The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
AFA members can log in to view full-text articles below.
View past issues
Search the Journal of Finance:
Search results: 15.
MYTHODOLOGY IN FINANCE*
Published: 05/01/1973 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01770.x
Irwin Friend
BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF THE S.E.C. SPECIAL STUDY
Published: 05/01/1966 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00231.x
Irwin Friend
DISCUSSION
Published: 05/01/1981 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00447.x
IRWIN FRIEND
Preliminary Program
Published: 09/01/1972 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01340.x
Irwin Friend, Sherman Maisel
The Effects of Different Taxes on Risky and Risk‐free Investment and on the Cost of Capital
Published: 03/01/1986 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04491.x
YU ZHU, IRWIN FRIEND
This paper analyzes the major factors which determine the effects of taxation on the value of risky assets and on the cost of capital, and shows how the magnitudes and even the signs of these effects depend on the values assumed for a few key parameters in the model. Using plausible values for these parameters, it is shown that the results obtained are frequently counter‐intuitive.
An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self‐Interest on Corporate Capital Structure
Published: 06/01/1988 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03938.x
IRWIN FRIEND, LARRY H. P. LANG
This paper provides a test of whether capital structure decisions are at least in part motivated by managerial self‐interest. It is shown that the debt ratio is negatively related to management's shareholding, reflecting the greater nondiversifiable risk of debt to management than to public investors for maintaining a low debt ratio. Unless there is a nonmanagerial principal stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can be realized, which may suggest that the existence of large nonmanagerial stockholders might make the interests of managers and public investors coincide.
A Critical Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence on the Arbitrage Pricing Theory
Published: 06/01/1984 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb02312.x
PHOEBUS J. DHRYMES, IRWIN FRIEND, N. BULENT GULTEKIN
This paper demonstrates that the Roll and Ross (RR) and other previously published tests of the APT are subject to several basic limitations. There is a general nonequivalence of factor analyzing small groups of securities and factor analyzing a group of securities sufficiently large for the APT model to hold. It is found that as one increases the number of securities, the number of “factors” determined increases. This increase in the number of “factors” with larger groups of securities cannot readily be explained by a distinction between “priced” and “nonpriced” risk factors as it is impermissible to carry out tests on whether a given “risk factor is priced” using factor analytic procedures.
New Tests of the APT and Their Implications
Published: 07/01/1985 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04988.x
PHOEBUS J. DHRYMES, IRWIN FRIEND, MUSTAFA N. GULTEKIN, N. BULENT GULTEKIN
This paper provides new tests of the arbitrage pricing theory (APT). Test results appear to be extremely sensitive to the number of securities used in the two stages of the tests of the APT model. New tests also indicate that unique risk is fully as important as common risk. While these tests have serious limitations, they are inconsistent with the APT.