The Journal of Finance

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor

Published: 09/01/1995   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04052.x

RAGHURAM RAJAN, ANDREW WINTON

Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.

How to Discount Cashflows with Time‐Varying Expected Returns

Published: 11/27/2005   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00715.x

ANDREW ANG, JUN LIU

While many studies document that the market risk premium is predictable and that betas are not constant, the dividend discount model ignores time‐varying risk premiums and betas. We develop a model to consistently value cashflows with changing risk‐free rates, predictable risk premiums, and conditional betas in the context of a conditional CAPM. Practical valuation is accomplished with an analytic term structure of discount rates, with different discount rates applied to expected cashflows at different horizons. Using constant discount rates can produce large misvaluations, which, in portfolio data, are mostly driven at short horizons by market risk premiums and at long horizons by time variation in risk‐free rates and factor loadings.

The Size and Incidence of the Losses from Noise Trading

Published: 07/01/1989   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04385.x

J. BRADFORD DE LONG, ANDREI SHLEIFER, LAWRENCE H. SUMMERS, ROBERT J. WALDMANN

Recent empirical research has identified a significant amount of volatility in stock prices that cannot easily be explained by changes in fundamentals; one interpretation is that asset prices respond not only to news but also to irrational “noise trading.” We assess the welfare effects and incidence of such noice trading using an overlapping‐generations model that gives investors short horizons. We find that the additional risk generated by noise trading can reduce the capital stock and consumption of the economy, and we show that part of that cost may be borne by rational investors. We conclude that the welfare costs of noise trading may be large if the magnitude of noise in aggregate stock prices is as large as suggested by some of the recent empirical litrature on the excess volatility of the market.

Valuation and Control in Venture Finance

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00337

Andrei A. Kirilenko

This paper presents the model of a relationship between a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur engaged in the formation of a new firm. I assume that the entrepreneur derives private nonpecuniary benefits from having some control over the firm. I show that to separate the entrepreneur's value of control from the firm's expected payoff, the venture capitalist demands disproportionately higher control rights than the size of his equity investment. The entrepreneur is compensated for a greater loss of control through better terms of financing, ability to extract higher rents from asymmetric information, and improved risk sharing.

Is the Real Interest Rate Stable?

Published: 12/01/1988   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03958.x

ANDREW K. ROSE

Univariate time‐series models for consumption, nominal interest rates, and prices each appear to have a single unit root before 1979. If nominal interest rates have a unit root but inflation and inflation forecast errors do not, then ex ante real interest rates have a unit root and are therefore nonstationary. This deduction does not depend on the properties of the unobservable ex post observed real return, which combines the ex ante real interest rate and inflation‐forecasting errors. The unit‐root characteristic of real interest rates is puzzling from at least two perspectives: many models imply that the growth rate of consumption and the real interest rate should have similar time‐series characteristics; also, nominal returns for other assets (e.g., stocks and bonds) appear to have different times‐series properties from those of treasury bills.

Optimal Debt and Profitability in the Trade‐Off Theory

Published: 10/10/2017   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12590

ANDREW B. ABEL

I develop a dynamic model of leverage with tax deductible interest and an endogenous cost of default. The interest rate includes a premium to compensate lenders for expected losses in default. A borrowing constraint is generated by lenders' unwillingness to lend an amount that would trigger immediate default. When the borrowing constraint is not binding, the trade‐off theory of debt holds: optimal debt equates the marginal interest tax shield and the marginal expected cost of default. Contrary to conventional interpretation, but consistent with empirical findings, increases in current or future profitability reduce the optimal leverage ratio when the trade‐off theory holds.

Multimarket Trading and Liquidity: Theory and Evidence

Published: 09/04/2007   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01272.x

SHMUEL BARUCH, G. ANDREW KAROLYI, MICHAEL L. LEMMON

We develop a new model of multimarket trading to explain the differences in the foreign share of trading volume of internationally cross‐listed stocks. The model predicts that the trading volume of a cross‐listed stock is proportionally higher on the exchange in which the cross‐listed asset returns have greater correlation with returns of other assets traded on that market. We find robust empirical support for this prediction using stock return and volume data on 251 non‐U.S. stocks cross‐listed on major U.S. exchanges.

Frailty Correlated Default

Published: 09/28/2009   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01495.x

DARRELL DUFFIE, ANDREAS ECKNER, GUILLAUME HOREL, LEANDRO SAITA

The probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated under the standard assumption that default correlation arises only from exposure to observable risk factors. At the high confidence levels at which bank loan portfolio and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) default losses are typically measured for economic capital and rating purposes, conventionally based loss estimates are downward biased by a full order of magnitude on test portfolios. Our estimates are based on U.S. public nonfinancial firms between 1979 and 2004. We find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate available model of firm‐by‐firm default probabilities.

Asset Market Participation and Portfolio Choice over the Life‐Cycle

Published: 01/20/2017   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12484

ANDREAS FAGERENG, CHARLES GOTTLIEB, LUIGI GUISO

Using error‐free data on life‐cycle portfolio allocations of a large sample of Norwegian households, we document a double adjustment as households age: a rebalancing of the portfolio composition away from stocks as they approach retirement and stock market exit after retirement. When structurally estimating an extended life‐cycle model, the parameter combination that best fits the data is one with a relatively large risk aversion, a small per‐period participation cost, and a yearly probability of a large stock market loss in line with the frequency of stock market crashes in Norway.

The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00134

Stephen R. Foerster, G. Andrew Karolyi

Non‐U.S. firms cross‐listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered

Published: 02/12/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00519

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Andrew A. Samwick

We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers diversify their firms for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We test the comparative static predictions of our model. In contrast to previous work, we find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. Further, the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not. Our findings suggest that managers diversify their firms in response to changes in private benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk.

Incomplete‐Market Equilibria Solved Recursively on an Event Tree

Published: 09/12/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01775.x

BERNARD DUMAS, ANDREW LYASOFF

Because of non‐traded human capital, real‐world financial markets are massively incomplete, while the modeling of imperfect, dynamic financial markets remains a wide‐open and difficult field. Some 30 years after Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) taught us how to calculate the prices of derivative securities on an event tree by simple backward induction, we show how a similar formulation can be used in computing heterogeneous‐agents incomplete‐market equilibrium prices of primitive securities. Extant methods work forward and backward, requiring a guess of the way investors forecast the future. In our method, the future is part of the current solution of each backward time step.

Stronger Risk Controls, Lower Risk: Evidence from U.S. Bank Holding Companies

Published: 05/13/2013   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12057

ANDREW ELLUL, VIJAY YERRAMILLI

We construct a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength and independence of the risk management function at bank holding companies (BHCs). The U.S. BHCs with higher RMI before the onset of the financial crisis have lower tail risk, lower nonperforming loans, and better operating and stock return performance during the financial crisis years. Over the period 1995 to 2010, BHCs with a higher lagged RMI have lower tail risk and higher return on assets, all else equal. Overall, these results suggest that a strong and independent risk management function can curtail tail risk exposures at banks.

Subsidizing Liquidity: The Impact of Make/Take Fees on Market Quality

Published: 12/02/2014   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12230

KATYA MALINOVA, ANDREAS PARK

Facing increased competition over the last decade, many stock exchanges changed their trading fees to maker‐taker pricing, an incentive scheme that rewards liquidity suppliers and charges liquidity demanders. Using a change in trading fees on the Toronto Stock Exchange, we study whether and why the breakdown of trading fees between liquidity demanders and suppliers matters. Posted quotes adjust after the change in fee composition, but the transaction costs for liquidity demanders remain unaffected once fees are taken into account. However, as posted bid‐ask spreads decline, traders (particularly retail) use aggressive orders more frequently, and adverse selection costs decrease.

Optimal Hedging in Futures Markets with Multiple Delivery Specifications

Published: 09/01/1987   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03924.x

AVRAHAM KAMARA, ANDREW F. SIEGEL

Nearly all futures contracts allow delivery of any of several qualities of the underlying asset. Consequently, the price of the futures contract is associated more with the price of the expected cheapest deliverable variety than with the price of the par‐delivery variety. The delivery specifications introduce a delivery risk for every hedger in the market. We derive the optimal hedging strategies in these markets. Their hedging effectiveness is evaluated for wheat futures contracts in Chicago. Hedging optimally would have significantly reduced the variance of the rates of return on hedges while yielding similar mean returns.

Yes, Discounts on Closed‐End Funds Are a Sentiment Index

Published: 06/01/1993   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04742.x

NAVIN CHOPRA, CHARLES M. C. LEE, ANDREI SHLEIFER, RICHARD H. THALER

The “Market Model” In Investment Management

Published: 05/01/1980   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02192.x

ANDREW RUDD, BARR ROSENBERG

DIRECT INVESTMENT AND CORPORATE ADJUSTMENT TECHNIQUES UNDER THE VOLUNTARY U.S. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROGRAM

Published: 05/01/1966   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00226.x

Andrew F. Brimmer

Reinvestment Risk and the Equity Term Structure

Published: 04/27/2021   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13035

ANDREI S. GONÇALVES

The equity term structure is downward sloping at long maturities. I estimate an Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) to show that the trade‐off between market and reinvestment risk explains this pattern. Intuitively, while long‐term dividend claims are highly exposed to market risk, they are good hedges for reinvestment risk because dividend prices rise as expected returns decline, and longer‐term claims are more sensitive to discount rates. In the estimated ICAPM, reinvestment risk dominates at long maturities, inducing relatively low risk premia on long‐term dividend claims. The model is also consistent with the equity term structure cyclicality and the upward‐sloping bond term structure.

When It Pays to Pay Your Investment Banker: New Evidence on the Role of Financial Advisors in M&As

Published: 01/17/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01712.x

ANDREY GOLUBOV, DIMITRIS PETMEZAS, NICKOLAOS G. TRAVLOS

We provide new evidence on the role of financial advisors in M&As. Contrary to prior studies, top‐tier advisors deliver higher bidder returns than their non‐top‐tier counterparts but in public acquisitions only, where the advisor reputational exposure and required skills set are relatively larger. This translates into a $65.83 million shareholder gain for an average bidder. The improvement comes from top‐tier advisors' ability to identify more synergistic combinations and to get a larger share of synergies to accrue to bidders. Consistent with the premium price–premium quality equilibrium, top‐tier advisors charge premium fees in these transactions.