The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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Search results: 16.

DISCUSSION

Published: 06/01/1978   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02016.x

Willard T. Carleton


AN ANALYTICAL MODEL FOR LONG‐RANGE FINANCIAL PLANNING*

Published: 05/01/1970   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00507.x

Willard T. Carleton


MEASUREMENT OF RISK ATTITUDES OF WISCONSIN BANKS*

Published: 03/01/1963   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01624.x

Willard T. Carleton


LINEAR PROGRAMMING AND CAPITAL BUDGETING MODELS: A NEW INTERPRETATION

Published: 12/01/1969   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01695.x

Willard T. Carleton


Dynamics of Borrower‐Lender Interaction: Partitioning Final Payoff in Venture Capital Finance

Published: 05/01/1979   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02117.x

IAN A. COOPER, WILLARD T. CARLETON


FINANCING DECISIONS OF THE FIRM

Published: 05/01/1966   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00221.x

Eugene M. Lerner, Willard T. Carleton


REPLY

Published: 12/01/1968   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00325.x

Eugene M. Lerner, Willard T. Carleton


ESTIMATION AND USES OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES

Published: 09/01/1976   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01960.x

Willard T. Carleton, Ian A. Cooper


JOINT DETERMINATION OF RATE OF RETURN AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE: AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS

Published: 06/01/1977   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01990.x

Willard T. Carleton, Irwin H. Silberman


APPLICATION OF THE DECOMPOSITION PRINCIPLE TO THE CAPITAL BUDGETING PROBLEM IN A DECENTRALIZED FIRM

Published: 06/01/1974   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb01485.x

Willard T. Carleton, Glen Kendall, Sanjiv Tandon


INFLATION RISK AND REGULATORY LAG

Published: 05/01/1983   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02247.x

WILLARD T. CARLETON, DONALD R. CHAMBERS, JOSEF LAKONISHOK


SURVEY OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: TEACHING VERSUS PRACTICE

Published: 05/01/1970   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00512.x

Willard T. Carleton, Keith V. Smith, Maurice B. Goudzwaard


DISCUSSION

Published: 05/01/1975   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01821.x

M. J. Brennan, Willard T. Carleton, Stewart C. Myers


DEFINING THE FINANCE FUNCTION: A MODEL‐SYSTEMS APPROACH

Published: 12/01/1967   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00291.x

Joseph S. Moag, Willard T. Carleton, Eugene M. Lerner


The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA‐CREF

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00055

Willard T. Carleton, James M. Nelson, Michael S. Weisbach

This paper analyzes the process of private negotiations between financial institutions and the companies they attempt to influence. It relies on a private database consisting of the correspondence between TIAA‐CREF and 45 firms it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996. This correspondence indicates that TIAA‐CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies more than 95 percent of the time. In more than 70 percent of the cases, this agreement is reached without shareholders voting on the proposal. We verify independently that at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions to comply with these agreements.


An Empirical Analysis of the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Mergers

Published: 06/01/1983   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02503.x

WILLARD T. CARLETON, DAVID K. GUILKEY, ROBERT S. HARRIS, JOHN F. STEWART

In empirical studies of differences between firms which are acquired and those which are not, researchers typically divide firms into two groups‐acquired and nonacquired. In this paper, we argue that cash takeovers may be sufficiently different from noncash acquisitionst hat failure to distinguish between them may lead to inappropriateg eneralizations. We provide evidence from the mid 1970s that three categories of firms can be distinguished:n onacquireda, cquiredi n a cash takeover, and acquired in an exchange of securities.