Connections and Allocative Distortions
Published: 1/7/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12751 | Cited by: 296
DAVID SCHOENHERR
Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints members of his networks as CEOs of state‐owned firms that act as intermediaries in allocating government contracts to private firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. Contracts allocated to connected private firms are executed systematically worse and exhibit more frequent cost increases through renegotiations.