The Journal of Finance

On the Foundations of Corporate Social Responsibility

Published: 3/21/2017,  Volume: 72,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12487  |  Cited by: 1344

HAO LIANG, LUC RENNEBOOG

Using corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings for 23,000 companies from 114 countries, we find that a firm's CSR rating and its country's legal origin are strongly correlated. Legal origin is a stronger explanation than “doing good by doing well” factors or firm and country characteristics (ownership concentration, political institutions, and globalization): firms from common law countries have lower CSR than companies from civil law countries, with Scandinavian civil law firms having the highest CSR ratings. Evidence from quasi‐natural experiments such as scandals and natural disasters suggests that civil law firms are more responsive to CSR shocks than common law firms.

A STUDY IN THE MATURITY STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES*

Published: 3/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb02966.x  |  Cited by: 0

Liang‐Shing Fan

Does Herding Behavior Reveal Skill? An Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance

Published: 7/16/2018,  Volume: 73,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12699  |  Cited by: 182

HAO JIANG, MICHELA VERARDO

We uncover a negative relation between herding behavior and skill in the mutual fund industry. Our new, dynamic measure of fund‐level herding captures the tendency of fund managers to follow the trades of the institutional crowd. We find that herding funds underperform their antiherding peers by over 2% per year. Differences in skill drive this performance gap: Antiherding funds make superior investment decisions even on stocks not heavily traded by institutions, and can anticipate the trades of the crowd; furthermore, the herding‐antiherding performance gap is persistent, wider when skill is more valuable, and larger among managers with stronger career concerns.

Term Structure of Interest Rates with Regime Shifts

Published: 10/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00487  |  Cited by: 342

Ravi Bansal, Hao Zhou

We develop a term structure model where the short interest rate and the market price of risks are subject to discrete regime shifts. Empirical evidence from efficient method of moments estimation provides considerable support for the regime shifts model. Standard models, which include affine specifications with up to three factors, are sharply rejected in the data. Our diagnostics show that only the regime shifts model can account for the well‐documented violations of the expectations hypothesis, the observed conditional volatility, and the conditional correlation across yields. We find that regimes are intimately related to business cycles.

Do Creditor Rights Increase Employment Risk? Evidence from Loan Covenants

Published: 11/10/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12435  |  Cited by: 256

ANTONIO FALATO, NELLIE LIANG

Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor bargaining units lead to higher loan spreads, consistent with creditors requiring compensation when employees gain bargaining power. Overall, binding financial contracts have a large impact on employees and are an amplification mechanism of economic downturns.

Market Making Contracts, Firm Value, and the IPO Decision

Published: 9/3/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12285  |  Cited by: 63

HENDRIK BESSEMBINDER, JIA HAO, KUNCHENG ZHENG

We examine the effects of secondary market liquidity on firm value and the IPO decision. Competitive aftermarket liquidity provision is associated with reduced welfare and a discounted secondary market price that can dissuade IPOs. The competitive market fails in particular for firms or at times when uncertainty regarding fundamental value and asymmetric information are large in combination. In these cases, firm value and welfare are improved by a contract where the firm engages a designated market maker to enhance liquidity. Such contracts represent a market solution to a market imperfection, particularly for small, growth firms.

The Causal Effect of Limits to Arbitrage on Asset Pricing Anomalies

Published: 5/29/2020,  Volume: 75,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12947  |  Cited by: 151

YONGQIANG CHU, DAVID HIRSHLEIFER, LIANG MA

We examine the causal effect of limits to arbitrage on 11 well‐known asset pricing anomalies using the pilot program of Regulation SHO, which relaxed short‐sale constraints for a quasi‐random set of pilot stocks, as a natural experiment. We find that the anomalies became weaker on portfolios constructed with pilot stocks during the pilot period. The pilot program reduced the combined anomaly long–short portfolio returns by 72 basis points per month, a difference that survives risk adjustment with standard factor models. The effect comes only from the short legs of the anomaly portfolios.

The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market

Published: 5/20/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12023  |  Cited by: 300

DANIEL COVITZ, NELLIE LIANG, GUSTAVO A. SUAREZ

This paper documents “runs” on asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one‐third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program‐level and macro‐financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.

Executive Financial Incentives and Payout Policy: Firm Responses to the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut

Published: 8/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01261.x  |  Cited by: 217

JEFFREY R. BROWN, NELLIE LIANG, SCOTT WEISBENNER

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.

Model Ambiguity versus Model Misspecification in Dynamic Portfolio Choice

Published: 1/21/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70027  |  Cited by: 0

PASCAL J. MAENHOUT, HAO XING, ANNE G. BALTER

We study aversion to model ambiguity and misspecification in dynamic portfolio choice. Risk‐averse investors (relative risk aversion ) fear return persistence, while risk‐tolerant investors () fear mean reversion, when confronting model misspecification concerns of identically and independently distributed (IID) returns. The intuition is that risk‐averse investors, who want to hedge intertemporally, endogenously fear return persistence, which precludes hedging. A log investor is myopic and unaffected by model misspecification, therefore only worrying about model ambiguity. Our model can generate belief scarring, nonparticipation in equity markets, and extrapolative return expectations. Extending beyond IID returns, we study model misspecification for a mean‐reverting Sharpe ratio.

The Dark Side of Circuit Breakers

Published: 2/23/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13310  |  Cited by: 23

HUI CHEN, ANTON PETUKHOV, JIANG WANG, HAO XING

Market‐wide circuit breakers are trading halts aimed at stabilizing the market during dramatic price declines. Using an intertemporal equilibrium model, we show that a circuit breaker significantly alters market dynamics and affects investor welfare. As the market approaches the circuit breaker, price volatility rises drastically, accelerating the chance of triggering the circuit breaker—the so‐called “magnet effect,” returns exhibit increasing negative skewness, and trading activity spikes up. Our empirical analysis supports the model's predictions. Circuit breakers can affect overall welfare negatively or positively, depending on the relative significance of investors' trading motives for risk sharing versus irrational speculation.

Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence from Hedge Fund Registration

Published: 11/11/2008,  Volume: 63,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01413.x  |  Cited by: 187

STEPHEN BROWN, WILLIAM GOETZMANN, BING LIANG, CHRISTOPHER SCHWARZ

Mandatory disclosure is a regulatory tool intended to allow market participants to assess operational risk. We examine the value of disclosure through the controversial SEC requirement, since overturned, which required major hedge funds to register as investment advisors and file Form ADV disclosures. Leverage and ownership structures suggest that lenders and equity investors were already aware of operational risk. However, operational risk does not mediate flow‐performance relationships. Investors either lack this information or regard it as immaterial. These findings suggest that regulators should account for the endogenous production of information and the marginal benefit of disclosure to different investment clienteles.

The Drivers and Implications of Retail Margin Trading

Published: 5/15/2026,  Volume: 81,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70049  |  Cited by: 4

JIANGZE BIAN, ZHI DA, ZHIGUO HE, DONG LOU, KELLY SHUE, HAO ZHOU

Using granular data covering both regulated (brokerage‐financed) and unregulated (shadow‐financed) margin accounts in China, we provide novel evidence on retail investors' margin trading behavior and its price implications. We first show that retail investors' decisions to lever up in stock trading despite the hefty borrowing cost is related to their lottery preferences. We then show that margin borrowing affects investors' trading behavior—investors are more likely to liquidate their holdings as they approach margin calls. Finally, we show that margin‐induced trading aggregates to affect asset prices and contributes to shock spillovers across stocks (e.g., from lottery stocks to nonlottery stocks).