The Journal of Finance publishes leading research across all the major fields of finance. It is one of the most widely cited journals in academic finance, and in all of economics. Each of the six issues per year reaches over 8,000 academics, finance professionals, libraries, and government and financial institutions around the world. The journal is the official publication of The American Finance Association, the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of knowledge about financial economics.
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Loan Sales and the Cost of Bank Capital
Published: 6/1988, Volume: 43, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1988.tb03945.x | Cited by: 352
GEORGE G. PENNACCHI
This paper considers a model where banks may improve the returns on loans by monitoring borrowers. Bank regulation, together with competitive deposit and equity financing, can give banks an incentive to sell loans, but the extent of their loan selling is limited by a moral‐hazard problem. A solution is given for the optimal design of the bank‐loan buyer contract that alleviates this moral‐hazard problem. An explanation is also given as to why some banks might buy loans and why loan sales volume has recently increased.
Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation
Published: 3/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05080.x | Cited by: 751
GARY GORTON, GEORGE PENNACCHI
Trading losses associated with information asymmetries can be mitigated by designing securities which split the cash flows of underlying assets. These securities, which can arise endogenously, have values that do not depend on the information known only to informed agents. Bank debt (deposits) is an example of this type of liquid security which protect relatively uninformed agents, and we provide a rationale for deposit insurance in this content. High‐grade corporate debt and government bonds are other examples, implying that a money market mutual fund‐based payments system may be an alternative to one based on insured bank deposits.
On Equilibrium When Contingent Capital Has a Market Trigger: A Correction to Sundaresan and Wang
Journal of Finance
(2015)
Published: 3/8/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12762 | Cited by: 29
GEORGE PENNACCHI, ALEXEI TCHISTYI
This paper identifies an error in Sundaresan and Wang (2015, hereafter SW) that invalidates its Theorem 1. The paper develops a model of contingent capital (CC) with a stock price trigger that is consistent with SW's framework and yields closed‐form solutions for stock and CC prices. Yet, the model shows that unique stock price equilibria exist for a broader range of CC contractual terms than those required by SW. Specifically, when conversion terms benefit CC investors and penalize shareholders, a unique equilibrium can exist rather than the multiple equilibria stated in SW.
Corporate Taxes and Securitization
Published: 5/11/2015, Volume: 70, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12157 | Cited by: 75
JOONGHO HAN, KWANGWOO PARK, GEORGE PENNACCHI
Most banks pay corporate income taxes, but securitization vehicles do not. Our model shows that, when a bank faces strong loan demand but limited deposit market power, this tax asymmetry creates an incentive to sell loans despite less‐efficient screening and monitoring of sold loans. Moreover, loan‐selling increases as a bank's corporate income tax rate and capital requirement rise. Our empirical tests show that U.S. commercial banks sell more of their mortgages when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. A policy implication is that tax‐induced loan‐selling will rise if banks’ required equity capital increases.
Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence
Published: 12/1999, Volume: 54, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00185 | Cited by: 95
Charles Kahn, George Pennacchi, Ben Sopranzetti
Like security prices, retail deposit interest rates cluster around integers and “even” fractions. However, explanations for security price clustering are incompatible with deposit rate clustering. A theory based on the limited recall of retail depositors is proposed. It predicts that banks tend to set rates at integers and that rates are “sticky” at these levels. The propensity for integer rates increases with the level of wholesale interest rates and deposit market concentration. When banks set noninteger rates, rates are more likely to be just above, rather than just below, integers. The paper finds substantial empirical support for the theory's implications.
PROJECTING MARKET STRUCTURE BY MONTE CARLO SIMULATION: A STUDY OF BANK EXPANSION IN NEW JERSEY
Published: 12/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03027.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Juncker, George S. Oldfield
INTRODUCTION
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00201.x | Cited by: 0
George Garvy
THE LONG‐RUN EFFECTS UPON THE UNITED STATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAR EAST*
Published: 12/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02488.x | Cited by: 0
George Rosen
ELEMENTS OF TIMING AND RESPONSE IN THE BALANCE SHEET OF BANKING, 1953–55*
Published: 5/1957, Volume: 12, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1957.tb04133.x | Cited by: 0
George Horwich
VALUATION PARAMETERS OF PROPERTY‐LIABILITY COMPANIES
Published: 6/1977, Volume: 32, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1977.tb01991.x | Cited by: 12
George Foster
Deposit Insurance and the Discount Window: Pricing under Asymmetric Information
Published: 6/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb05047.x | Cited by: 21
GEORGE KANATAS
The risk‐sensitive pricing of deposit insurance and the discount window is determined in an environment where banks have private information concerning their financial conditions. The two facilities are managed jointly; an incentive‐compatible policy is designed such that banks' choice of terms at which they can obtain insurance and access to discount window credit will reveal their asset quality. The function of the discount window is to be a risk‐neutral “lender of last resort” to banks in a market dominated by risk‐averse depositors.
TIGHT MONEY, MONETARY RESTRAINT, AND THE PRICE LEVEL*
Published: 3/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02952.x | Cited by: 2
George Horwich
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb04997.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE TAUCHEN
Output, Stock Volatility, and Political Uncertainty in a Natural Experiment: Germany, 1880–1940
Published: 12/1998, Volume: 53, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00090 | Cited by: 210
George Bittlingmayer
Why does stock volatility increase when output declines? The theory of investment under uncertainty implies that political uncertainty may simultaneously increase volatility and reduce output. Though cause and effect are typically hard to separate, the transition from Imperial to Weimar Germany offers a natural experiment because major political events left clear traces on stock prices. Current and past increases in volatility are associated with output declines, consistent with U.S. experience. However, political events are more clearly the source of volatility, and the results support the view that the relationship between volatility and output reflects the joint effects of political factors.
TIGHT MONEY AS A CAUSE OF INFLATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00600.x | Cited by: 1
George Horwich
Stock Returns, Real Activity, and the Trust Question
Published: 12/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04680.x | Cited by: 24
GEORGE BITTLINGMAYER
Periodic antitrust attacks on corporations may have influenced stock prices. For the period 1904 to 1944, each antitrust case filed is associated with a 0.5 to 1.9 percent drop of the Dow, and each unexpected case with even larger drops. Other aspects of antitrust besides actual filings may help account for other movements, in particular the 1929 Crash. Historical evidence bears on the question of whether antitrust is exogenous and also links antitrust and the “corporation problem.” These results illustrate the sorts of real factors aside from changes in concurrent output that may account for stock price volatility.
Externalities and Financial Reporting
Published: 5/1980, Volume: 35, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02183.x | Cited by: 55
GEORGE FOSTER
“IS THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM REALLY NECESSARY?”: COMMENT
Published: 9/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb02913.x | Cited by: 1
George G. Kaufman
Minutes of the Annual Membership Meeting December 29, 1959
Published: 5/1960, Volume: 15, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb00174.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
RESPONSES OF SELECTED COMMERCIAL BANKS TO FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY, JANUARY, 1957, TO APRIL, 1959*
Published: 3/1963, Volume: 18, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1963.tb01627.x | Cited by: 0
George G. Kaufman
DISCUSSION
Published: 7/1985, Volume: 40, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05003.x | Cited by: 1
GEORGE M. CONSTANTINIDES
REVENUE SHARING: PRIORITIES AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Published: 5/1968, Volume: 23, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1968.tb00800.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
FEDERAL TAXING AND SPENDING IN VIRGINIA: A QUANTITATIVE STUDY
Published: 3/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04446.x | Cited by: 0
George W. McKinney
“A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF INDUSTRIAL BOND RATINGS” AND THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATION: REPLY
Published: 3/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03412.x | Cited by: 5
George E. Pinches
SEASONAL MOVEMENTS IN THE FLOW OF FUNDS*
Published: 3/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00198.x | Cited by: 0
George J. Viksnins
COMMERCIAL BANK PRICE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST SMALL LOANS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
Published: 12/1964, Volume: 19, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1964.tb02889.x | Cited by: 1
George J. Benston
ON THE DEDUCTIBILITY OF CAPITAL LOSSES UNDER THE INCOME TAX
Published: 5/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01532.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Break
DIVIDEND REMITTANCE BEHAVIOR WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FIRM: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*
Published: 9/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb01332.x | Cited by: 0
George F. Kopits
FINANCIAL CONGENERICS*
Published: 6/1975, Volume: 30, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01875.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Ulseth
A FURTHER NOTE ON TIME DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES
Published: 3/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb00488.x | Cited by: 0
George R. Morrison
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LENDERS
Published: 3/1952, Volume: 7, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb01522.x | Cited by: 1
George W. McKinney
AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE RESERVE REQUIREMENT PLANS
Published: 12/1969, Volume: 24, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1969.tb01697.x | Cited by: 2
George J. Benston
THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF A STOCK RIGHT
Published: 3/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01560.x | Cited by: 1
George Heberton Evans
A MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO BANKING COMPETITION: COMMENT
Published: 6/1972, Volume: 27, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb00997.x | Cited by: 3
George J. Benston
BUSINESS PROCEEDINGS, AMERICAN FINANCE ASSOCIATION
Published: 5/1959, Volume: 14, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1959.tb01592.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Hassett
MARKET RISK ADJUSTMENT IN PROJECT VALUATION
Published: 5/1978, Volume: 33, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb04870.x | Cited by: 139
George M. Constantinides
AN EVALUATION OF MUNICIPAL “BANKRUPTCY” LAWS AND PROCEDURES
Published: 12/1973, Volume: 28, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1973.tb01462.x | Cited by: 5
George H. Hempel
THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE DEBT MANAGEMENT*
Published: 12/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01764.x | Cited by: 0
George M. Frankfurter
PROPERTY TAXATION IN RELATION TO INVESTMENT IN URBAN AREAS
Published: 6/1951, Volume: 6, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1951.tb04459.x | Cited by: 0
George W. Mitchell
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK, 1960–1967: REPLY
Published: 3/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00598.x | Cited by: 0
George E. Pinches
A GENERAL GRANT FOR THE STATES: A CONSIDERATION OF ITS OBJECTIVES, JUSTIFICATION, AND EFFECTS*
Published: 9/1971, Volume: 26, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00946.x | Cited by: 0
George Paul Roniger
CONVERTIBILITY—THE CURRENT APPROACH*
Published: 5/1955, Volume: 10, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1955.tb01262.x | Cited by: 0
George H. Willis
FINANCING WITH CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK, 1960–1967
Published: 3/1970, Volume: 25, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1970.tb00413.x | Cited by: 2
George E. Pinches
BRANCH BANKING AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE
Published: 5/1965, Volume: 20, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1965.tb00212.x | Cited by: 234
George J. Benston
THE PROXIMATE IMPACT OF MONETARY POLICY ON FLOWS OF FUNDS THROUGH FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES*
Published: 9/1966, Volume: 21, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00263.x | Cited by: 0
William George Nelson
THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN BANKING
Published: 12/1954, Volume: 9, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1954.tb01253.x | Cited by: 3
George Taylor Harris
Beatrice: A Study in the Creation and Destruction of Value
Published: 7/1992, Volume: 47, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04006.x | Cited by: 63
GEORGE P. BAKER
This paper chronicles the history of the Beatrice company from its founding in 1891 as a small creamery, through its growth by acquisition into a diversified consumer and industrial products firm, and its subsequent leveraged buyout and sell‐off. The paper analyzes the value consequences the firm's acquisition and divestiture policies, its organizational strategy, and its governance. The analysis sheds light on a number of issues in organization theory, strategy, and corporate finance, including the sources of value in diversifying aquisitions, the cost of over‐centralization and weak corporate governance, and the mechanisms of value creation in the market for corporate control.
DISCUSSION
Published: 5/1983, Volume: 38, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02248.x | Cited by: 0
GEORGE R. HALL