Search results: 25.
The Expiration of IPO Share Lockups
Published: 4/2001, Volume: 56, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00334 | Cited by: 373
Laura Casares Field, Gordon Hanka
We examine 1,948 share lockup agreements that prevent insiders from selling their shares in the period immediately after the IPO (typically 180 days). While lockups are in effect, there is little selling by insiders. When lockups expire, we find a permanent 40 percent increase in average trading volume, and a statistically prominent three‐day abnormal return of −1.5 percent. The abnormal return and volume are much larger when the firm is financed by venture capital, and we find that venture capitalists sell more aggressively than executives and other shareholders. We find limited support for several hypotheses that may explain the abnormal return, but no complete explanation.
Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms
Published: 10/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00482 | Cited by: 394
Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff
Many firms deploy takeover defenses when they go public. IPO managers tend to deploy defenses when their compensation is high, shareholdings are small, and oversight from nonmanagerial shareholders is weak. The presence of a defense is negatively related to subsequent acquisition likelihood, yet has no impact on takeover premiums for firms that are acquired. These results do not support arguments that takeover defenses facilitate the eventual sale of IPO firms at high takeover premiums. Rather, they suggest that managers shift the cost of takeover protection onto nonmanagerial shareholders. Thus, agency problems are important even for firms at the IPO stage.
Blurring Firm Boundaries: The Role of Venture Capital in Strategic Alliances
Published: 5/9/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01354.x | Cited by: 267
LAURA LINDSEY
This study documents a new value‐added role of venture capitalists and addresses important questions about how resources are combined to create firms. As part of the nexus of contracts surrounding a firm, strategic alliances can be viewed as relational contracts that blur firm boundaries. This paper provides evidence that alliances are more frequent among companies sharing a common venture capitalist. The effect is concentrated in alliances in which contracting problems are more pronounced, consistent with venture capitalists utilizing informational and other advantages in providing resources to firms. Further, these alliances improve the probability of exit for venture‐backed firms.
Empirical Testing of Real Option‐Pricing Models
Published: 6/1993, Volume: 48, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04730.x | Cited by: 203
LAURA QUIGG
This research is the first to examine the empirical predictions of a real option‐pricing model using a large sample of market prices. We find empirical support for a model that incorporates the option to wait to develop land. The option model has explanatory power for predicting transactions prices over and above the intrinsic value. Market prices reflect a premium for the option to wait to invest that has a mean value of 6% in our sample. We also estimate implied standard deviations for individual commercial property prices ranging from 18 to 28% per year.
Presidential Address: Sustainable Finance and ESG Issues—
Value
versus
Values
Published: 6/19/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13255 | Cited by: 458
LAURA T. STARKS
In this address, I discuss differences across investor and manager motivations for considering sustainable finance—
value
versus
values
motivations—and how these differences contribute to misunderstandings about environmental, social, and governance investment approaches. The finance research community has the ability and responsibility to help clear up these misunderstandings through additional research, which I suggest.
Mutual Fund Tax Clienteles
Published: 7/19/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01751.x | Cited by: 88
CLEMENS SIALM, LAURA STARKS
Mutual funds are held by investors in taxable and tax‐qualified retirement accounts. We investigate whether the characteristics, investment strategies, and performance of mutual funds held by these diverse tax clienteles differ. Examining both mutual fund distributions and mutual fund holdings, we find that funds held primarily by taxable investors choose investment strategies that result in lower tax burdens than funds held primarily in tax‐qualified accounts. Despite these differences, we find no evidence that any investment constraints that may arise from these tax‐efficient investment strategies result in performance differences between funds held by different tax clienteles.
Earnings Announcements, Stock Price Adjustment, and the Existence of Option Markets
Published: 3/1986, Volume: 41, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04494.x | Cited by: 136
ROBERT JENNINGS, LAURA STARKS
This paper employs a new approach to study the effects of option trading on the behavior of underlying stock prices. Extant research compares distributional properties of the stock price at two points in time divided by an event in the option market that might affect price behavior. As an alternative, we examine the stock price adjustment to the release of quarterly earnings using samples of firms with and without listed options. We find the two samples exhibit different adjustment processes, with the nonoption firms requiring substantially more time to adjust.
A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion
Published: 4/2002, Volume: 57, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00441 | Cited by: 727
Laura E. Kodres, Matthew Pritsker
We develop a multiple asset rational expectations model of asset prices to explain financial market contagion. Although the model allows contagion through several channels, our focus is on contagion through cross‐market rebalancing. Through this channel, investors transmit idiosyncratic shocks from one market to others by adjusting their portfolios' exposures to shared macroeconomic risks. The pattern and severity of financial contagion depends on markets' sensitivities to shared macroeconomic risk factors, and on the amount of information asymmetry in each market. The model can generate contagion in the absence of news, as well as between markets that do not directly share macroeconomic risks.
Information Immobility and the Home Bias Puzzle
Published: 5/20/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01462.x | Cited by: 725
STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, LAURA VELDKAMP
Many argue that home bias arises because home investors can predict home asset payoffs more accurately than foreigners can. But why does global information access not eliminate this asymmetry? We model investors, endowed with a small home information advantage, who choose what information to learn before they invest. Surprisingly, even when home investors can learn what foreigners know, they choose not to: Investors profit more from knowing information others do not know. Learning amplifies information asymmetry. The model matches patterns of local and industry bias, foreign investments, portfolio outperformance, and asset prices. Finally, we propose new avenues for empirical research.
Getting Out Early: An Analysis of Market Making Activity at the Recommending Analyst's Firm
Published: 9/28/2009, Volume: 64, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01502.x | Cited by: 92
JENNIFER L. JUERGENS, LAURA LINDSEY
This paper examines trading volume for Nasdaq market makers around analyst recommendation changes issued by an analyst at the same firm. Using Nasdaq PostData, we find a disproportionate increase in market making volume associated with the firm's recommendation changes and evidence of elevated sell volume at the recommending analyst's firm in the 2 days preceding a downgrade. The implications are that the information source matters in determining the placement of trades and that the issuing analyst's firm appears to be rewarded for prereleasing information through increased volume. These findings constitute new evidence of compensation for research production through the market making channel.
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation
Published: 11/7/2003, Volume: 58, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00608.x | Cited by: 1623
Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks
Abstract
We find that institutional ownership concentration is positively related to the pay‐for‐performance sensitivity of executive compensation and negatively related to the level of compensation, even after controlling for firm size, industry, investment opportunities, and performance. These results suggest that the institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Additionally, we find that clientele effects exist among institutions for firms with certain compensation structures, suggesting that institutions also influence compensation structures through their preferences.
Investment Management and Risk Sharing with Multiple Managers
Published: 6/1984, Volume: 39, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb02321.x | Cited by: 27
CHRISTOPHER B. BARRY, LAURA T. STARKS
This paper addresses the investor's decision to employ multiple managers for the management of investment funds. Under conditions such that specialization of managers and diversification among managers are not motives for the use of multiple managers, the paper shows that risk sharing considerations may be sufficient. A model is developed in which the decision to use multiple managers is explicitly treated, and conditions are studied such that an increase or decrease in the number of managers would be desirable. Under some conditions, a multiple manager solution is preferred over a single manager solution.
For Richer, for Poorer: Bankers' Liability and Bank Risk in New England, 1867 to 1880
Published: 3/9/2021, Volume: 76, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13011 | Cited by: 23
PETER KOUDIJS, LAURA SALISBURY, GURPAL SRAN
We study whether banks are riskier if managers have less liability. We focus on New England between 1867 and 1880 and consider the introduction of marital property laws that limited liability for newly wedded bankers. We find that banks with managers who married after a law had higher leverage, delayed loss recognition, made more risky and fraudulent loans, and lost more capital and deposits in the Long Depression of 1873 to 1878. These effects were most pronounced for bankers with the largest reduction in liability. We find no evidence that limiting liability increased firm investment at the county level.
Institutions and Individuals at the Turn‐of‐the‐Year
Published: 9/1997, Volume: 52, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01120.x | Cited by: 134
RICHARD W. SIAS, LAURA T. STARKS
This article evaluates the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis against the window‐dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn‐of‐the‐year anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn‐of‐the‐year effect.
Sentiment Metrics and Investor Demand
Published: 3/7/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12754 | Cited by: 158
LUKE DeVAULT, RICHARD SIAS, LAURA STARKS
Recent work suggests that sentiment traders shift from safer to more speculative stocks when sentiment increases. Exploiting these cross‐sectional patterns and changes in share ownership, we find that sentiment metrics capture institutional rather than individual investors’ demand shocks. We investigate the underlying economic mechanisms and find that common institutional investment styles (e.g., risk management, momentum trading) explain a significant portion of the relation between institutions and sentiment.
Tax‐Loss Selling and the January Effect: Evidence from Municipal Bond Closed‐End Funds
Published: 12/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.01011.x | Cited by: 84
LAURA T. STARKS, LI YONG, LU ZHENG
This paper provides direct evidence supporting the tax‐loss selling hypothesis as an explanation of the January effect. Examining turn‐of‐the‐year return and volume patterns for municipal bond closed‐end funds, which are held mostly by tax‐sensitive individual investors, we document a January effect for these funds, but not for their underlying assets. We provide evidence that this effect can be largely explained by tax‐loss selling activities at the previous year‐end. Moreover, we find that funds associated with brokerage firms display more tax‐loss selling behavior, suggesting that tax counseling plays a role.
Defined Contribution Pension Plans: Sticky or Discerning Money?
Published: 3/12/2015, Volume: 70, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12232 | Cited by: 188
CLEMENS SIALM, LAURA T. STARKS, HANJIANG ZHANG
Participants in defined contribution (DC) retirement plans rarely adjust their portfolio allocations, suggesting that their investment choices and consequent money flows are sticky and not discerning. However, participants’ inertia could be offset by DC plan sponsors, who adjust the plan's investment options. We examine these countervailing influences on flows into U.S. mutual funds. We find that flows into funds from DC assets are more volatile and exhibit more performance sensitivity than non‐DC flows, primarily due to adjustments to the investment options by the plan sponsors. Thus, DC retirement money is less sticky and more discerning than non‐DC money.
Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill
Published: 7/18/2014, Volume: 69, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12084 | Cited by: 515
MARCIN KACPERCZYK, STIJN VAN NIEUWERBURGH, LAURA VELDKAMP
We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.
Corporate ESG Profiles and Investor Horizons
Published: 1/8/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70008 | Cited by: 31
LAURA T. STARKS, PARTH VENKAT, QIFEI ZHU
We find that long‐term institutional investors tilt their portfolios toward firms with better Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) profiles, in the cross sections of both institutional investor portfolios and the ownership of firms. We test whether several theoretically motivated mechanisms can explain this relationship. Our results that long‐term investors exhibit patience with firms around poor earnings announcements, but quickly sell portfolio firms after negative ES incidents, support the view that long‐ and short‐term investors evaluate information differently. Our evidence shows that limits‐to‐arbitrage play a role, as we find that investors' ESG tilt weakens following regulatory shocks that shorten their horizon.
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
Published: 12/2001, Volume: 56, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00405 | Cited by: 801
Mark R. Huson, Robert Parrino, Laura T. Starks
We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
Published: 11/10/2016, Volume: 71, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12393 | Cited by: 1222
JOSEPH A. McCAHERY, ZACHARIAS SAUTNER, LAURA T. STARKS
We survey institutional investors to better understand their role in the corporate governance of firms. Consistent with a number of theories, we document widespread behind‐the‐scenes intervention as well as governance‐motivated exit. These governance mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention typically occurring prior to a potential exit. We further find that long‐term investors and investors that are less concerned about stock liquidity intervene more intensively. Finally, we find that most investors use proxy advisors and believe that the information provided by such advisors improves their own voting decisions.
An Equilibrium Model of Asset Trading with Sequential Information Arrival
Published: 3/1981, Volume: 36, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb03540.x | Cited by: 283
ROBERT H. JENNINGS, LAURA T. STARKS, JOHN C. FELLINGHAM
In an effort to better understand the dynamic market price adjustment process, this paper develops a model which describes the impact of new information on a financial market. The primary emphasis is on the price change‐volume relationship in the presence of a margin requirement. We find that the margin requirement significantly affects the relation of price change to volume. Furthermore, this relationship is shown to be affected by the number of investors in the market, the degree of information dissemination, differences in interpretation of information and the implicit cost of the margin requirement.
Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry
Published: 3/1996, Volume: 51, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb05203.x | Cited by: 1046
KEITH C. BROWN, W. V. HARLOW, LAURA T. STARKS
We test the hypothesis that when their compensation is linked to relative performance, managers of investment portfolios likely to end up as “losers” will manipulate fund risk differently than those managing portfolios likely to be “winners.” An empirical investigation of the performance of 334 growth‐oriented mutual funds during 1976 to 1991 demonstrates that mid‐year losers tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period to a greater extent than mid‐year winners. Furthermore, we show that this effect became stronger as industry growth and investor awareness of fund performance increased over time.
Securitization and Capital Structure in Nonfinancial Firms: An Empirical Investigation
Published: 7/18/2014, Volume: 69, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12128 | Cited by: 58
MICHAEL LEMMON, LAURA XIAOLEI LIU, MIKE QINGHAO MAO, GREG NINI
Contrary to recent accounts of off‐balance‐sheet securitization by financial firms, we show that asset securitization by nonfinancial firms provides a valuable form of financing for shareholders without harming debtholders. Using data from firms’ SEC filings, we find that securitization is attractive to firms in the middle of the credit quality distribution, which are the firms with the most to gain. Upon initiation, firms experience positive abnormal stock returns and zero abnormal bond returns, and largely use the securitization proceeds to repay existing debt. Securitization minimizes financing costs by reducing expected bankruptcy costs and providing access to segmented credit markets.
Nonstandard Errors
Published: 4/17/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337 | Cited by: 107
ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.