The Journal of Finance

The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements

Published: 6/22/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13160  |  Cited by: 19

FLORIAN HOFFMANN, ROMAN INDERST, MARCUS OPP

We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk‐takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk‐management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.

Real Anomalies

Published: 4/2/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12771  |  Cited by: 94

JULES H. van BINSBERGEN, CHRISTIAN C. OPP

We examine the importance of cross‐sectional asset pricing anomalies (alphas) for the real economy. To this end, we develop a novel quantitative model of the cross‐section of firms that features lumpy investment and informational inefficiencies, while yielding distributions in closed form. Our findings indicate that anomalies can cause material real inefficiencies, which raises the possibility that agents who help eliminate them add significant value to the economy. The model shows that the magnitude of alphas alone is a poor indicator of real outcomes, and highlights the importance of the alpha persistence, the amount of mispriced capital, and the Tobin's q of firms affected.

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CANADIAN FISCAL POLICY

Published: 12/1952,  Volume: 7,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1952.tb02483.x  |  Cited by: 0

Edward Marcus

THE OUTLOOK FOR MONEY RATES*

Published: 5/1956,  Volume: 11,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1956.tb00703.x  |  Cited by: 0

Marcus Nadler

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb00909.x  |  Cited by: 0

Marcus Alexis

Spinoff/Terminations and the Value of Pension Insurance

Published: 7/1985,  Volume: 40,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb05018.x  |  Cited by: 20

ALAN J. MARCUS

This paper derives the value of Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) pension insurance under two scenarios of interest. The first allows for voluntary plan termination, which appears to be legal under current statutes. In the second scenario, termination is prohibited unless the firm is bankrupt. Empirical estimates of PBGC liabilities are calculated. These show that prospective PBGC liabilities greatly exceed current reserves for plan terminations, that even under a bankruptcy‐only termination rule, PBGC liabilities still would be quite sensitive to discretionary funding policy, and that the increasingly common practice of pension spinoff/terminations, substantially increases the present value of the PBGC's contingent liabilities.

The Bank Capital Decision: A Time Series—Cross Section Analysis

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02292.x  |  Cited by: 12

ALAN J. MARCUS

This paper seeks to explain the dramatic decline in capital to asset ratios in U.S. commercial banks during the last two decades. It is hypothesized that the rise in nominal interest rates during this period might have contributed substantially to the fall in capital ratios. Time series‐cross section estimation supports the hypothesis regarding the interest rate.

Tracing the International Transmission of a Crisis through Multinational Firms

Published: 4/8/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13338  |  Cited by: 19

MARCUS BIERMANN, KILIAN HUBER

We show that multinational firms transmit shocks across countries through their internal capital markets. We study a credit supply shock to parent firms in Germany. International affiliates outside Germany supported their parents through internal lending, became financially constrained themselves, and experienced lower real growth. We find that managers were “Darwinist” with respect to international affiliates but “Socialist” in the home country, that internal capital markets transmitted the credit shock more strongly than a nonfinancial shock, and that access to developed credit markets attenuated the real effects. The total real impact of shock transmission through multinationals on foreign economies was large.

Erratum: Flotation Cost Adjustment in Rate of Return Regulation: A Reply

Published: 6/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb02330.x  |  Cited by: 0

ENRIQUE R. ARZAC, MATITYAHU MARCUS

Flotation Cost Allowance in Rate of Return Regulation: A Reply

Published: 9/1983,  Volume: 38,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02305.x  |  Cited by: 3

ENRIQUE R. ARZAC, MATITYAHU MARCUS

Flotation Cost Allowance for the Regulated Firm: A Reply

Published: 3/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03879.x  |  Cited by: 1

E. R. ARZAC, M. MARCUS

Valuation and Optimal Exercise of the Wild Card Option in the Treasury Bond Futures Market

Published: 3/1986,  Volume: 41,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04499.x  |  Cited by: 32

ALEX KANE, ALAN J. MARCUS

The Chicago Board of Trade Treasury Bond Futures Contract allows the short position several delivery options as to when and with which bond the contract will be settled. The timing option allows the short position to choose any business day in the delivery month to make delivery. In addition, the contract settlement price is locked in at 2:00 p.m. when the futures market closes, despite the facts that the short position need not declare an intent to settle the contract until 8:00 p.m. and that trading in Treasury bonds can occur all day in dealer markets. If bond prices change significantly between 2:00 and 8:00 p.m., the short has the option of settling the contract at a favorable 2:00 p.m. price. This phenomenon, which recurs on every trading day of the delivery month, creates a sequence of 6‐hour put options for the short position which has been dubbed the “wild card option.” This paper presents a valuation model for the wild card option and computes estimates of the value of that option, as well as rules for its optimal exercise.

CAPITAL BUDGETING OF RISKY PROJECTS WITH “IMPERFECT” MARKETS FOR PHYSICAL CAPITAL

Published: 5/1974,  Volume: 29,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1974.tb03073.x  |  Cited by: 33

MARCUS C. BOGUE, RICHARD ROLL

Flotation Cost Allowance in Rate of Return Regulation: A Note

Published: 12/1981,  Volume: 36,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1981.tb01087.x  |  Cited by: 7

ENRIQUE R. ARZAC, MATITYAHU MARCUS

A NOTE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF EXPECTED PRICE/EARNINGS RATIOS OVER TIME

Published: 6/1971,  Volume: 26,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1971.tb01726.x  |  Cited by: 5

Alexander A. Robichek, Marcus C. Bogue

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1966,  Volume: 21,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1966.tb00236.x  |  Cited by: 0

J. Marcus Fleming, Arthur I. Bloomfield

Earnings and Dividend Announcements: Is There a Corroboration Effect?

Published: 9/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03894.x  |  Cited by: 141

ALEX KANE, YOUNG KI LEE, ALAN MARCUS

We examine abnormal stock returns surrounding contemporaneous earnings and dividend announcements in order to determine whether investors evaluate the two announcements in relation to each other. We find that there is a statistically significant interaction effect. The abnormal return corresponding to any earnings or dividend announcement depends upon the value of the other announcement. This evidence suggests the existence of a corroborative relationship between the two announcements. Investors give more credence to unanticipated dividend increases or decreases when earnings are also above or below expectations, and vice versa.

How Big is the Tax Advantage to Debt?

Published: 7/1984,  Volume: 39,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1984.tb03678.x  |  Cited by: 74

ALEX KANE, ALAN J. MARCUS, ROBERT L. McDONALD

This paper uses an option valuation model of the firm to answer the question, “What magnitude tax advantage to debt is consistent with the range of observed corporate debt ratios?” We incorporate into the model differential personal tax rates on capital gains and ordinary income. We conclude that variations in the magnitude of bankruptcy costs across firms can not by itself account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. When it is possible for the value of the underlying assets to jump discretely to zero, differences across firms in the probability of this jump can account for the simultaneous existence of levered and unlevered firms. Moreover, if the tax advantage to debt is small, the annual rate of return advantage offered by optimal leverage may be so small as to make the firm indifferent about debt policy over a wide range of debt‐to‐firm value ratios.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 107

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.