The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
AFA members can log in to view full-text articles below.
View past issues
Search the Journal of Finance:
Search results: 50.
Mutual Fund Trading Pressure: Firm‐Level Stock Price Impact and Timing of SEOs
Published: 7/19/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01750.x | Cited by: 204
MOZAFFAR KHAN, LEONID KOGAN, GEORGE SERAFEIM
We use price pressure resulting from purchases by mutual funds with large capital inflows to identify overvalued equity. This is a relatively exogenous overvaluation indicator as it is associated with who is buying—buyers with excess liquidity—rather than what is being purchased. We document substantial stock price impact associated with purchases by high‐inflow mutual funds, and find the probability of a seasoned equity offering (SEO), insider sales, and the probability of a stock‐based acquisition increase significantly in the four quarters following the mutual fund buying pressure. These results provide new evidence that firm managers are able to identify and exploit overvalued equity.
PROJECTING MARKET STRUCTURE BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION: A STUDY OF BANK EXPANSION IN NEW JERSEY
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03027.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Juncker, George S. Oldfield
VALUATION PARAMETERS OF PROPERTY‐LIABILITY COMPANIES
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01991.x | Cited by: 12
George Foster
Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information
Published: 6/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05047.x | Cited by: 19
GEORGE KANATAS
The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.
INTRODUCTION
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00201.x | Cited by: 0
George Garvy
ELEMENTS OF TIMING AND RESPONSE IN THE BALANCE SHEET OF BANKING, 1953–55*
Published: 5/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04133.x | Cited by: 0
George Horwich
TIGHT MONEY, MONETARY RESTRAINT, AND THE PRICE LEVEL*
Published: 3/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02952.x | Cited by: 2
George Horwich
THE LONG‐RUN EFFECTS UPON THE UNITED STATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EAST*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02488.x | Cited by: 0
George Rosen
Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural Experiment: Germany, 1880–1940
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00090 | Cited by: 208
George Bittlingmayer
Why does stock volatility increase when output declines? The theory of investment under uncertainty implies that political uncertainty may simultaneously increase volatility and reduce output. Though cause and effect are typically hard to separate, the transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany offers a natural experiment because major political events left clear traces on stock prices. Current and past increases in volatility are associated with output declines, consistent with U.S. experience. However, political events are more clearly the source of volatility, and the results support the view that the relationship between volatility and output reflects the joint effects of political factors.
TIGHT MONEY AS A CAUSE OF INFLATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00600.x | Cited by: 1
George Horwich
Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question
Published: 12/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04680.x | Cited by: 24
GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER
Periodic antitrust attacks on corporations may have influenced stock prices. For the period 1904 to 1944, each antitrust case filed is associated with a 0.5 to 1.9 percent drop of the Dow, and each unexpected case with even larger drops. Other aspects of antitrust besides actual filings may help account for other movements, in particular the 1929 Crash. Historical evidence bears on the question of whether antitrust is exogenous and also links antitrust and the “corporation problem.” These results illustrate the sorts of real factors aside from changes in concurrent output that may account for stock price volatility.
Externalities and Financial Reporting
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02183.x | Cited by: 47
GEORGE FOSTER
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04997.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE TAUCHEN
“IS THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REALLY NECESSARY?”: COMMENT
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02913.x | Cited by: 1
George G. Kaufman
FEDERAL TAXING AND SPENDING IN VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY
Published: 3/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04446.x | Cited by: 0
George W. McKinney
“A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS” AND THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03412.x | Cited by: 5
George E. Pinches
COMMERCIAL BANK PRICE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SMALL LOANS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
Published: 12/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02889.x | Cited by: 0
George J. Benston
SEASONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FLOW OF FUNDS*
Published: 3/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00198.x | Cited by: 0
George J. Viksnins
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO BANKING COMPETITION: COMMENT
Published: 6/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00997.x | Cited by: 3
George J. Benston
BUSINESS PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
Published: 5/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01592.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
PROPERTY TAXATION IN RELATION TO INVESTMENT IN URBAN AREAS
Published: 6/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04459.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK, 1960–1967: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00598.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Pinches
LAND DEVELOPMENT‐VALUE PROBLEMS AND THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT OF 1947*
Published: 12/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01307.x | Cited by: 0
George G. Sause
Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting December 29, 1959
Published: 5/1960, Volume: 15, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb00174.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
RESPONSES OF SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANKS TO FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY, JANUARY, 1957, TO APRIL, 1959*
Published: 3/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01627.x | Cited by: 0
George G. Kaufman
THE PROXIMATE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON FLOWS OF FUNDS THROUGH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES*
Published: 9/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00263.x | Cited by: 0
William George Nelson
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN BANKING
Published: 12/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01253.x | Cited by: 3
George Taylor Harris
Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value
Published: 7/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04006.x | Cited by: 63
GEORGE P. BAKER
This paper chronicles the history of the Beatrice company from its founding in 1891 as a small creamery, through its growth by acquisition into a diversified consumer and industrial products firm, and its subsequent leveraged buyout and sell‐off. The paper analyzes the value consequences the firm's acquisition and divestiture policies, its organizational strategy, and its governance. The analysis sheds light on a number of issues in organization theory, strategy, and corporate finance, including the sources of value in diversifying aquisitions, the cost of over‐centralization and weak corporate governance, and the mechanisms of value creation in the market for corporate control.
AN EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL “BANKRUPTCY” LAWS AND PROCEDURES
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01462.x | Cited by: 5
George H. Hempel
A GENERAL GRANT FOR THE STATES: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS OBJECTIVES, JUSTIFICATION, AND EFFECTS*
Published: 9/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00946.x | Cited by: 0
George Paul Roniger
CONVERTIBILITY—THE CURRENT APPROACH*
Published: 5/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01262.x | Cited by: 0
George H. Willis
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK, 1960–1967
Published: 3/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00413.x | Cited by: 2
George E. Pinches
BRANCH BANKING AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00212.x | Cited by: 227
George J. Benston
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02248.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE R. HALL
INTEREST RATES VERSUS INTEREST CEILINGS IN THE ALLOCATION OF CREDIT FLOWS
Published: 5/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00012.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05003.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
REVENUE SHARING: PRIORITIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00800.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDERS
Published: 3/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01522.x | Cited by: 1
George W. McKinney
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESERVE REQUIREMENT PLANS
Published: 12/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01697.x | Cited by: 2
George J. Benston
THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF A STOCK RIGHT
Published: 3/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01560.x | Cited by: 0
George Heberton Evans
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03065.x | Cited by: 1
George C. Pinches
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04987.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting December 29, 1960
Published: 5/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02833.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
Published: 6/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03945.x | Cited by: 347
GEORGE G. PENNACCHI
This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral‐hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank‐loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral‐hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.
A FURTHER NOTE ON TIME DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
Published: 3/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00488.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Morrison
Managerial Preference, Asymmetric Information, and Financial Structure
Published: 9/1987, Volume: 42, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1987.tb03915.x | Cited by: 37
GEORGE W. BLAZENKO
If firm performance affects managers' wealth or reputation, preferences of managers dominate firms' financing decisions. When information about real asset investment is symmetric, managers finance exclusively with equity. If managers know more about asset quality than do investors and if managers are sufficiently risk averse, they signal high‐quality projects with debt. Increases in collateral value decrease risky debt use. Increases in interest rates that do not change productive opportunities increase debt use. The explanation for these and further results is based on underpricing of equity and overpricing of debt at the margin.
CAPITAL BUDGETING, CIRCA 1915*
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02910.x | Cited by: 0
George A. Wing
THE FISCAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA FROM 1860 TO 1870*
Published: 9/1962, Volume: 17, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04325.x | Cited by: 0
George Wood Jennings