The Journal of Finance

Trading Patterns and Prices in the Interbank Foreign Exchange Market

Published: 9/1993,  Volume: 48,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04760.x  |  Cited by: 258

TIM BOLLERSLEV, IAN DOMOWITZ

The behavior of quote arrivals and bid‐ask spreads is examined for continuously recorded deutsche mark‐dollar exchange rate data over time, across locations, and by market participants. A pattern in the intraday spread and intensity of market activity over time is uncovered and related to theories of trading patterns. Models for the conditional mean and variance of returns and bid‐ask spreads indicate volatility clustering at high frequencies. The proposition that trading intensity has an independent effect on returns volatility is rejected, but holds for spread volatility. Conditional returns volatility is increasing in the size of the spread.

Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision

Published: 2/1999,  Volume: 54,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00110  |  Cited by: 199

Ian Domowitz, Robert L. Sartain

Qualitative choice models of consumers' decisions to file for bankruptcy and their choice of bankruptcy chapter are estimated jointly, combining choice‐based sampling techniques with a nested estimation procedure. Medical and credit card debt are found to be the strongest contributors to bankruptcy, with homeownership playing an important role with respect to both the decision to declare bankruptcy and the choice of bankruptcy alternative. The potential effects of legal changes relating to property exemptions and dischargeable debt categories are found to encourage debt repayment through Chapter 13.

Market Segmentation and Stock Prices: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Published: 7/1997,  Volume: 52,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02725.x  |  Cited by: 169

IAN DOMOWITZ, JACK GLEN, ANANTH MADHAVAN

We examine the relationship between stock prices and market segmentation induced by ownership restrictions in Mexico. The focus is on multiple classes of equity that differentiate between foreign and domestic traders, and between domestic individuals and institutions. Significant stock price premia are documented for shares not restricted to a particular investor group. We analyze the theoretical and empirical determinants of premia across firms and over time. In addition to economy‐wide factors, segmentation reflects the relative scarcity of unrestricted shares. The results provide additional support for Stulz and Wasserfallen's (1995) hypothesis that firms discriminate between investor groups with different demand elasticities.

International Cross‐Listing and Order Flow Migration: Evidence from an Emerging Market

Published: 12/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00081  |  Cited by: 280

Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen, Ananth Madhavan

Policymakers in emerging markets are increasingly concerned about the consequences for the domestic equity market when companies list stock abroad. We show that the effects of cross‐listing depend on the quality of intermarket information linkages. We investigate these issues with unique data from the Mexican equity market. The impact of cross‐listing is complex—balancing the costs of order flow migration against the benefits of increased intermarket competition. These effects are exacerbated by equity investment barriers that induce segmentation of the domestic equity market. Consequently, the benefits and costs of cross‐listing are not evenly spread over all classes of shareholders.

DISCUSSION

Published: 6/1978,  Volume: 33,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb02042.x  |  Cited by: 0

Ian H. Giddy

The Limits of Limited Liability: Evidence from Industrial Pollution

Published: 10/13/2020,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12978  |  Cited by: 274

PAT AKEY, IAN APPEL

We study how parent liability for subsidiaries' environmental cleanup costs affects industrial pollution and production. Our empirical setting exploits a Supreme Court decision that strengthened parent limited liability protection for some subsidiaries. Using a difference‐in‐differences framework, we find that stronger liability protection for parents leads to a 5% to 9% increase in toxic emissions by subsidiaries. Evidence suggests the increase in pollution is driven by lower investment in abatement technologies rather than increased production. Cross‐sectional tests suggest convexities associated with insolvency and executive compensation drive heterogeneous effects. Overall, our findings highlight the moral hazard problem associated with limited liability.

THE EFFECT OF DEPOSIT RATE CEILINGS ON AGGREGATE INCOME

Published: 12/1972,  Volume: 27,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1972.tb03020.x  |  Cited by: 1

Gordon Pye, Ian Young

The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings

Published: 6/1989,  Volume: 44,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb05066.x  |  Cited by: 40

IAN GALE, JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ

The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small, there must be pooling in the first period. When uncertainty is large, the pooling equilibria dominate the separating equilibrium.

Work Ethic, Employment Contracts, and Firm Value

Published: 3/13/2009,  Volume: 64,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01449.x  |  Cited by: 83

BRUCE IAN CARLIN, SIMON GERVAIS

We analyze how the work ethic of managers impacts a firm's employment contracts, riskiness, growth potential, and organizational structure. Flat contracts are optimal for diligent managers because they reduce risk‐sharing costs, but they attract egoistic agents who shirk and unskilled agents who add no value. Stable, bureaucratic firms with low growth potential are more likely to gain value from managerial diligence. Firms that hire from a virtuous pool of agents are more conservative in their investments and have a horizontal corporate structure. Our theory also yields several testable implications that distinguish it from standard agency models.

ESTIMATION AND USES OF THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES

Published: 9/1976,  Volume: 31,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1976.tb01960.x  |  Cited by: 68

Willard T. Carleton, Ian A. Cooper

The Default Risk of Swaps

Published: 6/1991,  Volume: 46,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02676.x  |  Cited by: 86

IAN A. COOPER, ANTONIO S. MELLO

We characterize the exchange of financial claims from risky swaps. These transfers are among three groups: shareholders, debtholders, and the swap counterparty. From this analysis we derive equilibrium swap rates and relate them to debt market spreads. We then show that equilibrium swaps in perfect markets transfer wealth from shareholders to debtholders. In a simplified case, we obtain closed‐form solutions for the value of the default risk in the swap. For interest‐rate swaps, we obtain numerical solutions for the equilibrium swap rate, including default risk. We compare these with equilibrium debt market default risk spreads.

Volatility, Valuation Ratios, and Bubbles: An Empirical Measure of Market Sentiment

Published: 8/31/2021,  Volume: 76,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13068  |  Cited by: 70

CAN GAO, IAN W. R. MARTIN

We define a sentiment indicator based on option prices, valuation ratios, and interest rates. The indicator can be interpreted as a lower bound on the expected growth in fundamentals that a rational investor would have to perceive to be happy to hold the market. The bound was unusually high in the late 1990s, reflecting dividend growth expectations that in our view were unreasonably optimistic. Our approach exploits two key ingredients. First, we derive a new valuation ratio decomposition that is related to the Campbell–Shiller loglinearization but that resembles the Gordon growth model more closely and has certain other advantages. Second, we introduce a volatility index that provides a lower bound on the market's expected log return.

Disasters Implied by Equity Index Options

Published: 11/14/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01697.x  |  Cited by: 238

DAVID BACKUS, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, IAN MARTIN

We use equity index options to quantify the distribution of consumption growth disasters. The challenge lies in connecting the risk‐neutral distribution of equity returns implied by options to the true distribution of consumption growth. First, we compare pricing kernels constructed from macro‐finance and option‐pricing models. Second, we compare option prices derived from a macro‐finance model to those we observe. Third, we compare the distribution of consumption growth derived from option prices using a macro‐finance model to estimates based on macroeconomic data. All three perspectives suggest that options imply smaller probabilities of extreme outcomes than have been estimated from macroeconomic data.

What Is the Expected Return on a Stock?

Published: 5/22/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12778  |  Cited by: 198

IAN W. R. MARTIN, CHRISTIAN WAGNER

We derive a formula for the expected return on a stock in terms of the risk‐neutral variance of the market and the stock's excess risk‐neutral variance relative to that of the average stock. These quantities can be computed from index and stock option prices; the formula has no free parameters. The theory performs well empirically both in and out of sample. Our results suggest that there is considerably more variation in expected returns, over time and across stocks, than has previously been acknowledged.

Dynamics of Borrower‐Lender Interaction: Partitioning Final Payoff in Venture Capital Finance

Published: 5/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02117.x  |  Cited by: 13

IAN A. COOPER, WILLARD T. CARLETON

Trading Complex Assets

Published: 9/10/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12029  |  Cited by: 65

BRUCE IAN CARLIN, SHIMON KOGAN, RICHARD LOWERY

We perform an experimental study to assess the effect of complexity on asset trading. We find that higher complexity leads to increased price volatility, lower liquidity, and decreased trade efficiency especially when repeated bargaining takes place. However, the channel through which complexity acts is not simply due to the added noise induced by estimation error. Rather, complexity alters the bidding strategies used by traders, making them less inclined to trade, even when we control for estimation error across treatments. As such, it appears that adverse selection plays an important role in explaining the trading abnormalities caused by complexity.

An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment‐Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps

Published: 9/16/2005,  Volume: 60,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00798.x  |  Cited by: 1031

ROBERTO BLANCO, SIMON BRENNAN, IAN W. MARSH

We test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) prices and credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999) , finding support for the parity relation as an equilibrium condition. We also find two forms of deviation from parity. First, for three firms, CDS prices are substantially higher than credit spreads for long periods of time, arising from combinations of imperfections in the contract specification of CDSs and measurement errors in computing the credit spread. Second, we find short‐lived deviations from parity for all other companies due to a lead for CDS prices over credit spreads in the price discovery process.

Long‐Horizon Exchange Rate Expectations

Published: 9/29/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13504  |  Cited by: 11

LUKAS KREMENS, IAN W. R. MARTIN, LILIANA VARELA

We study exchange rate expectations in surveys of financial professionals and find that they successfully forecast currency appreciation at the two‐year horizon, both in and out of sample. Exchange rate expectations are also interpretable, in the sense that three macro‐finance variables—the risk‐neutral covariance between the exchange rate and equity market, the real exchange rate, and the current account relative to GDP—explain most of their variation. There is no “secret sauce,” however, in expectations: After controlling for the three macro‐finance variables, the residual information in survey expectations does not forecast currency appreciation in our sample.

Episodic Liquidity Crises: Cooperative and Predatory Trading

Published: 9/4/2007,  Volume: 62,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01274.x  |  Cited by: 226

BRUCE IAN CARLIN, MIGUEL SOUSA LOBO, S. VISWANATHAN

We describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants. We first solve a one‐period trading game in continuous‐time, using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading. Then, in a multi‐period framework, we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction, providing apparent liquidity to one another. Cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high, leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity. Equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity, but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down.

The Interaction of Financing and Investment Decisions When the Firm has Unused Tax Credits††

Published: 5/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02267.x  |  Cited by: 2

WILBUR G. LEWELLEN, IAN COOPER, JULIAN R. FRANKS

Decentralized Investment Management: Evidence from the Pension Fund Industry

Published: 5/20/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12024  |  Cited by: 106

DAVID BLAKE, ALBERTO G. ROSSI, ALLAN TIMMERMANN, IAN TONKS, RUSS WERMERS

Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better‐performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk‐taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 111

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.