The Journal of Finance

Do Spin‐offs Expropriate Wealth from Bondholders?

Published: 09/11/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00598

William F. Maxwell, Ramesh P. Rao

A wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders is one of several hypotheses used to explain stockholder gains on the announcement of a spin‐off. However, previous empirical research has not found systematic evidence supporting the wealth expropriation hypothesis. Using a larger sample with comprehensive bond data, we find evidence consistent with wealth expropriation. Bondholders, on average, suffer a significant negative abnormal return during the month of the spin‐off announcement. However, even accounting for the loss to the bondholders, the aggregate value of the publicly traded debt and equity increases on a spin‐off announcement, suggesting that the wealth expropriation hypothesis is not a complete explanation of the stockholder gains. In explaining the magnitude of the losses to bondholders, we find they are a function of the loss in collateral in the spun‐off subsidiary and the level of financial risk of the parent firm. Consistent with a loss to bondholders, firms are more likely to have their credit rating downgraded than upgraded after a spin‐off. Additionally, consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, losses to bondholders tend to be more severe, the larger the gains to shareholders.

The Wealth Effects of Repurchases on Bondholders

Published: 03/21/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00550

William F. Maxwell, Clifford P. Stephens

Prior research has documented positive abnormal stock returns around the announcements of repurchase programs; several explanations of these returns have been suggested, including signaling, free cash flow, and wealth redistributions. This study analyzes abnormal stock, bond, and firm returns around repurchase announcements to examine these hypotheses. We find evidence consistent with both signaling and wealth redistribution. The loss to bondholders is a function of the size of the repurchase, and the risk of the firm's debt. We also find that bond ratings are twice as likely to be downgraded as upgraded after the announcement of the repurchase program.

Refinancing Risk and Cash Holdings

Published: 12/12/2013   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12133

JARRAD HARFORD, SANDY KLASA, WILLIAM F. MAXWELL

We find that firms mitigate refinancing risk by increasing their cash holdings and saving cash from cash flows. The maturity of firms’ long‐term debt has shortened markedly, and this shortening explains a large fraction of the increase in cash holdings over time. Consistent with the inference that cash reserves are particularly valuable for firms with refinancing risk, we document that the value of these reserves is higher for such firms and that they mitigate underinvestment problems. Our findings imply that refinancing risk is a key determinant of cash holdings and highlight the interdependence of a firm's financial policy decisions.

Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

Published: 05/14/2018   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12694

HENDRIK BESSEMBINDER, STACEY JACOBSEN, WILLIAM MAXWELL, KUMAR VENKATARAMAN

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.

An Examination of Long‐Term Abnormal Stock Returns and Operating Performance Following R&D Increases

Published: 03/25/2004   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00644.x

Allan C. Eberhart, William F. Maxwell, Akhtar R. Siddique

We examine a sample of 8,313 cases, between 1951 and 2001, where firms unexpectedly increase their research and development (R&D) expenditures by a significant amount. We find consistent evidence of a misreaction, as manifested in the significantly positive abnormal stock returns that our sample firms' shareholders experience following these increases. We also find consistent evidence that our sample firms experience significantly positive long‐term abnormal operating performance following their R&D increases. Our findings suggest that R&D increases are beneficial investments, and that the market is slow to recognize the extent of this benefit (consistent with investor underreaction).