The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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Habit Formation and Macroeconomic Models of the Term Structure of Interest Rates

Published: 11/28/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01299.x

ANDREA BURASCHI, ALEXEI JILTSOV

This paper introduces a new class of nonaffine models of the term structure of interest rates that is supported by an economy with habit formation. Distinguishing features of the model are that the interest rate dynamics are nonlinear, interest rates depend on lagged monetary and consumption shocks, and the price of risk is not a constant multiple of interest rate volatility. We find that habit persistence can help reproduce the nonlinearity of the spot rate process, the documented deviations from the expectations hypothesis, the persistence of the conditional volatility of interest rates, and the lead‐lag relationship between interest rates and monetary aggregates.


Economic Links and Predictable Returns

Published: 07/19/2008   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01379.x

LAUREN COHEN, ANDREA FRAZZINI

This paper finds evidence of return predictability across economically linked firms. We test the hypothesis that in the presence of investors subject to attention constraints, stock prices do not promptly incorporate news about economically related firms, generating return predictability across assets. Using a data set of firms' principal customers to identify a set of economically related firms, we show that stock prices do not incorporate news involving related firms, generating predictable subsequent price moves. A long–short equity strategy based on this effect yields monthly alphas of over 150 basis points.


Attracting Attention: Cheap Managerial Talk and Costly Market Monitoring

Published: 05/09/2008   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01361.x

ANDRES ALMAZAN, SANJAY BANERJI, ADOLFO DE MOTTA

We provide a theory of informal communication—cheap talk—between firms and capital markets that incorporates the role of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. The analysis suggests that a policy of discretionary disclosure that encourages managers to attract the market's attention when the firm is substantially undervalued can create shareholder value. The theory also relates the credibility of managerial announcements to the use of stock‐based compensation, the presence of informed trading, and the liquidity of the stock. Our results are consistent with the existence of positive announcement effects produced by apparently innocuous corporate events (e.g., stock dividends, name changes).


Model Comparison with Transaction Costs

Published: 03/20/2023   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13225

ANDREW DETZEL, ROBERT NOVY‐MARX, MIHAIL VELIKOV

Failing to account for transaction costs materially impacts inferences drawn when evaluating asset pricing models, biasing tests in favor of those employing high‐cost factors. Ignoring transaction costs, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015, Review of Financial Studies, 28, 650–705) q‐factor model and Barillas and Shanken (2018, TheJournal of Finance, 73, 715–754) six‐factor models have high maximum squared Sharpe ratios and small alphas across 205 anomalies. They do not, however, come close to spanning the achievable mean‐variance efficient frontier. Accounting for transaction costs, the Fama and French (2015, Journal of Financial Economics, 116, 1–22; 2018, Journal of Financial Economics, 128, 234–252) five‐factor model has a significantly higher squared Sharpe ratio than either of these alternative models, while variations employing cash profitability perform better still.


Brokers and Order Flow Leakage: Evidence from Fire Sales

Published: 08/09/2019   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12840

ANDREA BARBON, MARCO DI MAGGIO, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, AUGUSTIN LANDIER

Using trade‐level data, we study whether brokers play a role in spreading order flow information in the stock market. We focus on large portfolio liquidations that result in temporary price drops, and identify the brokers who intermediate these trades. These brokers’ clients are more likely to predate on the liquidating funds than to provide liquidity. Predation leads to profits of about 25 basis points over 10 days and increases the liquidation costs of the distressed fund by 40%. This evidence suggests a role of information leakage in exacerbating fire sales.


A MODEL OF WARRANT PRICING IN A DYNAMIC MARKET

Published: 12/01/1970   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00867.x

Andrew H. Y. Chen


Model Uncertainty and Option Markets with Heterogeneous Beliefs

Published: 01/11/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01006.x

ANDREA BURASCHI, ALEXEI JILTSOV

This paper provides option pricing and volume implications for an economy with heterogeneous agents who face model uncertainty and have different beliefs on expected returns. Market incompleteness makes options nonredundant, while heterogeneity creates a link between differences in beliefs and option volumes. We solve for both option prices and volumes and test the joint empirical implications using S&P500 index option data. Specifically, we use survey data to build an Index of Dispersion in Beliefs and find that a model that takes information heterogeneity into account can explain the dynamics of option volume and the smile better than can reduced‐form models with stochastic volatility.


The Value of Financial Flexibility

Published: 09/10/2008   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01397.x

ANDREA GAMBA, ALEXANDER TRIANTIS

We develop a model that endogenizes dynamic financing, investment, and cash retention/payout policies in order to analyze the effect of financial flexibility on firm value. We show that the value of financing flexibility depends on the costs of external financing, the level of corporate and personal tax rates that determine the effective cost of holding cash, the firm's growth potential and maturity, and the reversibility of capital. Through simulations, we demonstrate that firms facing financing frictions should simultaneously borrow and lend, and we examine the nature of dynamic debt and liquidity policies and the value associated with corporate liquidity.


The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading

Published: 07/01/1989   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04385.x

J. BRADFORD DE LONG, ANDREI SHLEIFER, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, ROBERT J. WALDMANN

Recent empirical research has identified a significant amount of volatility in stock prices that cannot easily be explained by changes in fundamentals; one interpretation is that asset prices respond not only to news but also to irrational “noise trading.” We assess the welfare effects and incidence of such noice trading using an overlapping‐generations model that gives investors short horizons. We find that the additional risk generated by noise trading can reduce the capital stock and consumption of the economy, and we show that part of that cost may be borne by rational investors. We conclude that the welfare costs of noise trading may be large if the magnitude of noise in aggregate stock prices is as large as suggested by some of the recent empirical litrature on the excess volatility of the market.


THE EFFECTS OF TAX POLICY ON CAPITAL FORMATION, CORPORATE LIQUIDITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INVESTIBLE FUNDS: A SIMULATION STUDY

Published: 05/01/1976   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01887.x

Andrew F. Brimmer, Allen Sinai


Rational Expectations and the Measurement of a Stock's Elasticity of Demand

Published: 09/01/1984   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03896.x

FRANKLIN ALLEN, ANDREW POSTLEWAITE

Scholes [1] considered the effect of secondary sales of large blocks of stock on the price of the stock. However, he only looked at price changes occurring just before and just after the sale took place. It is argued here, using a simple model, that if traders have rational expectations they may anticipate the sale, and prices could reflect this possibility long before it actually occurs. To determine the full effect, it may therefore be necessary to consider the price path many months, or even years, before the sale.


Financial Contracting and Organizational Form: Evidence from the Regulation of Trade Credit

Published: 08/04/2016   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12439

EMILY BREZA, ANDRES LIBERMAN

We present evidence that restrictions to the set of feasible financial contracts affect buyer‐supplier relationships and the organizational form of the firm. We exploit a regulation that restricted the maturity of the trade credit contracts that a large retailer could sign with some of its small suppliers. Using a within‐product difference‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find that the restriction reduces the likelihood of trade by 11%. The retailer also responds by internalizing procurement to its own subsidiaries and reducing overall purchases. Finally, we find that relational contracts can mitigate the inability to extend long trade credit terms.


Corporate Ownership Around the World

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00115

Rafael Porta, Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer

We use data on ownership structures of large corporations in 27 wealthy economies to identify the ultimate controlling shareholders of these firms. We find that, except in economies with very good shareholder protection, relatively few of these firms are widely held, in contrast to Berle and Means's image of ownership of the modern corporation. Rather, these firms are typically controlled by families or the State. Equity control by financial institutions is far less common. The controlling shareholders typically have power over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights, primarily through the use of pyramids and participation in management.


A Nonparametric Approach to Pricing and Hedging Derivative Securities Via Learning Networks

Published: 07/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb00081.x

JAMES M. HUTCHINSON, ANDREW W. LO, TOMASO POGGIO

We propose a nonparametric method for estimating the pricing formula of a derivative asset using learning networks. Although not a substitute for the more traditional arbitrage‐based pricing formulas, network‐pricing formulas may be more accurate and computationally more efficient alternatives when the underlying asset's price dynamics are unknown, or when the pricing equation associated with the no‐arbitrage condition cannot be solved analytically. To assess the potential value of network pricing formulas, we simulate Black‐Scholes option prices and show that learning networks can recover the Black‐Scholes formula from a two‐year training set of daily options prices, and that the resulting network formula can be used successfully to both price and delta‐hedge options out‐of‐sample. For comparison, we estimate models using four popular methods: ordinary least squares, radial basis function networks, multilayer perceptron networks, and projection pursuit. To illustrate the practical relevance of our network pricing approach, we apply it to the pricing and delta‐hedging of S&P 500 futures options from 1987 to 1991.


The Limits of Arbitrage

Published: 04/18/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03807.x

Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny

Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.


Financial Protectionism? First Evidence

Published: 06/20/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12184

ANDREW K. ROSE, TOMASZ WIELADEK

We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.


MULTI‐NATIONAL BANKS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES

Published: 05/01/1973   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01788.x

Andrew F. Brimmer


Money Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution

Published: 09/01/1984   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03889.x

ANDREW B. LYON

This paper analyzes the effects of a share valuation technique, amortized cost valuation, on institutional money market funds (MMFs) and their investors. The possibility of arbitrage between securities priced at market value and amortized MMFs is investigated. It is found that significant dilution has taken place as a result of this valuation technique. Losses per share have been about 10 basis points per year. Evidence that arbitrageurs will take advantage of a misvaluation of the MMF and cause losses to other shareholders may suggest that some investors should reconsider the desirability of amortized MMFs for their investments.


Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00625.x

Andrea L. Eisfeldt

This paper analyzes a model in which long‐term risky assets are illiquid due to adverse selection. The degree of adverse selection and hence the liquidity of these assets is determined endogenously by the amount of trade for reasons other than private information. I find that higher productivity leads to increased liquidity. Moreover, liquidity magnifies the effects of changes in productivity on investment and volume. High productivity implies that investors initiate larger scale risky projects which increases the riskiness of their incomes. Riskier incomes induce more sales of claims to high‐quality projects, causing liquidity to increase.


SOME STUDIES IN MONETARY POLICY, INTEREST RATES, AND THE INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES*

Published: 12/01/1958   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04224.x

Andrew Felton Brimmer



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