The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information
Published: 6/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05047.x | Cited by: 21
GEORGE KANATAS
The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.
Integration of Lending and Underwriting: Implications of Scope Economies
Published: 5/6/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00562 | Cited by: 63
George Kanatas, Jianping Qi
AbstractInformational scope economies provide a cost advantage to universal banks offering “one‐stop shopping” for lending and underwriting that enables them to “lock in” their clients' subsequent business. This market power reduces universal banks' incentive, relative to that of specialized investment banks, to apply costly underwriting efforts; consequently, universal banks are less successful in selling their clients' securities. Our results suggest that an integrated financial services market is less innovative than one with specialized intermediaries. Our analysis also identifies economy, intermediary, and firm characteristics that motivate either the integration or segmentation of bank lending and underwriting.
Interest Rate Uncertainty and the Financial Intermediary's Choice of Exposure
Published: 3/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03631.x | Cited by: 25
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
The financial intermediary's choice of operating as a broker with minimal risk exposure or as an asset‐transformer with interest rate risk is modeled as a funds inventory decision made prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the borrowing or lending interest rates. It is shown that an increase in the interest rate uncertainty leads the intermediary to reduce its exposure, thereby offering decreased asset‐transformation and more brokerage services. However, a stochastic increase in the interest rates leads to greater asset‐transformation and less brokerage services.
Bank Forward Lending in Alternative Funding Environments
Published: 9/1982, Volume: 37, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03589.x | Cited by: 12
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
This paper examines the effects of loan commitments on bank lending behavior in both deposit‐funding and liability management environments. Assuming that the bank lends exclusively under commitments and that the number of commitments exercised is uncertain, the bank must choose its supply of commitments. Given this choice, the bank becomes a passive lender to commitment holders. Our focus on forward credit markets sheds new light on the private bankers' assertion that they do not directly determine their level of lending, but merely “accommodate” the credit needs of their customers. Similarly, the central banker's claimed inability to control monetary aggregates in the short‐run becomes understandable in a new context. It is shown that the advent of liability management will reduce the volume of loan commitments and the expected size of the bank and of the banking system. It is also shown that increased uncertainty regarding borrower takedown behavior diminishes the volume of commitments, expected bank and banking system size.
Lending Policies of Financial Intermediaries Facing Credit and Funding Risk
Published: 6/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02507.x | Cited by: 10
SUDHAKAR D. DESHMUKH, STUART I. GREENBAUM, GEORGE KANATAS
This paper compares the optimal lending decisions of financial intermediaries that differ in their risk exposure. All intermediaries are assumed to face a loan demand described by a random applicant arrival process with each applicant offering a unique risk‐adjusted rate of return; loan demand is therefore uncertain in both quantity and quality. The intermediaries differ in terms of their risk exposure because of disparate funding practices. Intermediaries functioning as brokers minimize their exposure by borrowing funds only as demand is realized, whereas those behaving as asset‐transformers borrow in advance of realizing loan demand, thereby maintaining a loanable funds inventory and sustaining the related exposure. The optimal sequential lending policy is shown to involve setting a credit standard that becomes stricter with the length of the intermediary's planning horizon and the volume of loans outstanding. Most importantly, it is shown that brokers adopt stricter credit standards than asset‐transformers and therby reduce their volume of lending.
PROJECTING MARKET STRUCTURE BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION: A STUDY OF BANK EXPANSION IN NEW JERSEY
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03027.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Juncker, George S. Oldfield
THE LONG‐RUN EFFECTS UPON THE UNITED STATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EAST*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02488.x | Cited by: 0
George Rosen
ELEMENTS OF TIMING AND RESPONSE IN THE BALANCE SHEET OF BANKING, 1953–55*
Published: 5/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04133.x | Cited by: 0
George Horwich
Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural Experiment: Germany, 1880–1940
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00090 | Cited by: 210
George Bittlingmayer
Why does stock volatility increase when output declines? The theory of investment under uncertainty implies that political uncertainty may simultaneously increase volatility and reduce output. Though cause and effect are typically hard to separate, the transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany offers a natural experiment because major political events left clear traces on stock prices. Current and past increases in volatility are associated with output declines, consistent with U.S. experience. However, political events are more clearly the source of volatility, and the results support the view that the relationship between volatility and output reflects the joint effects of political factors.
VALUATION PARAMETERS OF PROPERTY‐LIABILITY COMPANIES
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01991.x | Cited by: 12
George Foster
INTRODUCTION
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00201.x | Cited by: 0
George Garvy
TIGHT MONEY AS A CAUSE OF INFLATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00600.x | Cited by: 1
George Horwich
TIGHT MONEY, MONETARY RESTRAINT, AND THE PRICE LEVEL*
Published: 3/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02952.x | Cited by: 2
George Horwich
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04997.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE TAUCHEN
Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question
Published: 12/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04680.x | Cited by: 24
GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER
Periodic antitrust attacks on corporations may have influenced stock prices. For the period 1904 to 1944, each antitrust case filed is associated with a 0.5 to 1.9 percent drop of the Dow, and each unexpected case with even larger drops. Other aspects of antitrust besides actual filings may help account for other movements, in particular the 1929 Crash. Historical evidence bears on the question of whether antitrust is exogenous and also links antitrust and the “corporation problem.” These results illustrate the sorts of real factors aside from changes in concurrent output that may account for stock price volatility.
Externalities and Financial Reporting
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02183.x | Cited by: 55
GEORGE FOSTER
“IS THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REALLY NECESSARY?”: COMMENT
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02913.x | Cited by: 1
George G. Kaufman
FEDERAL TAXING AND SPENDING IN VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY
Published: 3/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04446.x | Cited by: 0
George W. McKinney
“A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS” AND THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03412.x | Cited by: 5
George E. Pinches
SEASONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FLOW OF FUNDS*
Published: 3/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00198.x | Cited by: 0
George J. Viksnins
COMMERCIAL BANK PRICE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SMALL LOANS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
Published: 12/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02889.x | Cited by: 1
George J. Benston
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05003.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
REVENUE SHARING: PRIORITIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00800.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
ON THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CAPITAL LOSSES UNDER THE INCOME TAX
Published: 5/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01532.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
DIVIDEND REMITTANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*
Published: 9/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01332.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Kopits
FINANCIAL CONGENERICS*
Published: 6/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01875.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Ulseth
A FURTHER NOTE ON TIME DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
Published: 3/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00488.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Morrison
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1974, Volume: 29, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03065.x | Cited by: 1
George C. Pinches
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04987.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting December 29, 1960
Published: 5/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02833.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
Published: 6/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03945.x | Cited by: 352
GEORGE G. PENNACCHI
This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral‐hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank‐loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral‐hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO BANKING COMPETITION: COMMENT
Published: 6/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00997.x | Cited by: 3
George J. Benston
BUSINESS PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
Published: 5/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01592.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDERS
Published: 3/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01522.x | Cited by: 1
George W. McKinney
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESERVE REQUIREMENT PLANS
Published: 12/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01697.x | Cited by: 2
George J. Benston
THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF A STOCK RIGHT
Published: 3/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01560.x | Cited by: 1
George Heberton Evans
CAPITAL BUDGETING, CIRCA 1915*
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02910.x | Cited by: 0
George A. Wing
THE FISCAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA FROM 1860 TO 1870*
Published: 9/1962, Volume: 17, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1962.tb04325.x | Cited by: 0
George Wood Jennings
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF REVENUE BOND FINANCING
Published: 5/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01268.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
CORPORATE BOND MARKET
Published: 5/1961, Volume: 16, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02824.x | Cited by: 2
George T. Conklin
THE EFFECT OF “MARKET INDEXES” ON THE EX‐POST PERFORMANCE OF THE SHARPE PORTFOLIO SELECTION MODEL
Published: 6/1976, Volume: 31, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01936.x | Cited by: 6
George M. Frankfurter
THE CHANGING ROLE OF U.S. BANKS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCING
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00202.x | Cited by: 1
George H. Chittenden
A MARGINAL ANALYSIS OF THE BENEFIT‐COST RELATIONSHIPS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION PLANS*
Published: 12/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00883.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Hettenhouse
MAJOR TRENDS IN THE MARKET FOR TAX‐EXEMPT SECURITIES*, 1
Published: 5/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01222.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Lent
FISCAL POLICY IN A FULLY EMPLOYED ECONOMY
Published: 5/1967, Volume: 22, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1967.tb00010.x | Cited by: 1
George F. Break
AN EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL “BANKRUPTCY” LAWS AND PROCEDURES
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01462.x | Cited by: 5
George H. Hempel
MARKET RISK ADJUSTMENT IN PROJECT VALUATION
Published: 5/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb04870.x | Cited by: 139
George M. Constantinides
THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE DEBT MANAGEMENT*
Published: 12/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01764.x | Cited by: 0
George M. Frankfurter