The Journal of Finance

Political Connections and Allocative Distortions

Published: 1/7/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12751  |  Cited by: 295

DAVID SCHOENHERR

Exploiting a unique institutional setting in Korea, this paper documents that politicians can increase the amount of government resources allocated through their social networks to the benefit of private firms connected to these networks. After winning the election, the new president appoints members of his networks as CEOs of state‐owned firms that act as intermediaries in allocating government contracts to private firms. In turn, these state firms allocate significantly more procurement contracts to private firms with a CEO from the same network. Contracts allocated to connected private firms are executed systematically worse and exhibit more frequent cost increases through renegotiations.

When Should Bankruptcy Law Be Creditor‐ or Debtor‐Friendly? Theory and Evidence

Published: 8/22/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13171  |  Cited by: 39

DAVID SCHOENHERR, JAN STARMANS

We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners' and managers' personal costs of bankruptcy (PCB). Theoretically, we show that firms with high PCB borrow and invest more under a more debtor‐friendly management stay system, whereas firms with low PCB borrow and invest more under a more creditor‐friendly receivership system. Intuitively, stronger creditor protection relaxes financial constraints but reduces credit demand. Which effect dominates depends on owners' and managers' PCB. Empirically, we find support for these predictions using a Korean bankruptcy reform that replaced receivership with management stay.

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04539.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID FELDMAN

STATE OF THE FINANCE FIELD: FURTHER COMMENT

Published: 12/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00322.x  |  Cited by: 10

David Durand

Heterogeneous Beliefs, Speculation, and the Equity Premium

Published: 1/10/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01310.x  |  Cited by: 211

ALEXANDER DAVID

Agents with heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental growth do not share risks perfectly but instead speculate with each other on the relative accuracy of their models' predictions. They face the risk that market prices move more in line with the trading models of competing agents than with their own. Less risk‐averse agents speculate more aggressively and demand higher risk premiums. My calibrated model generates countercyclical consumption volatility, earnings forecast dispersion, and cross‐sectional consumption dispersion. With a risk aversion coefficient less than one, agents' speculation causes half the observed equity premium and lowers the riskless rate by about 1%.

Testing the Efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. Exchange Market under the Assumption of no Risk Premium

Published: 3/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03533.x  |  Cited by: 45

DAVID LONGWORTH

The efficiency of the Canadian‐U.S. exchange market for the current float is examined more extensively than previously. Semi‐strong‐form tests which admit the lagged spot rate as a predictor are considered in addition to the standard weak‐form test. These stronger tests reject the joint null hypothesis of an efficient exchange market and no risk premium for the period ending in October 1976, although not for the entire period. For almost every year the current spot rate provided a better forecast of the future spot rate than did the current forward rate.

The Term Structure of Interest Rates in a Partially Observable Economy

Published: 7/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04391.x  |  Cited by: 29

DAVID FELDMAN

This paper investigates the term structure of interest rates in a multiperiod production and exchange economy with incomplete information. Unable to observe their stochastic investment opportunities, investors engage in dynamic Bayesian inference. This results in the endogenous identification of a more complex production function which generates a richer term structure, resembling the one that actual market prices imply. In addition, this paper introduces a characteristic function of the term structure and demonstrates that, in contrast with a fully observable economy, the widely investigated expectations hypothesis holds true only if interest rates are nonstochastic.

Transactions Costs and the Theory of Portfolio Selection

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01964.x  |  Cited by: 26

David Goldsmith

Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors

Published: 10/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00699.x  |  Cited by: 624

DAVID YERMACK

I study incentives received by outside directors in Fortune 500 firms from compensation, replacement, and the opportunity to obtain other directorships. Previous research has only shown these relations to apply under limited circumstances such as financial distress. Together these incentive mechanisms provide directors with wealth increases of approximately 11 cents per $1,000 rise in firm value. Although smaller than the performance sensitivities of CEOs, outside directors' incentives imply a change in wealth of about $285,000 for a 1 standard deviation (SD) change in typical firm performance. Cross‐sectional patterns of director equity awards conform to agency and financial theories.

Individual Investors and Volatility

Published: 7/19/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01668.x  |  Cited by: 316

THIERRY FOUCAULT, DAVID SRAER, DAVID J. THESMAR

We show that retail trading activity has a positive effect on the volatility of stock returns, which suggests that retail investors behave as noise traders. To identify this effect, we use a reform of the French stock market that raises the relative cost of speculative trading for retail investors. The daily return volatility of the stocks affected by the reform falls by 20 basis points (a quarter of the sample standard deviation of the return volatility) relative to other stocks. For affected stocks, we also find a significant decrease in the magnitude of return reversals and the price impact of trades.

INCREASED TAXATION WITH INCREASED ACCEPTABILITY—A DISCUSSION OF NET WORTH TAXATION AS A FEDERAL REVENUE ALTERNATIVE

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01793.x  |  Cited by: 0

Martin David

Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements

Published: 6/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04809.x  |  Cited by: 622

DAVID YERMACK

This article analyzes the timing of CEO stock option awards, as a method of investigating corporate managers' influence over the terms of their own compensation. In a sample of 620 stock option awards to CEOs of Fortune 500 companies between 1992 and 1994, I find that the timing of awards coincides with favorable movements in company stock prices. Patterns of companies' quarterly earnings announcements are consistent with an interpretation that CEOs receive stock option awards shortly before favorable corporate news. I evaluate and reject several alternative explanations of the results, including insider trading and the manipulation of news announcement dates.

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03648.x  |  Cited by: 0

DAVID EMANUEL

A QUARTERLY SERIES OF CORPORATE BASIC YIELDS, 1952–57, AND SOME ATTENDANT RESERVATIONS*

Published: 9/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04200.x  |  Cited by: 3

David Durand

GROWTH STOCKS AND THE PETERSBURG PARADOX*

Published: 9/1957,  Volume: 12,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04143.x  |  Cited by: 13

David Durand

Presidential Address: Social Transmission Bias in Economics and Finance

Published: 5/27/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12906  |  Cited by: 271

DAVID HIRSHLEIFER

I discuss a new intellectual paradigm, social economics and finance—the study of the social processes that shape economic thinking and behavior. This emerging field recognizes that people observe and talk to each other. A key, underexploited building block of social economics and finance is social transmission bias: systematic directional shift in signals or ideas induced by social transactions. I use five “fables” (models) to illustrate the novelty and scope of the transmission bias approach, and offer several emergent themes. For example, social transmission bias compounds recursively, which can help explain booms, bubbles, return anomalies, and swings in economic sentiment.

MERGERS, DIVERSIFICATION AND THE THEORIES OF THE FIRM

Published: 3/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01368.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Gilbert

A Theoretical Model for Valuing Preferred Stock

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02288.x  |  Cited by: 19

DAVID EMANUEL

This paper develops a model of preferred stock value which includes the possibility of dividends on the preferred stock being omitted. The analytical framework used is based on the option‐hedging methodology of Black and Scholes. Precise valuation formulae are obtained for cumulative and noncumulative preferred stock in a variety of contexts. The values obtained are quite different from those for either riskless or risky perpetual bonds, which have previously been proposed as being similar to preferred stock.

Can Unemployment Insurance Spur Entrepreneurial Activity? Evidence from France

Published: 2/5/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12880  |  Cited by: 126

JOHAN HOMBERT, ANTOINETTE SCHOAR, DAVID SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We evaluate the effect of downside insurance on self‐employment. We exploit a large‐scale reform of French unemployment benefits that insured unemployed workers starting businesses. The reform significantly increased firm creation without decreasing the quality of new entrants. Firms started postreform were initially smaller, but their employment growth, productivity, and survival rates are similar to those prereform. New entrepreneurs' characteristics and expectations are also similar. Finally, jobs created by new entrants crowd out employment in incumbent firms almost one‐for‐one, but have a higher productivity than incumbents. These results highlight the benefits of encouraging experimentation by lowering barriers to entry.

Housing Collateral and Entrepreneurship

Published: 1/12/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12468  |  Cited by: 344

MARTIN C. SCHMALZ, DAVID A. SRAER, DAVID THESMAR

We show that collateral constraints restrict firm entry and postentry growth, using French administrative data and cross‐sectional variation in local house‐price appreciation as shocks to collateral values. We control for local demand shocks by comparing treated homeowners to controls in the same region that do not experience collateral shocks: renters and homeowners with an outstanding mortgage, who (in France) cannot take out a second mortgage. In both comparisons, an increase in collateral value leads to a higher probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Conditional on entry, treated entrepreneurs use more debt, start larger firms, and remain larger in the long run.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF UTILITY RATE‐BASE TYPE, PERMITTED RATE OF RETURN, AND UTILITY EARNINGS*

Published: 3/1962,  Volume: 17,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04247.x  |  Cited by: 2

David K. Eiteman

A BEHAVIORAL MODEL FOR COMMERCIAL BANKING*

Published: 9/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00941.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Neil Hyman

LEGAL ASPECTS OF REVENUE BOND FINANCING*

Published: 5/1955,  Volume: 10,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01266.x  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Wood

Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective Bargaining

Published: 5/7/2010,  Volume: 65,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01565.x  |  Cited by: 516

DAVID A. MATSA

I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier—organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm‐level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions.

Portfolio Disclosures and Year‐End Price Shifts

Published: 9/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01121.x  |  Cited by: 82

DAVID K. MUSTO

Commercial paper sells at an extra discount if it matures in the next calendar year but Treasury bills do not. The discount is apparent in downward price shifts before the year‐end, and upward price shifts at the turn of the year that are significantly correlated with the simultaneous returns to small stocks, and that cannot reflect tax‐loss selling. Cross‐sectional and time‐series tests on prices, as well as low of funds evidence on trades by institutional investors, indicate that both the debt and equity patterns reflect agency problems related to portfolio disclosures.

A SUGGESTION FOR THE CONTROL OF PEACETIME INFLATION*

Published: 12/1949,  Volume: 4,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1949.tb02359.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Gordon Tyndall

CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICIES—DEBT VERSUS EQUITY*

Published: 6/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01873.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Patrick Rochester

SECURITY‐BASED CONGLOMERATE ACQUISITIONS: THE EFFECT ON RESIDUAL OWNERSHIP*

Published: 3/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00611.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Foster Rankin

THE S.E.C. SPECIAL STUDY AND THE EXCHANGE MARKETS

Published: 5/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00230.x  |  Cited by: 2

David K. Eiteman

THE RESPONSE OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO FEDERAL GRANT‐IN‐AID PAYMENTS*

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00839.x  |  Cited by: 0

David L. Smith

ON THE UTILITY THEORETIC FOUNDATIONS OF MEAN‐VARIANCE ANALYSIS

Published: 12/1977,  Volume: 32,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb03363.x  |  Cited by: 47

David P. Baron

THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GROWTH ON THE RISK OF COMMON STOCKS

Published: 5/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01827.x  |  Cited by: 18

David R. Fewings

LIQUIDITY RATIOS AND RECENT BRITISH MONETARY EXPERIENCE

Published: 12/1958,  Volume: 13,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1958.tb04219.x  |  Cited by: 0

David E. Novack

Risk‐Based Premiums for Insurance Guaranty Funds

Published: 9/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb02607.x  |  Cited by: 148

J. DAVID CUMMINS

Insurance guaranty funds have been adopted in all states to compensate policyholders for losses resulting from insurance company insolvencies. The guaranty funds charge flat premium rates, usually a percentage of premiums. Flat premiums can induce insurers to adopt high‐risk strategies, a problem that can be avoided through the use of risk‐based premiums. This article develops risk‐based premium formulas for three cases: a) an ongoing insurer with stochastic assets and liabilities, b) an ongoing insurer also subject to jumps in liabilities (catastrophes), and c) a policy cohort, where claims eventually run off to zero. Premium estimates are provided and compared with actual guaranty fund assessment rates.

Inflation and Asset Returns in a Monetary Economy

Published: 9/1992,  Volume: 47,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04660.x  |  Cited by: 170

DAVID A. MARSHALL

Postwar U.S. data are characterized by negative correlations between real equity returns and inflation and by positive correlations between real equity returns and money growth. These patterns are closely matched quantitatively by an equilibrium monetary asset pricing model. The model also implies negative correlations between expected asset returns and expected inflation, and it predicts that the inflation‐asset return correlation will be more strongly negative when inflation is generated by fluctuations in real economic activity than when it is generated by monetary fluctuations.

Volatility increases Subsequent to NYSE and AMEX Stock Splits

Published: 3/1991,  Volume: 46,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03759.x  |  Cited by: 66

DAVID A. DUBOFSKY

The post‐split increase in daily returns volatility is less for AMEX stocks than for NYSE stocks. The exchange trading location is a significant factor in explaining the volatility shift even after stock price and firm size are considered. Furthermore, when measured on a weekly basis, there is no increase in AMEX stocks' returns volatility. These results suggest that measurement errors created by bid‐ask spreads and the 1/8 effect, and also one or more of the elements that make the NYSE different from the AMEX, explain why the estimated volatility of daily stock returns increases after the ex split date.

What Do Entrepreneurs Pay for Venture Capital Affiliation?

Published: 8/2004,  Volume: 59,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00680.x  |  Cited by: 1055

David H. Hsu

This study empirically evaluates the certification and value‐added roles of reputable venture capitalists (VCs). Using a novel sample of entrepreneurial start‐ups with multiple financing offers, I analyze financing offers made by competing VCs at the first professional round of start‐up funding, holding characteristics of the start‐up fixed. Offers made by VCs with a high reputation are three times more likely to be accepted, and high‐reputation VCs acquire start‐up equity at a 10–14% discount. The evidence suggests that VCs' “extra‐financial” value may be more distinctive than their functionally equivalent financial capital. These extra‐financial services can have financial consequences.

Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer

Published: 8/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00380-i1  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03668.x  |  Cited by: 1

DAVID S. KIDWELL

The Manipulation of Executive Stock Option Exercise Strategies: Information Timing and Backdating

Published: 11/25/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01513.x  |  Cited by: 70

DAVID C. CICERO

I identify three option exercise strategies executives engage in, including (i) exercising with cash and immediately selling the shares, (ii) exercising with cash and holding the shares, and (iii) delivering some shares to the company to cover the exercise costs and holding the remaining shares. Stock price patterns suggest executives manipulate option exercises. They use private information to increase the profitability of all three strategies, and likely backdated some exercise dates in the pre‐Sarbanes‐Oxley period to enhance the profitability of the latter two strategies, where the executive's company is the only counterparty. Backdating is associated with reporting of internal control weaknesses.

Investment Decisions Depend on Portfolio Disclosures

Published: 6/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00132  |  Cited by: 146

David K. Musto

Abstract A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross‐sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers.

DISCUSSION

Published: 7/1988,  Volume: 43,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb04595.x  |  Cited by: 2

DAVID K. WHITCOMB

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1973,  Volume: 28,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01795.x  |  Cited by: 0

David J. Ott

REPLY

Published: 12/1959,  Volume: 14,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00143.x  |  Cited by: 0

David E. Novack

THE PERFORMANCE OF PRIMARY COMMON STOCK OFFERINGS: A CANADIAN COMPARISON

Published: 12/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01751.x  |  Cited by: 17

David C. Shaw

Fed Policy, Financial Market Efficiency, and Capital Flows

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00153  |  Cited by: 0

David M. Jones

GOVERNMENT DEBT, INTERGENERATION WELFARE, AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY*

Published: 6/1968,  Volume: 23,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00836.x  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Kopf

Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting

Published: 8/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00155  |  Cited by: 0

David H. Pyle

Liquidity and Liquidation: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Published: 2/2000,  Volume: 55,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00213  |  Cited by: 38

David T. Brown

This study provides evidence that highly leveraged owner‐managed properties liquidated assets during the commercial real estate decline of the late 1980s, and that this provided buying opportunities for better capitalized buyers. The analysis documents significant financial distress costs for highly leveraged firms during an industry‐wide downturn and shows that these costs are particularly large for owner‐managed firms.

A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services for New Issues

Published: 9/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03591.x  |  Cited by: 637

DAVID P. BARON

This paper presents a theory of the demand for investment banking advising and distribution services for the case in which the investment banker is better informed about the capital market than is the issuer, and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the banker. The optimal contract under which the offer price decision is delegated to the better‐informed banker in order to deal with the adverse selection and moral hazard problems resulting from the informational asymmetry and the observability problem is characterized. The model demonstrates a positive demand for investment banking advising and distribution services and provides an explanation of the underpricing of new issues.