The Journal of Finance

Thirty Years of Shareholder Rights and Firm Value

Published: 5/8/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12138  |  Cited by: 191

MARTIJN CREMERS, ALLEN FERRELL

This paper introduces a new hand‐collected data set that tracks restrictions on shareholder rights at approximately 1,000 firms from 1978 to 1989. In conjunction with the 1990 to 2006 IRRC data, we track shareholder rights over 30 years. Most governance changes occurred during the 1980s. We find a robustly negative association between restrictions on shareholder rights (using G‐Index as a proxy) and Tobin's Q. The negative association only appears after judicial approval of antitakeover defenses in the 1985 landmark Delaware Supreme Court decision of Moran v. Household. This decision was an unanticipated exogenous shock that increased the importance of shareholder rights.

Selection Editor's Introduction

Published: 8/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00258  |  Cited by: 0

Franklin Allen

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02163.x  |  Cited by: 0

Beth Allen

The Prevention of Default

Published: 5/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb00439.x  |  Cited by: 12

FRANKLIN ALLEN

THE ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF 12 U.S.C. 84: THE EVOLUTION OF THE 10 PER CENT LENDING LIMIT GOVERNING NATIONAL BANKS*

Published: 3/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00612.x  |  Cited by: 0

Allen Rappaport

Do Financial Institutions Matter?

Published: 8/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00361  |  Cited by: 183

Franklin Allen

In standard asset pricing theory, investors are assumed to invest directly in financial markets. The role of financial institutions is ignored. The focus in corporate finance is on agency problems. How do you ensure that managers act in shareholders' interests? There is an inconsistency in assuming that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency problem, but when you give it to a firm there is. It is argued that both areas need to take proper account of the role of financial institutions and markets. Appropriate concepts for analyzing particular situations should be used.

A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FIXED INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY, 1947–1965*

Published: 12/1970,  Volume: 25,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00888.x  |  Cited by: 0

Allen L. Sinai

RATIONAL DECISION‐MAKING IN PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT*

Published: 9/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00132.x  |  Cited by: 1

Henry Allen Latané

TERMS ON CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE LOANS ON EXISTING HOUSES

Published: 9/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04298.x  |  Cited by: 7

Allen F. Jung

MONEY AND GROWTH IN OPEN ECONOMIES: A NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH*

Published: 12/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01760.x  |  Cited by: 0

Polly Reynolds Allen

A BORROWER‐ORIENTED MODEL OF U.S.‐CANADIAN LONG‐TERM FIXED‐INTEREST CAPITAL FLOWS*

Published: 3/1974,  Volume: 29,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb00048.x  |  Cited by: 0

Allen B. Frankel

THE MONEY DEMAND AND SUPPLY DETERMINANTS OF STOCK PRICES*

Published: 9/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01334.x  |  Cited by: 0

Neal Allen Pepper

INTERBANK DEPOSITS AND EXCESS RESERVES*

Published: 3/1956,  Volume: 11,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb00687.x  |  Cited by: 0

William R. Allen

Underreaction, Overreaction, and Increasing Misreaction to Information in the Options Market

Published: 6/2001,  Volume: 56,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00348  |  Cited by: 185

Allen M. Poteshman

This paper investigates options market reaction to changes in the instantaneous variance of the underlying asset. There are three main findings. First, options market investors underreact to individual daily changes in instantaneous variance. Second, these same investors overreact to periods of mostly increasing or mostly decreasing daily changes in instantaneous variance. Third, they tend to underreact (overreact) to current daily changes in instantaneous variance that are preceded mostly by daily changes of the opposite (same) sign. The third finding can reconcile the first two and is also consistent with well‐established cognitive biases.

A STUDY OF THE DELINEATION OF GEOGRAPHIC MARKETS FOR BUSINESS LOANS*

Published: 6/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01736.x  |  Cited by: 0

Robert Allen Eisenbeis

INDIVIDUAL RISK PREFERENCE IN PORTFOLIO SELECTION

Published: 3/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb04835.x  |  Cited by: 5

Henry Allen Latané

Dynamic Competition in Negotiated Price Markets

Published: 12/13/2024,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13408  |  Cited by: 6

JASON ALLEN, SHAOTENG LI

Using contract‐level data for the Canadian mortgage market, this paper provides evidence of an “invest‐and‐harvest” pricing pattern. We build a dynamic model of price negotiation with search and switching frictions to capture key market features. We estimate the model and use it to investigate the effects of market frictions and the resulting dynamic competition on borrowers' and banks' payoffs. We show that dynamic pricing and the presence of search and switching costs have important implications for public policies.

Persuading Investors: A Video‐Based Study

Published: 8/14/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13471  |  Cited by: 26

ALLEN HU, SONG MA

Persuasive communication functions through not only content but also delivery—facial expression, tone of voice, and diction. This paper examines the persuasiveness of delivery in startup pitches. Using machine learning algorithms to process full pitch videos, we quantify persuasion in visual, vocal, and verbal dimensions. We find that positive (i.e., passionate, warm) pitches increase funding probability. However, conditional on funding, startups with higher levels of pitch positivity underperform. Women are more heavily judged on delivery when evaluated in single‐gender teams, but they are neglected when copitching in mixed‐gender teams. Using an experiment, we show that persuasion delivery works mainly through leading investors to form inaccurate beliefs.

Optimal Financial Crises

Published: 8/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00052  |  Cited by: 667

Franklin Allen, Douglas Gale

Empirical evidence suggests that banking panics are related to the business cycle and are not simply the result of “sunspots.” Panics occur when depositors perceive that the returns on bank assets are going to be unusually low. We develop a simple model of this. In this setting, bank runs can be first‐best efficient: they allow efficient risk sharing between early and late withdrawing depositors and they allow banks to hold efficient portfolios. However, if costly runs or markets for risky assets are introduced, central bank intervention of the right kind can lead to a Pareto improvement in welfare.

Rational Expectations and the Measurement of a Stock's Elasticity of Demand

Published: 9/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03896.x  |  Cited by: 10

FRANKLIN ALLEN, ANDREW POSTLEWAITE

Scholes [1] considered the effect of secondary sales of large blocks of stock on the price of the stock. However, he only looked at price changes occurring just before and just after the sale took place. It is argued here, using a simple model, that if traders have rational expectations they may anticipate the sale, and prices could reflect this possibility long before it actually occurs. To determine the full effect, it may therefore be necessary to consider the price path many months, or even years, before the sale.

Clearly Irrational Financial Market Behavior: Evidence from the Early Exercise of Exchange Traded Stock Options

Published: 2/2003,  Volume: 58,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00518  |  Cited by: 171

Allen M. Poteshman, Vitaly Serbin

This paper analyzes the early exercise of exchange‐traded options by different classes of investors over the 1996 to 1999 period. A large number of exercises are identified as clearly irrational without invoking any model of market equilibrium. Customers of discount brokers and customers of fullservice brokers both engage in a significant number of irrational exercises while traders at large investment houses exhibit no irrational early exercise behavior. Rational and irrational exercise is triggered for discount and full‐service customers by the underlying stock price attaining its highest level over the past year and by high returns on the underlying stock.

THE EFFECTS OF TAX POLICY ON CAPITAL FORMATION, CORPORATE LIQUIDITY AND THE AVAILABILITY OF INVESTIBLE FUNDS: A SIMULATION STUDY

Published: 5/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01887.x  |  Cited by: 8

Andrew F. Brimmer, Allen Sinai

Corporate Equity Ownership, Strategic Alliances, and Product Market Relationships

Published: 12/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00307  |  Cited by: 480

Jeffrey W. Allen, Gordon M. Phillips

This paper examines long‐term block ownership by corporations and performance changes in firms with corporate block owners. We also examine potential reasons for corporate ownership including benefits in product market relationships, alleviation of financing constraints, and board monitoring by corporate owners. We find the largest significant increases in targets' stock prices, investment, and operating profitability when ownership is combined with alliances, joint ventures, and other product market relationships between purchasing and target firms, especially in industries with high research and development. Our findings are consistent with the conclusion that block ownership by corporations has significant benefits in product market relationships.

Equity Carve‐Outs and Managerial Discretion

Published: 2/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.65022  |  Cited by: 128

Jeffrey W. Allen, John J. McConnell

This study proposes a managerial discretion hypothesis of equity carve‐outs in which managers value control over assets and are reluctant to carve out subsidiaries. Thus, managers undertake carve‐outs only when the firm is capital constrained. Consistent with this hypothesis, firms that carve out subsidiaries exhibit poor operating performance and high leverage prior to carve‐outs. Also consistent with this hypothesis, in carve‐outs wherein funds raised are used to pay down debt, the average excess stock return of + 6.63 percent is significantly greater than the average excess stock return of −0.01 percent for carve‐outs wherein funds are retained for investment purposes.

Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks

Published: 3/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03817.x  |  Cited by: 117

ALLEN B. ATKINS, EDWARD A. DYL

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions costs are held by investors for longer holding periods, and vice versa. We examine average holding periods and bid‐ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted, the length of investors' holding periods is related to bid‐ask spreads. We also find that the relation between holding periods and bid‐ask spreads is much stronger on Nasdaq, where spreads are larger, than on the NYSE, where spreads are smaller.

A Theory of Dividends Based on Tax Clienteles

Published: 12/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00298  |  Cited by: 621

Franklin Allen, Antonio E. Bernardo, Ivo Welch

This paper explains why some firms prefer to pay dividends rather than repurchase shares. When institutional investors are relatively less taxed than individual investors, dividends induce “ownership clientele” effects. Firms paying dividends attract relatively more institutions, which have a relative advantage in detecting high firm quality and in ensuring firms are well managed. The theory is consistent with some documented regularities, specifically both the presence and stickiness of dividends, and offers novel empirical implications, e.g., a prediction that it is the tax difference between institutions and retail investors that determines dividend payments, not the absolute tax payments.

Volatility Information Trading in the Option Market

Published: 5/9/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01352.x  |  Cited by: 231

SOPHIE X. NI, JUN PAN, ALLEN M. POTESHMAN

This paper investigates informed trading on stock volatility in the option market. We construct non‐market maker net demand for volatility from the trading volume of individual equity options and find that this demand is informative about the future realized volatility of underlying stocks. We also find that the impact of volatility demand on option prices is positive. More importantly, the price impact increases by 40% as informational asymmetry about stock volatility intensifies in the days leading up to earnings announcements and diminishes to its normal level soon after the volatility uncertainty is resolved.

Short Selling and Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment

Published: 5/11/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12369  |  Cited by: 432

VIVIAN W. FANG, ALLEN H. HUANG, JONATHAN M. KARPOFF

During 2005 to 2007, the SEC ordered a pilot program in which one‐third of the Russell 3000 index were arbitrarily chosen as pilot stocks and exempted from short‐sale price tests. Pilot firms’ discretionary accruals and likelihood of marginally beating earnings targets decrease during this period, and revert to pre‐experiment levels when the program ends. After the program starts, pilot firms are more likely to be caught for fraud initiated before the program, and their stock returns better incorporate earnings information. These results indicate that short selling, or its prospect, curbs earnings management, helps detect fraud, and improves price efficiency.

The Shelf Registration of Debt and Self Selection Bias

Published: 3/1990,  Volume: 45,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05093.x  |  Cited by: 18

DAVID S. ALLEN, ROBERT E. LAMY, G. RODNEY THOMPSON

Prior studies report lower issue costs for shelf registered debt and conclude that the benefits of increased underwriter competition can be realized by those firms using this registration procedure. This study re‐examines the purported superiority of issuing debt via shelf registration, and finds that the savings in issue costs displayed by earlier studies can be attributed to a self selection bias and not the method of registration.

Dissecting the Long‐Term Performance of the Chinese Stock Market

Published: 3/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13312  |  Cited by: 119

FRANKLIN ALLEN, JUN (QJ) QIAN, CHENYU SHAN, JULIE LEI ZHU

Domestically listed Chinese (A‐share) firms have lower stock returns than externally listed Chinese, developed, and emerging country firms during 2000 to 2018. They also have lower net cash flows than matched unlisted Chinese firms. The underperformance of both stock and accounting returns is more pronounced for large A‐share firms, while small firms show no underperformance along either dimension. Investor sentiment explains low stock returns in the cross‐country and within‐A‐share samples. Institutional deficiencies in listing and delisting processes and weak corporate governance in terms of shareholder value creation are consistent with the underperformance in stock returns and net cash flows.

Debt Maturity, Risk, and Asymmetric Information

Published: 11/10/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00820.x  |  Cited by: 278

ALLEN N. BERGER, MARCO A. ESPINOSA‐VEGA, W. SCOTT FRAME, NATHAN H. MILLER

We test the implications of Flannery's (1986) and Diamond's (1991) models concerning the effects of risk and asymmetric information in determining debt maturity, and we examine the overall importance of informational asymmetries in debt maturity choices. We employ data on over 6,000 commercial loans from 53 large U.S. banks. Our results for low‐risk firms are consistent with the predictions of both theoretical models, but our findings for high‐risk firms conflict with the predictions of Diamond's model and with much of the empirical literature. Our findings also suggest a strong quantitative role for asymmetric information in explaining debt maturity.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 104

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.