The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Predictable Financial Crises
Published: 01/27/2022 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13105
ROBIN GREENWOOD, SAMUEL G. HANSON, ANDREI SHLEIFER, JAKOB AHM SØRENSEN
Using historical data on postwar financial crises around the world, we show that the combination of rapid credit and asset price growth over the prior three years, whether in the nonfinancial business or the household sector, is associated with a 40% probability of entering a financial crisis within the next three years. This compares with a roughly 7% probability in normal times, when neither credit nor asset price growth is elevated. Our evidence challenges the view that financial crises are unpredictable “bolts from the sky” and supports the Kindleberger‐Minsky view that crises are the byproduct of predictable, boom‐bust credit cycles. This predictability favors policies that lean against incipient credit‐market booms.
Incomplete‐Market Equilibria Solved Recursively on an Event Tree
Published: 09/12/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01775.x
BERNARD DUMAS, ANDREW LYASOFF
Because of non‐traded human capital, real‐world financial markets are massively incomplete, while the modeling of imperfect, dynamic financial markets remains a wide‐open and difficult field. Some 30 years after Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) taught us how to calculate the prices of derivative securities on an event tree by simple backward induction, we show how a similar formulation can be used in computing heterogeneous‐agents incomplete‐market equilibrium prices of primitive securities. Extant methods work forward and backward, requiring a guess of the way investors forecast the future. In our method, the future is part of the current solution of each backward time step.
Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies
Published: 05/13/2013 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12057
ANDREW ELLUL, VIJAY YERRAMILLI
We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.
Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality
Published: 12/02/2014 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12230
KATYA MALINOVA, ANDREAS PARK
Facing increased competition over the last decade, many stock exchanges changed their trading fees to maker‐taker pricing, an incentive scheme that rewards liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders. Using a change in trading fees on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we study whether and why the breakdown of trading fees between liquidity demanders and suppliers matters. Posted quotes adjust after the change in fee composition, but the transaction costs for liquidity demanders remain unaffected once fees are taken into account. However, as posted bid‐ask spreads decline, traders (particularly retail) use aggressive orders more frequently, and adverse selection costs decrease.
Family Firms
Published: 09/11/2003 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00601
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo‐Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross‐country evidence.
An Analysis of Divestiture Effects Resulting from Deregulation
Published: 12/01/1986 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb02527.x
ANDREW H. CHEN, LARRY J. MERVILLE
Capital market data were used to examine the divestiture effects pertaining to deregulation, the dropping of antitrust charges, and the reversing of the co‐insurance effect associated with the recent breakup of AT&T. The empirical results of the study indicate that significant economic events took place during the breakup process, which led to transfers of wealth from various parties to the securityholders of AT&T. The results also indicate that the buffering effect of regulation was reduced as AT&T went through the total deregulation process. This is in accordance with Peltzman's prediction.
REPLY
Published: 12/01/1972 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03030.x
Andrew F. Brimmer
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COST OF DEBT CAPITAL
Published: 06/01/1978 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02027.x
Andrew H. Chen
Performance Evaluation with Transactions Data: The Stock Selection of Investment Newsletters
Published: 12/17/2002 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00165
Andrew Metrick
This paper analyzes the equity‐portfolio recommendations made by investment newsletters. Overall, there is no significant evidence of superior stock‐picking ability for this sample of 153 newsletters. Moreover, there is no evidence of abnormal short‐run performance persistence (“hot hands”). The comprehensive and bias‐free transactions database also allows for insights into the precision of performance evaluation. Using a measure of precision defined in the paper, a transactions‐based approach yields a median improvement of 10 percent over a corresponding factor model. This compares favorably with the precision gained by adding factors to the CAPM.
Limitation of Liability and the Ownership Structure of the Firm
Published: 06/01/1993 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04724.x
ANDREW WINTON
This paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability. If investors want managers to be monitored, the monitors should be residual claimants (shareholders), and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm. When liquidating wealth is costly, contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device; however, if wealth is unobservable, under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium. This may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers. Comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements.
When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As
Published: 01/17/2012 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01712.x
ANDREY GOLUBOV, DIMITRIS PETMEZAS, NICKOLAOS G. TRAVLOS
We provide new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Contrary to prior studies, top‐tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non‐top‐tier counterparts but in public acquisitions only, where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are relatively larger. This translates into a $65.83 million shareholder gain for an average bidder. The improvement comes from top‐tier advisors' ability to identify more synergistic combinations and to get a larger share of synergies to accrue to bidders. Consistent with the premium price–premium quality equilibrium, top‐tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.
Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor
Published: 09/01/1995 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x
RAGHURAM RAJAN, ANDREW WINTON
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.
How to Discount Cashflows with Time‐Varying Expected Returns
Published: 11/27/2005 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00715.x
ANDREW ANG, JUN LIU
While many studies document that the market risk premium is predictable and that betas are not constant, the dividend discount model ignores time‐varying risk premiums and betas. We develop a model to consistently value cashflows with changing risk‐free rates, predictable risk premiums, and conditional betas in the context of a conditional CAPM. Practical valuation is accomplished with an analytic term structure of discount rates, with different discount rates applied to expected cashflows at different horizons. Using constant discount rates can produce large misvaluations, which, in portfolio data, are mostly driven at short horizons by market risk premiums and at long horizons by time variation in risk‐free rates and factor loadings.
Public Information and Coordination: Evidence from a Credit Registry Expansion
Published: 03/21/2011 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01637.x
ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSÉ MARÍA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI
This paper provides evidence that lenders to a firm close to distress have incentives to coordinate: lower financing by one lender reduces firm creditworthiness and causes other lenders to reduce financing. To isolate the coordination channel from lenders' joint reaction to new information, we exploit a natural experiment that forced lenders to share negative private assessments about their borrowers. We show that lenders, while learning nothing new about the firm, reduce credit in anticipation of other lenders' reaction to the negative news about the firm. The results show that public information exacerbates lender coordination and increases the incidence of firm financial distress.