The Journal of Finance

Second Chance: Life with Less Student Debt

Published: 12/14/2025,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70002  |  Cited by: 0

MARCO DI MAGGIO, ANKIT KALDA, VINCENT YAO

We exploit an episode of plausibly random debt discharge due to the loss of paperwork for thousands of defaulted borrowers to examine the effects of private student debt relief on borrower outcomes. We find that borrowers who receive debt relief (treated) experience declines in debt balances and delinquency rates on other accounts, and increases in mobility and income relative to those who bear the costs of default like wage garnishment and collections (control). Borrowers in both groups contribute to our findings through different mechanisms. While our estimates may not directly apply to blanket student loan forgiveness, they speak to the benefits of forgiveness in reducing the consequences of debt burden for distressed borrowers.

In the Red: Overdrafts, Payday Lending, and the Underbanked

Published: 3/31/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13447  |  Cited by: 1

MARCO DI MAGGIO, ANGELA MA, EMILY WILLIAMS

The reordering of transactions from “high‐to‐low” is a controversial bank practice thought to maximize fees paid by low‐income customers on overdrawn accounts. We exploit a series of class‐action lawsuits that mandated that some banks cease the practice. Using alternative credit bureau data, we find that after banks cease high‐to‐low reordering, low‐income individuals reduce payday borrowing, increase consumption, realize long‐term improvements in financial health, and gain access to lower‐cost loans in the traditional financial system. These findings suggest that aggressive bank practices can create demand for alternative financial services and highlight an important link between the traditional and alternative financial systems.

Stock Market Returns and Consumption

Published: 8/10/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12968  |  Cited by: 136

MARCO DI MAGGIO, AMIR KERMANI, KAVEH MAJLESI

This paper employs Swedish data on households' stock holdings to investigate how consumption responds to changes in stock market returns. We instrument the actual capital gains and dividend payments with past portfolio weights. Unrealized capital gains lead to a marginal propensity to consume of 23% for the bottom 50% of the wealth distribution and about 3% for the top 30% of the wealth distribution. Household consumption is significantly more responsive to dividend payouts across all parts of the wealth distribution. Our findings are consistent with households treating capital gains and dividends as separate sources of income.

Brokers and Order Flow Leakage: Evidence from Fire Sales

Published: 8/28/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12840  |  Cited by: 73

ANDREA BARBON, MARCO DI MAGGIO, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, AUGUSTIN LANDIER

Using trade‐level data, we study whether brokers play a role in spreading order flow information in the stock market. We focus on large portfolio liquidations that result in temporary price drops, and identify the brokers who intermediate these trades. These brokers’ clients are more likely to predate on the liquidating funds than to provide liquidity. Predation leads to profits of about 25 basis points over 10 days and increases the liquidation costs of the distressed fund by 40%. This evidence suggests a role of information leakage in exacerbating fire sales.

Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading

Published: 6/1996,  Volume: 51,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb02695.x  |  Cited by: 307

MARCO PAGANO, AILSA RÖELL

Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.

Short‐Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 2007–09 Crisis

Published: 1/11/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01802.x  |  Cited by: 508

ALESSANDRO BEBER, MARCO PAGANO

Most regulators around the world reacted to the 2007–09 crisis by imposing bans on short selling. These were imposed and lifted at different dates in different countries, often targeted different sets of stocks, and featured varying degrees of stringency. We exploit this variation in short‐sales regimes to identify their effects on liquidity, price discovery, and stock prices. Using panel and matching techniques, we find that bans (i) were detrimental for liquidity, especially for stocks with small capitalization and no listed options; (ii) slowed price discovery, especially in bear markets, and (iii) failed to support prices, except possibly for U.S. financial stocks.

The Disappearing Index Effect

Published: 12/20/2024,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13410  |  Cited by: 20

ROBIN GREENWOOD, MARCO SAMMON

The abnormal return associated with a stock being added to the S&P 500 has fallen from an average of 7.4% in the 1990s to less than 1% over the past decade. This has occurred despite a significant increase in the share of stock market assets linked to the index. A similar pattern has occurred for index deletions, with large negative abnormal returns during the 1990s but an average return of only 0.1% between 2010 and 2020. We investigate the drivers of this phenomenon and discuss implications for market efficiency. We document a similar decline in the index effect among other families of indices.

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

Published: 12/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb05125.x  |  Cited by: 434

MARCO PAGANO, TULLIO JAPPELLI

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.

Stock Market Spillovers via the Global Production Network: Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy

Published: 10/10/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13181  |  Cited by: 62

JULIAN DI GIOVANNI, GALINA HALE

We quantify the role of global production linkages in explaining spillovers of U.S. monetary policy shocks on country‐sector stock returns. We estimate a structural spatial autoregression (SAR) model that is consistent with an open‐economy production network framework. Using the SAR model, we decompose the total impact of U.S. monetary policy on global stock returns into direct and network effects. Nearly 70% of the total impact is due to the network effect of global production linkages. Empirical counterfactuals show that shutting down global production linkages halves the total impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks.

Winners or Losers? The Effects of Banking Consolidation on Corporate Borrowers

Published: 3/20/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01220.x  |  Cited by: 125

EMILIA BONACCORSI DI PATTI, GIORGIO GOBBI

We estimate the impact of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on outstanding credit, credit lines, and the sensitivity of investment to cash flow using a large sample of Italian corporate borrowers. We distinguish between firms that experienced relationship termination as a consequence of bank M&As and those that did not. Our findings are consistent with bank M&As having an adverse effect on credit, particularly when the M&A is followed by relationship termination. The effect persists 3 years and then is absorbed, suggesting that firms are able to compensate for the negative shock.

Local Crowding‐Out in China

Published: 8/10/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12966  |  Cited by: 467

YI HUANG, MARCO PAGANO, UGO PANIZZA

In China, between 2006 and 2013, local public debt crowded out the investment of private firms by tightening their funding constraints while leaving state‐owned firms' investment unaffected. We establish this result using a purpose‐built data set for Chinese local public debt. Private firms invest less in cities with more public debt, with the reduction in investment larger for firms located farther from banks in other cities or more dependent on external funding. Moreover, in cities where public debt is high, private firms' investment is more sensitive to internal cash flow.

Why Do Companies Go Public? An Empirical Analysis

Published: 2/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.25448  |  Cited by: 1215

Marco Pagano, Fabio Panetta, Luigi Zingales

Using a large database of private firms in Italy, we analyze the determinants of initial public offerings (IPOs) by comparing the ex ante and ex post characteristics of IPOs with those of private firms. The likelihood of an IPO is increasing in the company's size and the industry's market‐to‐book ratio. Companies appear to go public not to finance future investments and growth, but to rebalance their accounts after high investment and growth. IPOs are also followed by lower cost of credit and increased turnover in control.

Local Experiences, Search, and Spillovers in the Housing Market

Published: 2/20/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13208  |  Cited by: 17

ANTONIO GARGANO, MARCO GIACOLETTI, ELVIS JARNECIC

Recent local price growth explains differences in search behavior across prospective homebuyers. Those experiencing higher growth in their postcode of residence search more broadly across locations and house characteristics, without changing attention devoted to individual sales listings, and have shorter search duration. Effects are stronger for homeowners, in particular those living in less wealthy areas and looking for a new primary residence. We use reduced‐form analysis and a quantitative equilibrium model to show that the expansion of search breadth translates into widespread spillovers onto house sales prices and inventories of listings across postcodes within a metropolitan area.

Collateral Constraints and the Law of One Price: An Experiment

Published: 11/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12722  |  Cited by: 16

MARCO CIPRIANI, ANA FOSTEL, DANIEL HOUSER

We test the asset pricing implications of collateralized borrowing (that is, of using assets as collateral to borrow money) in the laboratory. To this purpose, we develop a general equilibrium model with collateral constraints amenable to laboratory implementation and gather experimental data. In the laboratory, assets that can be leveraged fetch higher prices than assets that cannot, even though assets' payoffs are identical in all states of the world. Collateral value, therefore, creates deviations from the Law of One Price. The spread between collateralizeable and noncollateralizeable assets is significant and quantitatively close to theoretical predictions.

The Benefits of Access: Evidence from Private Meetings with Portfolio Firms

Published: 2/22/2026,  Volume: ,  Issue:   |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13495  |  Cited by: 0

MARCO BECHT, JULIAN FRANKS, HANNES F. WAGNER

We use large language models to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms. The high‐level meetings convey mostly soft information about the firm, and little about industry or market. Fund manager meetings focus on business models and financial metrics, while governance specialist meetings focus on environmental, social, and governance risks; 0.4% of meetings discuss material nonpublic information. Trades by fund managers increase with meetings attended by senior management, rated as unusually good or bad, where the tone is significantly positive or negative, or assessed as creating consensus. Meeting‐informed portfolios can generate significant outperformance.

The Geography of Equity Listing: Why Do Companies List Abroad?

Published: 12/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00509  |  Cited by: 572

Marco Pagano, Ailsa A. Röell, Josef Zechner

This paper documents aggregate trends in the foreign listings of companies, and analyzes their distinctive prelisting characteristics and postlisting performance. In 1986–1997, many European companies listed abroad, mainly on U.S. exchanges, while the number of U.S. companies listed in Europe decreased. European companies that cross‐list tend to be large and recently privatized firms, and expand their foreign sales after listing abroad. They differ sharply depending on where they cross‐list: The U.S. exchanges attract high‐tech and export‐oriented companies that expand rapidly without significant leveraging. Companies cross‐listing within Europe do not grow unusually fast, and increase their leverage after cross‐listing.

Learning From Disagreement in the U.S. Treasury Bond Market

Published: 8/10/2020,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12971  |  Cited by: 40

MARCO GIACOLETTI, KRISTOFFER T. LAURSEN, KENNETH J. SINGLETON

We study risk premiums in the U.S. Treasury bond market from the perspective of a Bayesian econometrician who learns in real time from disagreement among investors about future bond yields. Notably, disagreement has substantial predictive power for yields, and 's risk premiums are less volatile than those in the analogous model without learning. 's forecasts are substantially more accurate than the consensus forecasts of market professionals, particularly following U.S. recessions. The predictive power of disagreement is distinct from the (much weaker) one of inflation and output growth. Rather, it appears to reflect uncertainty about future fiscal policy.

Selling Fast and Buying Slow: Heuristics and Trading Performance of Institutional Investors

Published: 9/7/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13271  |  Cited by: 41

KLAKOW AKEPANIDTAWORN, RICK DI MASCIO, ALEX IMAS, LAWRENCE D.W. SCHMIDT

Are market experts prone to heuristics, and do these heuristics transfer across buying and selling domains? We investigate this question using a unique data set of institutional investors with portfolios averaging $573 million. A striking finding emerges: While there is evidence of skill in buying, selling decisions underperform substantially, even relative to random‐selling strategies. This holds despite the similarity between the two decisions in frequency, substance, and consequences for performance. Evidence suggests an asymmetric allocation of cognitive resources such as attention can explain the discrepancy: We document a systematic, costly heuristic process for selling but not for buying.

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

Published: 11/10/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00820.x  |  Cited by: 270

ALLEN N. BERGER, MARCO A. ESPINOSA‐VEGA, W. SCOTT FRAME, NATHAN H. MILLER

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 84

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.