The Journal of Finance

The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.

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Women's Liberation as a Financial Innovation

Published: 7/19/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12829  |  Cited by: 29

MOSHE HAZAN, DAVID WEISS, HOSNY ZOABI

In one of the greatest extensions of property rights in human history, common law countries began giving rights to married women in the 1850s. Before this “women's liberation,” the doctrine of coverture strongly incentivized parents of daughters to hold real estate, rather than financial assets such as money, stocks, or bonds. We exploit the staggered nature of coverture's demise across U.S. states to show that women's rights led to shifts in household portfolios, a positive shock to the supply of credit, and a reallocation of labor toward nonagriculture and capital‐intensive industries. Investor protection thus deepened financial markets, aiding industrialization.


REPLY

Published: 3/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00489.x  |  Cited by: 0

Leonard W. Weiss


A NOTE ON TIME DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES

Published: 3/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04174.x  |  Cited by: 1

Leonard W. Weiss


THE PROFITABILITY OF MULTIBANK HOLDING COMPANY ACQUISITIONS

Published: 3/1974,  Volume: 29,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00032.x  |  Cited by: 16

Thomas R. Piper, Steven J. Weiss


Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings

Published: 7/1991,  Volume: 46,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03770.x  |  Cited by: 1896

WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, KATHLEEN A. WEISS

This paper provides support for the certification role of venture capitalists in initial public offerings. Consistent with the certification hypothesis, a comparison of venture capital backed IPOs with a control sample of nonventure capital backed IPOs from 1983 through 1987 matched as closely as possible by industry and offering size indicates that venture capital backing results in significantly lower initial returns and gross spreads. In effect, the presence of venture capitalists in the issuing firms serves to lower the total costs of going public and to maximize the net proceeds to the offering firm. In addition, we document that venture capitalists retain a significant portion of their holdings in the firm after the IPO.


A Note on Quantity versus Price Risk and the Theory of Financial Intermediation

Published: 12/1987,  Volume: 42,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb04372.x  |  Cited by: 0

STEPHEN D. SMITH, DEBORAH WRIGHT GREGORY, KATHLEEN A. WEISS


Individual Investors and Volatility

Published: 7/19/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01668.x  |  Cited by: 314

THIERRY FOUCAULT, DAVID SRAER, DAVID J. THESMAR

We show that retail trading activity has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns, which suggests that retail investors behave as noise traders. To identify this effect, we use a reform of the French stock market that raises the relative cost of speculative trading for retail investors. The daily return volatility of the stocks affected by the reform falls by 20 basis points (a quarter of the sample standard deviation of the return volatility) relative to other stocks. For affected stocks, we also find a significant decrease in the magnitude of return reversals and the price impact of trades.


MERGERS, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE THEORIES OF THE FIRM

Published: 3/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01368.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Gilbert


DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03648.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID EMANUEL


The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Partially Observable Economy

Published: 7/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04391.x  |  Cited by: 30

DAVID FELDMAN

This paper investigates the term structure of interest rates in a multiperiod production and exchange economy with incomplete information. Unable to observe their stochastic investment opportunities, investors engage in dynamic Bayesian inference. This results in the endogenous identification of a more complex production function which generates a richer term structure, resembling the one that actual market prices imply. In addition, this paper introduces a characteristic function of the term structure and demonstrates that, in contrast with a fully observable economy, the widely investigated expectations hypothesis holds true only if interest rates are nonstochastic.


Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance

Published: 5/27/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12906  |  Cited by: 254

DAVID HIRSHLEIFER

I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.


Political Connections and Allocative Distortions

Published: 1/7/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12751  |  Cited by: 289

DAVID SCHOENHERR

Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints members of his networks as CEOs of state‐owned firms that act as intermediaries in allocating government contracts to private firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. Contracts allocated to connected private firms are executed systematically worse and exhibit more frequent cost increases through renegotiations.


A QUARTERLY SERIES OF CORPORATE BASIC YIELDS, 1952–57, AND SOME ATTENDANT RESERVATIONS*

Published: 9/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04200.x  |  Cited by: 3

David Durand


Testing the Efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. Exchange Market under the Assumption of no Risk Premium

Published: 3/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03533.x  |  Cited by: 47

DAVID LONGWORTH

The efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. exchange market for the current float is examined more extensively than previously. Semi‐strong‐form tests which admit the lagged spot rate as a predictor are considered in addition to the standard weak‐form test. These stronger tests reject the joint null hypothesis of an efficient exchange market and no risk premium for the period ending in October 1976, although not for the entire period. For almost every year the current spot rate provided a better forecast of the future spot rate than did the current forward rate.


Transactions Costs and the Theory of Portfolio Selection

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01964.x  |  Cited by: 27

David Goldsmith


Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium

Published: 1/10/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01310.x  |  Cited by: 207

ALEXANDER DAVID

Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.


A Theoretical Model for Valuing Preferred Stock

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02288.x  |  Cited by: 19

DAVID EMANUEL

This paper develops a model of preferred stock value which includes the possibility of dividends on the preferred stock being omitted. The analytical framework used is based on the option‐hedging methodology of Black and Scholes. Precise valuation formulae are obtained for cumulative and noncumulative preferred stock in a variety of contexts. The values obtained are quite different from those for either riskless or risky perpetual bonds, which have previously been proposed as being similar to preferred stock.


GROWTH STOCKS AND THE PETERSBURG PARADOX*

Published: 9/1957,  Volume: 12,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04143.x  |  Cited by: 13

David Durand


Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors

Published: 10/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x  |  Cited by: 621

DAVID YERMACK

I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross‐sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.


INCREASED TAXATION WITH INCREASED ACCEPTABILITY—A DISCUSSION OF NET WORTH TAXATION AS A FEDERAL REVENUE ALTERNATIVE

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01793.x  |  Cited by: 0

Martin David


Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

Published: 6/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04809.x  |  Cited by: 619

DAVID YERMACK

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.


DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04539.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID FELDMAN


STATE OF THE FINANCE FIELD: FURTHER COMMENT

Published: 12/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00322.x  |  Cited by: 10

David Durand


Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France

Published: 2/5/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12880  |  Cited by: 115

JOHAN HOMBERT, ANTOINETTE SCHOAR, DAVID SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self‐employment. We exploit a large‐scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one‐for‐one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.


Housing Collateral and Entrepreneurship

Published: 1/12/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12468  |  Cited by: 335

MARTIN C. SCHMALZ, DAVID A. SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We show that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and postentry growth, using French administrative data and cross‐sectional variation in local house‐price appreciation as shocks to collateral values. We control for local demand shocks by comparing treated homeowners to controls in the same region that do not experience collateral shocks: renters and homeowners with an outstanding mortgage, who (in France) cannot take out a second mortgage. In both comparisons, an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, treated entrepreneurs use more debt, start larger firms, and remain larger in the long run.


How Crashes Develop: Intradaily Volatility and Crash Evolution

Published: 11/26/2018,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12732  |  Cited by: 50

DAVID S. BATES

This paper explores whether affine models with volatility jumps estimated on intradaily S&P 500 futures data over 1983 to 2008 can capture major daily outliers such as the 1987 stock market crash. Intradaily jumps in futures prices are typically small; self‐exciting but short‐lived volatility spikes capture intradaily and daily returns better. Multifactor models of the evolution of diffusive variance and jump intensities improve fits substantially, including out‐of‐sample over 2009 to 2016. The models capture reasonably well the conditional distributions of daily returns and realized variance outliers, but underpredict realized variance inliers. I also examine option pricing implications.


Expectations and the Treasury Bill‐Federal Funds Rate Spread over Recent Monetary Policy Regimes

Published: 6/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03703.x  |  Cited by: 23

DAVID P. SIMON

This paper shows that the spread between the 3–month Treasury bill and the federal funds rate has significant predictive power for the future change in the federal funds rate during the volatile nonborrowed reserves operating regime, but it has less and no predictive power during the borrowed reserves regime and the federal funds targeting regime, respectively. These findings suggest that Treasury bill rates forecast future federal funds rates most accurately when the Federal Reserve follows a well‐defined rule that does not smooth the impact of shocks on the federal funds rate.


Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas Producers

Published: 2/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00202  |  Cited by: 523

G. David Haushalter

This paper studies the hedging policies of oil and gas producers between 1992 and 1994. My evidence shows that the extent of hedging is related to financing costs. In particular, companies with greater financial leverage manage price risks more extensively. My evidence also shows that the likelihood of hedging is related to economies of scale in hedging costs and to the basis risk associated with hedging instruments. Larger companies and companies whose production is located primarily in regions where prices have a high correlation with the prices on which exchange‐traded derivatives are based are more likely to manage risks.


LEGAL ASPECTS OF REVENUE BOND FINANCING*

Published: 5/1955,  Volume: 10,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01266.x  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Wood


Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting, January 7, 2012

Published: 7/19/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01756.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID H. PYLE


AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CREDIT UNIONS IN MICHIGAN*

Published: 12/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00285.x  |  Cited by: 1

David L. McKee


REAL ESTATE CREDIT CONTROLS AS A SELECTIVE INSTRUMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY*

Published: 12/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04227.x  |  Cited by: 0

David P. Eastburn


Inflation and Asset Returns in a Monetary Economy

Published: 9/1992,  Volume: 47,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04660.x  |  Cited by: 175

DAVID A. MARSHALL

Postwar U.S. data are characterized by negative correlations between real equity returns and inflation and by positive correlations between real equity returns and money growth. These patterns are closely matched quantitatively by an equilibrium monetary asset pricing model. The model also implies negative correlations between expected asset returns and expected inflation, and it predicts that the inflation‐asset return correlation will be more strongly negative when inflation is generated by fluctuations in real economic activity than when it is generated by monetary fluctuations.


Defensive Changes in Corporate Payout Policy: Share Repurchases and Special Dividends

Published: 12/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb03722.x  |  Cited by: 98

DAVID J. DENIS

This paper examines defensive payouts announced in response to hostile corporate control activity. The evidence indicates that the announcement of defensive share repurchases is associated with an average negative impact on the share price of the target firm. In contrast, special dividend payments generally increase the wealth of target firm shareholders. Regardless of payout type, those firms remaining independent after the outcome of the corporate control contest experience an abnormal share price increase over the duration of the contest. Among these firms there are substantial post‐contest changes in capital, asset, and ownership structure and abnormally high rates of top management turnover.


MONEY SUPPLY CONTROL: RESERVES AS THE INSTRUMENT UNDER LAGGED ACCOUNTING

Published: 6/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01927.x  |  Cited by: 0

David A. Pierce


Fed Policy, Financial Market Efficiency, and Capital Flows

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00153  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Jones


THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE CEILING RATE ON DEPOSITS AT COMMERCIAL BANKS*

Published: 9/1967,  Volume: 22,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb02985.x  |  Cited by: 0

David E. Bond


The Equilibrium Valuation of Risky Discrete Cash Flows in Continuous Time

Published: 12/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb02659.x  |  Cited by: 9

DAVID C. SHIMKO

This paper values a contingent claim to discrete stochastic cash flows generated by a Poisson arrival process with a randomly varying intensity parameter. In the most general case, both the size and the arrival intensity of cash flows may correlate wih state variables in a continuous time economy. Assuming the conditions of an intertemporal capital aset pricing model, solutions for the value of the contingent claim can be found using various techniques. The paper suggests immediate applications to the valuation of insurance contracts, the decision to build a firm with unknown future investment opportunities, and the pricing of mortgage‐backed securities.


Presidential Address: Pension Policy and the Financial System

Published: 8/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12710  |  Cited by: 62

DAVID S. SCHARFSTEIN

In this paper, I examine the effect of pension policy on the structure of financial systems around the world. In particular, I explore the hypothesis that policies that promote pension savings also promote the development of capital markets. I present a model that endogenizes the extent to which savings are intermediated through banks or capital markets, and derive implications for corporate finance, household finance, banking, and the size of the financial sector. I then present a number of facts that are broadly consistent with the theory and examine a variety of alternative explanations of my findings.


Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00155  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle


FIRM VALUATION, CORPORATE TAXES, AND DEFAULT RISK

Published: 12/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01053.x  |  Cited by: 11

David P. Baron


Risk‐Based Premiums for Insurance Guaranty Funds

Published: 9/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02607.x  |  Cited by: 148

J. DAVID CUMMINS

Insurance guaranty funds have been adopted in all states to compensate policyholders for losses resulting from insurance company insolvencies. The guaranty funds charge flat premium rates, usually a percentage of premiums. Flat premiums can induce insurers to adopt high‐risk strategies, a problem that can be avoided through the use of risk‐based premiums. This article develops risk‐based premium formulas for three cases: a) an ongoing insurer with stochastic assets and liabilities, b) an ongoing insurer also subject to jumps in liabilities (catastrophes), and c) a policy cohort, where claims eventually run off to zero. Premium estimates are provided and compared with actual guaranty fund assessment rates.


Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for the Year Ending September 30, 2008

Published: 7/16/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01487.x  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle


Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer

Published: 8/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00380-i1  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle


What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?

Published: 8/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00680.x  |  Cited by: 1033

David H. Hsu

This study empirically evaluates the certification and value‐added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start‐ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start‐up funding, holding characteristics of the start‐up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high‐reputation VCs acquire start‐up equity at a 10–14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs' “extra‐financial” value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These extra‐financial services can have financial consequences.


THE FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN, 1878–1958*

Published: 12/1961,  Volume: 16,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb04240.x  |  Cited by: 0

David J. Ott


Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting

Published: 8/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00271  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle


The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating

Published: 11/25/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01513.x  |  Cited by: 69

DAVID C. CICERO

I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.


COMMODITY TAXATION AND EQUITY

Published: 12/1961,  Volume: 16,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb04238.x  |  Cited by: 2

David G. Davies


Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for the Year Ending September 30, 2010

Published: 7/19/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01674.x  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle