The Journal of Finance

What Works in Securities Laws?

Published: 01/20/2006   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00828.x

RAFAEL PORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, ANDREI SHLEIFER

We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.

Information Flows in Foreign Exchange Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades

Published: 03/18/2016   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12378

LUKAS MENKHOFF, LUCIO SARNO, MAIK SCHMELING, ANDREAS SCHRIMPF

We study the information in order flows in the world's largest over‐the‐counter market, the foreign exchange (FX) market. The analysis draws on a data set covering a broad cross‐section of currencies and different customer segments of FX end‐users. The results suggest that order flows are highly informative about future exchange rates and provide significant economic value. We also find that different customer groups can share risk with each other effectively through the intermediation of a large dealer, and differ markedly in their predictive ability, trading styles, and risk exposure.

THE JOINT DETERMINATION OF PORTFOLIO AND TRANSACTION DEMANDS FOR MONEY

Published: 03/01/1974   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00033.x

Andrew H. Y. Chen, Frank C. Jen, Stanley Zionts

The Effects of Market Segmentation and Investor Recognition on Asset Prices: Evidence from Foreign Stocks Listing in the United States

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00134

Stephen R. Foerster, G. Andrew Karolyi

Non‐U.S. firms cross‐listing shares on U.S. exchanges as American Depositary Receipts earn cumulative abnormal returns of 19 percent during the year before listing, and an additional 1.20 percent during the listing week, but incur a loss of 14 percent during the year following listing. We show how these unusual share price changes are robust to changing market risk exposures and are related to an expansion of the shareholder base and to the amount of capital raised at the time of listing. Our tests provide support for the market segmentation hypothesis and Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis.

Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered

Published: 02/12/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00519

Rajesh K. Aggarwal, Andrew A. Samwick

We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers diversify their firms for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We test the comparative static predictions of our model. In contrast to previous work, we find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. Further, the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not. Our findings suggest that managers diversify their firms in response to changes in private benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk.

Pricing New Corporate Bond Issues: An Analysis of Issue Cost and Seasoning Effects

Published: 07/01/1986   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04525.x

W. K. H. FUNG, ANDREW RUDD

The pricing of new corporate bond issues is examined, with particular emphasis on the seasoning effect and the cost of underwriting. Considerable attention is paid to some special features of the corporate bond market, including the use of actual trader quotes so as to accurately measure holding period returns. Our results suggest that the cost of issuing corporate bonds is less than previously reported.

Why Do Foreign Firms Leave U.S. Equity Markets?

Published: 07/15/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01577.x

CRAIG DOIDGE, G. ANDREW KAROLYI, RENÉ M. STULZ

Foreign firms terminate their Securities and Exchange Commission registration in the aftermath of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) because they no longer require outside funds to finance growth opportunities. Deregistering firms’ insiders benefit from greater discretion to consume private benefits without having to raise higher cost funds. Foreign firms with more agency problems have worse stock‐price reactions to the adoption of Rule 12h‐6 in 2007, which made deregistration easier, than those firms more adversely affected by the compliance costs of SOX. Stock‐price reactions to deregistration announcements are negative, but less so under Rule 12h‐6, and more so for firms that raise fewer funds externally.

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis

Published: 09/04/2015   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12356

ROBERT DEYOUNG, ANNE GRON, GӦKHAN TORNA, ANDREW WINTON

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.

The Joy of Giving or Assisted Living? Using Strategic Surveys to Separate Public Care Aversion from Bequest Motives

Published: 03/21/2011   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01641.x

JOHN AMERIKS, ANDREW CAPLIN, STEVEN LAUFER, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH

The “annuity puzzle,” conveying the apparently low interest of retirees in longevity insurance, is central to household finance. Two possible explanations are “public care aversion” (PCA), retiree aversion to simultaneously running out of wealth and being in need of long‐term care, and an intentional bequest motive. To disentangle the relative importance of PCA and bequest motive, we estimate a structural model of the retirement phase using a novel survey instrument that includes hypothetical questions. We identify PCA as very significant and find bequest motives that spread deep into the middle class. Our results highlight potential interest in annuities that make allowance for long‐term care expenses.

Diagnostic Expectations and Stock Returns

Published: 07/06/2019   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12833

PEDRO BORDALO, NICOLA GENNAIOLI, RAFAEL LA PORTA, ANDREI SHLEIFER

We revisit La Porta's finding that returns on stocks with the most optimistic analyst long‐term earnings growth forecasts are lower than those on stocks with the most pessimistic forecasts. We document the joint dynamics of fundamentals, expectations, and returns of these portfolios, and explain the facts using a model of belief formation based on the representativeness heuristic. Analysts forecast fundamentals from observed earnings growth, but overreact to news by exaggerating the probability of states that have become more likely. We find support for the model's predictions. A quantitative estimation of the model accounts for the key patterns in the data.

Carry Trades and Global Foreign Exchange Volatility

Published: 03/27/2012   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01728.x

LUKAS MENKHOFF, LUCIO SARNO, MAIK SCHMELING, ANDREAS SCHRIMPF

We investigate the relation between global foreign exchange (FX) volatility risk and the cross section of excess returns arising from popular strategies that borrow in low interest rate currencies and invest in high interest rate currencies, so‐called “carry trades.” We find that high interest rate currencies are negatively related to innovations in global FX volatility, and thus deliver low returns in times of unexpected high volatility, when low interest rate currencies provide a hedge by yielding positive returns. Furthermore, we show that volatility risk dominates liquidity risk and our volatility risk proxy also performs well for pricing returns of other portfolios.

Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures

Published: 03/21/2003   |   DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00536

Andres Almazan, Javier Suarez

This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to undertake actions that improve the effectiveness of his management interacts with the firm's policy on CEO replacement. Such policy depends on the presence and the size of severance pay in the CEO's compensation package and on the CEO's influence on the board of directors regarding his own replacement (i.e., entrenchment). We explain when and why the combination of some degree of entrenchment and a sizeable severance package is desirable. The analysis offers predictions about the correlation between entrenchment, severance pay, and incentive compensation.

Factor‐Related and Specific Returns of Common Stocks: Serial Correlation and Market Inefficiency

Published: 05/01/1982   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03575.x

BARR ROSENBERG, ANDREW RUDD

The Value of the Tax Treatment of Original‐Issue Deep‐Discount Bonds: A Note

Published: 03/01/1984   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03873.x

MARCELLE ARAK, ANDREW SILVER

Mortgage Redlining: Race, Risk, and Demand

Published: 03/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04421.x

ANDREW HOLMES, PAUL HORVITZ

Charges that geographical redlining is widely practiced by mortgage lenders and is associated with racial discrimination have received much attention. However, empirical research in this area has yet to document a convincing answer to the question of whether redlining even exists. Much of the previous research in this area has suffered from failure to account for variations in risk, and/or failure to adequately control for geographical differences in demand. This study addresses these problems in an effort to determine whether the disparity in the flow of mortgage credit can be explained by differences in risk and demand.

Where Is the Risk in Value? Evidence from a Market‐to‐Book Decomposition

Published: 08/09/2019   |   DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12836

ANDREY GOLUBOV, THEODOSIA KONSTANTINIDI

We study the value premium using the multiples‐based market‐to‐book decomposition of Rhodes‐Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005). The market‐to‐value component drives all of the value strategy return, while the value‐to‐book component exhibits no return predictability in either portfolio sorts or firm‐level regressions. Existing results linking market‐to‐book to operating leverage, duration, exposure to investment‐specific technology shocks, and analysts’ risk ratings derive from the unpriced value‐to‐book component. In contrast, results on expectation errors, limits to arbitrage, and certain types of cash flow risk and consumption risk exposure are due to the market‐to‐value component. Overall, our evidence casts doubt on several value premium theories.

Should Investors Avoid All Actively Managed Mutual Funds? A Study in Bayesian Performance Evaluation

Published: 12/17/2002   |   DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00319

Klaas P. Baks, Andrew Metrick, Jessica Wachter

This paper analyzes mutual‐fund performance from an investor's perspective. We study the portfolio‐choice problem for a mean‐variance investor choosing among a risk‐free asset, index funds, and actively managed mutual funds. To solve this problem, we employ a Bayesian method of performance evaluation; a key innovation in our approach is the development of a flexible set of prior beliefs about managerial skill. We then apply our methodology to a sample of 1,437 mutual funds. We find that some extremely skeptical prior beliefs nevertheless lead to economically significant allocations to active managers.

Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?

Published: 03/01/1990   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x

RANDALL MORCK, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY

In a sample of 326 US acquisitions between 1975 and 1987, three types of acquisitions have systematically lower and predominantly negative announcement period returns to bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a rapidly growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition. These results suggest that managerial objectives may drive acquisitions that reduce bidding firms' values.

Contrarian Investment, Extrapolation, and Risk

Published: 12/01/1994   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04772.x

JOSEF LAKONISHOK, ANDREI SHLEIFER, ROBERT W. VISHNY

For many years, scholars and investment professionals have argued that value strategies outperform the market. These value strategies call for buying stocks that have low prices relative to earnings, dividends, book assets, or other measures of fundamental value. While there is some agreement that value strategies produce higher returns, the interpretation of why they do so is more controversial. This article provides evidence that value strategies yield higher returns because these strategies exploit the suboptimal behavior of the typical investor and not because these strategies are fundamentally riskier.

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

Published: 05/07/2010   |   DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01553.x

ANDREW HERTZBERG, JOSE MARIA LIBERTI, DANIEL PARAVISINI

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.