The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Sufficient Conditions for Public Information to Have Social Value in a Production and Exchange Economy
Published: 09/01/1982 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03593.x
J. GREGORY KUNKEL
Conditions are derived under which all consumers in a production and exchange economy will prefer (at least weakly) disclosure of public information to no such disclosure. The conditions involve consumer endowments, the allocative efficiency of the financial market, and value maximizing behavior by firms. Cases exist where consumers will prefer disclosure of public information in a production and exchange economy, although they would be indifferent to such disclosure in an otherwise similar pure exchange economy. The difference in results is due purely to the fact that in production and exchange economies, information may be used to reallocate resources across time and firms, thus highlighting the fundamental difference between the role of information in pure exchange and in production and exchange economies.
Sufficient and Necessary Conditions for Information to have Social Value in Pure Exchange
Published: 12/01/1982 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03610.x
NILS H. HAKANSSON, J. GREGORY KUNKEL, JAMES A. OHLSON
This paper extends, corrects, and unifies earlier statements concerning the social value of public information as well as the no‐trading conditions in pure exchange. Sufficient and necessary conditions are provided for both the single‐period and two‐period cases in a postsignal trading model. The social value of information is shown to be closely linked to the allocational efficiency of the market, the degree of homogeneity of prior beliefs, and of information structures, the time‐additivity of preferences, and the efficiency of endowments. We conclude that the case in favor of public information is much stronger than previously suggested.