The Journal of Finance

Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market

Published: 9/12/2014,  Volume: 69,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12186  |  Cited by: 446

ALAIN P. CHABOUD, BENJAMIN CHIQUOINE, ERIK HJALMARSSON, CLARA VEGA

We study the impact of algorithmic trading (AT) in the foreign exchange market using a long time series of high‐frequency data that identify computer‐generated trading activity. We find that AT causes an improvement in two measures of price efficiency: the frequency of triangular arbitrage opportunities and the autocorrelation of high‐frequency returns. We show that the reduction in arbitrage opportunities is associated primarily with computers taking liquidity. This result is consistent with the view that AT improves informational efficiency by speeding up price discovery, but that it may also impose higher adverse selection costs on slower traders. In contrast, the reduction in the autocorrelation of returns owes more to the algorithmic provision of liquidity. We also find evidence consistent with the strategies of algorithmic traders being highly correlated. This correlation, however, does not appear to cause a degradation in market quality, at least not on average.

SOME INVESTMENT ASPECTS OF ACCUMULATION THROUGH EQUITIES

Published: 5/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04270.x  |  Cited by: 2

Benjamin Graham

METHODS IN OPTIMIZATION FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICY*

Published: 6/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01003.x  |  Cited by: 0

Benjamin M. Friedman

Interest Rate Expectations Versus Forward Rates: Evidence From an Expectations Survey

Published: 9/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb03449.x  |  Cited by: 11

BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN

The Exploitation of Relationships in Financial Distress: The Case of Trade Credit

Published: 2/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00203  |  Cited by: 550

Benjamin S. Wilner

This paper develops optimal pricing, lending, and renegotiation strategies for companies in relationships where one firm is highly dependent on the other. Long‐term trade—creditor firm relationships induce dependent trade creditors to grant more concessions in debt renegotiations than nondependent creditors. Anticipating these larger renegotiation concessions, not only do less financially stable firms prefer trade credit, but all firms agree to pay a higher interest rate for trade credit. The model also explains the existence of “teaser” interest rates and convenience classes. Findings are consistent with those of the relationship‐lending literature.

WHO PUTS THE INFLATION PREMIUM INTO NOMINAL INTEREST RATES?

Published: 6/1978,  Volume: 33,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02024.x  |  Cited by: 9

Benjamin M. Friedman

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01888.x  |  Cited by: 0

Benjamin M. Friedman

Effects of Shifting Saving Patterns on Interest Rates and Economic Activity

Published: 3/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb01094.x  |  Cited by: 1

BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN

Individuals in the United States consistently do most of their saving through financial intermediaries, but over time there have been and continue to be major shifts in people's reliance on specific kinds of intermediary institutions. This paper assesses the potential effects on interest rates, and via interest rates (and asset prices and yields more generally) on nonfinancial economic activity, of four specific shifts in saving behavior: additional pension contributions financed by individuals, additional pension contributions financed by businesses, additional purchases of life insurance by individuals, and additional deposits in thrift institutions by individuals. The paper's results indicate that such shifts, in plausible magnitudes, would have significant effects not only on interest rates and asset‐liability flows but also on both the level and the composition of nonfinancial economic activity. In particular, although the specific effects differ from one shift to another, each would disproportionately stimulate capital formation in comparison to other forms of spending.

THE EURO‐DOLLAR, THE COMMON MARKET, AND CURRENCY UNIFICATION*

Published: 12/1963,  Volume: 18,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01635.x  |  Cited by: 0

Benjamin J. Cohen

THE SOCIAL SECURITY PAYROLL TAX: SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR REFORM

Published: 5/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01831.x  |  Cited by: 1

Benjamin A. Okner

Trends in Corporate Governance

Published: 9/16/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00801.x  |  Cited by: 376

BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN

The popular press and scholarly studies have noted a number of trends in corporate governance. This article addresses, from a theoretical perspective, whether these trends are linked. And, if so, how? The article finds that a trend toward greater board diligence will lead, sometimes through subtle or indirect mechanisms, to trends toward more external candidates becoming CEO, shorter tenures for CEOs, more effort/less perquisite consumption by CEOs (even though such behavior is not directly monitored), and greater CEO compensation. An additional prediction is that, under plausible conditions, externally hired CEOs should have shorter tenures, on average, than internally hired CEOs.

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01796.x  |  Cited by: 0

Benjamin A. Okner

THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON BANK BALANCE SHEET DECISIONS

Published: 12/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03357.x  |  Cited by: 10

John Mingo, Benjamin Wolkowitz

The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts

Published: 11/12/2019,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12856  |  Cited by: 16

BARNEY HARTMAN‐GLASER, BENJAMIN HÉBERT

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has private information about the ability of this index to measure the true state that the borrower would like to hedge. The lender is risk‐averse and thus requires a premium to insure the borrower. The borrower, however, might be paying something for nothing if the index is a poor measure of the true state. We provide sufficient conditions for this effect to cause the borrower to choose a nonindexed contract instead.

The Allocation of Socially Responsible Capital

Published: 1/22/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13425  |  Cited by: 50

DANIEL GREEN, BENJAMIN N. ROTH

Portfolio allocation decisions increasingly incorporate social values. We develop a tractable framework to study how competition between investors to own socially valuable assets affects social welfare. Relative to the most common social‐investing strategies, we identify alternative strategies that result in higher impact and higher financial returns. We identify strategies for investors to have impact when impact is difficult to measure. From the firm's perspective, increasing profitability can have greater impact than directly increasing social value. We present new empirical evidence on the social preferences of investors that demonstrates the practical relevance of our theory.

Asset Allocation in Bankruptcy

Published: 11/29/2018,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12740  |  Cited by: 124

SHAI BERNSTEIN, EMANUELE COLONNELLI, BENJAMIN IVERSON

This paper investigates the consequences of liquidation and reorganization on the allocation and subsequent utilization of assets in bankruptcy. Using the random assignment of judges to bankruptcy cases as a natural experiment that forces some firms into liquidation, we find that the long‐run utilization of assets of liquidated firms is lower relative to assets of reorganized firms. These effects are concentrated in thin markets with few potential users and in areas with low access to finance. These findings suggest that when search frictions are large, liquidation can lead to inefficient allocation of assets in bankruptcy.

Can Small Businesses Survive Chapter 11?

Published: 8/19/2026,  Volume: ,  Issue:   |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70076  |  Cited by: 0

EDITH HOTCHKISS, BENJAMIN IVERSON, XIANG ZHENG

A majority of small U.S. businesses attempting to reorganize in bankruptcy fail to do so. Subchapter V of Chapter 11 (SubV) streamlines bankruptcy for small firms by reducing bankruptcy costs and negotiation frictions, and enables entrepreneurs to retain ownership. We show that many businesses reorganize under SubV that otherwise would liquidate. Creditor recoveries and postbankruptcy survival rates are at least as high in SubV as in traditional Chapter 11s. Our results show the increase in reorganizations is not associated with continuation of unviable firms, and that creditors are not harmed by a shift in bargaining power toward small business owners.

Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance

Published: 1/17/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01710.x  |  Cited by: 502

BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, MICHAEL S. WEISBACH

Public policy discussions typically favor greater corporate disclosure as a way to reduce firms' agency problems. This argument is incomplete because it overlooks that better disclosure regimes can also aggravate agency problems and related costs, including executive compensation. Consequently, a point can exist beyond which additional disclosure decreases firm value. Holding all else equal, we further show that larger firms will adopt stricter disclosure rules than smaller firms and firms with better disclosure will employ more able management. We show that mandated increases in disclosure could, in part, explain recent increases in both CEO compensation and CEO turnover rates.

THE BEHAVIOR OF U.S. SHORT‐TERM INTEREST RATES SINCE OCTOBER 1979

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03655.x  |  Cited by: 13

RICHARD H. CLARIDA, BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN

Short‐term interest rates in the United States have been “too high” since October 1979 in the sense that both unconditional and conditional forecasts, based on an estimated vector autoregression model summarizing the prior experience, underpredict short‐term interest rates during this period. Although a nonstructural model cannot directly answer the question of why this has been so, comparisons of alternative conditional forecasts point to the post‐October 1979 relationship between the growth of real income and the growth of real money balances as closely connected to the level and pattern of short‐term interest rates. This finding is consistent with the authors' earlier conclusion, based on analysis of a small structural macroeconometric model, that the high average level of interest rates has been due to a combination of slow growth of (nominal) money supply and continuing price inflation, which together have kept real balances small in relation to prevailing levels of economic activity.

How Integrated are Credit and Equity Markets? Evidence from Index Options

Published: 1/9/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13300  |  Cited by: 24

PIERRE COLLIN‐DUFRESNE, BENJAMIN JUNGE, ANDERS B. TROLLE

We study the extent to which credit index (CDX) options are priced consistent with S&P 500 (SPX) equity index options. We derive analytical expressions for CDX and SPX options within a structural credit‐risk model with stochastic volatility and jumps using new results for pricing compound options via multivariate affine transform analysis. The model captures many aspects of the joint dynamics of CDX and SPX options. However, it cannot reconcile the relative levels of option prices, suggesting that credit and equity markets are not fully integrated. A strategy of selling CDX volatility yields significantly higher excess returns than selling SPX volatility.

Going Public and the Internal Organization of the Firm

Published: 12/9/2025,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70012  |  Cited by: 4

DANIEL BIAS, BENJAMIN LOCHNER, STEFAN OBERNBERGER, MERIH SEVILIR

This paper examines how initial public offerings (IPOs) affect firms' internal organization. We find that IPO firms become more hierarchical and standardized organizations, characterized by additional layers, more managers, smaller control spans, and larger administrative functions. These changes occur mostly in preparation for the IPO and can be only partially explained by growth. IPO firms with greater human capital risk experience larger hierarchical changes. Hierarchical changes help firms standardize employee roles and formalize internal processes. Our results suggest that firms reorganize to reduce their dependence on key individuals' human capital when transitioning to public markets.

Market Structure and Transaction Costs of Index CDSs

Published: 6/17/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12953  |  Cited by: 56

PIERRE COLLIN‐DUFRESNE, BENJAMIN JUNGE, ANDERS B. TROLLE

Despite regulatory efforts to promote all‐to‐all trading, the post–Dodd‐Frank index credit default swap market remains two‐tiered. Transaction costs are higher for dealer‐to‐client than interdealer trades, but the difference is explained by the higher, largely permanent, price impact of client trades. Most interdealer trades are liquidity motivated and executed via low‐cost, low‐immediacy trading protocols. Dealer‐to‐client trades are nonanonymous; they almost always improve upon contemporaneous executable interdealer quotes, and dealers appear to price discriminate based on the perceived price impact of trades. Our results suggest that the market structure is a consequence of the characteristics of client trades: relatively infrequent, large, and differentially informed.

Who Owns What? A Factor Model for Direct Stockholding

Published: 3/27/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13220  |  Cited by: 57

VIMAL BALASUBRAMANIAM, JOHN Y. CAMPBELL, TARUN RAMADORAI, BENJAMIN RANISH

We build a cross‐sectional factor model for investors' direct stockholdings and estimate it using data from almost 10 million retail accounts in the Indian stock market. Our model identifies strong investor clienteles for stock characteristics, most notably firm age and share price, and for particular clusters of stock characteristics. These clienteles are intuitively associated with investor attributes such as account age, size, and diversification. Coheld stocks tend to have higher return covariance, inconsistent with simple models of diversification but suggestive that clientele demands influence stock returns.

Sequential Search for Corporate Bonds

Published: 8/10/2026,  Volume: ,  Issue:   |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70068  |  Cited by: 0

MAHYAR KARGAR, BENJAMIN LESTER, SÉBASTIEN PLANTE, PIERRE‐OLIVIER WEILL

Customers in over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets must find a counterparty to trade. Little is known about this process, however, because existing data consist of transaction records, which only reveal the outcome of a search. Using data from a trading platform for corporate bonds, we unpack the search process. We analyze how long it takes customers to trade and how dealers' offers evolve across repeated inquiries. We estimate that it takes two to three days to complete a transaction after an unsuccessful attempt, with substantial variation across trade and customer characteristics. Our analysis offers insights into the sources of trading delays in OTC markets.

Shareholder Taxes in Acquisition Premiums: The Effect of Capital Gains Taxation

Published: 11/7/2003,  Volume: 58,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00622.x  |  Cited by: 154

Benjamin C. Ayers, Craig E. Lefanowicz, John R. Robinson

AbstractWe exploit cross‐temporal differences in capital gains tax rates to test whether shareholder‐level capital gains taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. We model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price‐setting shareholder as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Consistent with a lock‐in effect for acquisition premiums, results suggest a unique positive association between shareholder capital gains taxes for individual investors and acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions, which is mitigated by target institutional ownership.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 106

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.