The Journal of Finance

Skill, Scale, and Value Creation in the Mutual Fund Industry

Published: 11/29/2021,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13096  |  Cited by: 74

LAURENT BARRAS, PATRICK GAGLIARDINI, OLIVIER SCAILLET

We develop a flexible and bias‐adjusted approach to jointly examine skill, scalability, and value‐added across individual funds. We find that skill and scalability (i) vary substantially across funds, and (ii) are strongly related, as great investment ideas are difficult to scale up. The combination of skill and scalability produces a value‐added that (i) is positive for the majority of funds, and (ii) approaches its optimal level after an adjustment period (possibly due to investor learning). These results are consistent with theoretical models in which funds are skilled and able to extract economic rents from capital markets.

Presidential Address: Debt and Money: Financial Constraints and Sovereign Finance

Published: 7/13/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12418  |  Cited by: 26

PATRICK BOLTON

Economic analyses of corporate finance, money, and sovereign debt are largely considered separately. I introduce a novel corporate finance framing of sovereign finance based on the analogy between fiat liabilities for sovereigns and equity for corporations. The analysis focuses on financial constraints at the country level, making explicit the trade‐offs involved in relying on domestic versus foreign‐currency debt to finance investments or government expenditures. This framing provides new insights into issues ranging from the costs and benefits of inflation, optimal foreign exchange reserves, and sovereign debt restructuring.

The Ex‐Dividend Day Behavior of Stock Returns: Further Evidence on Tax Effects

Published: 5/1982,  Volume: 37,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03566.x  |  Cited by: 22

PATRICK J. HESS

DISCUSSION

Published: 5/1980,  Volume: 35,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1980.tb02179.x  |  Cited by: 2

Patrick J. Hess

CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICIES—DEBT VERSUS EQUITY*

Published: 6/1975,  Volume: 30,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1975.tb01873.x  |  Cited by: 0

David Patrick Rochester

THE BANK OF JAPAN: A CASE STUDY IN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CENTRAL BANK TECHNIQUES OF MONETARY CONTROL*

Published: 12/1960,  Volume: 15,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1960.tb02779.x  |  Cited by: 0

Hugh T. Patrick

Should Derivatives Be Privileged in Bankruptcy?

Published: 11/12/2015,  Volume: 70,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12201  |  Cited by: 63

PATRICK BOLTON, MARTIN OEHMKE

Derivatives enjoy special status in bankruptcy: they are exempt from the automatic stay and effectively senior to virtually all other claims. We propose a corporate finance model to assess the effect of these exemptions on a firm's cost of borrowing and incentives to engage in derivative transactions. While derivatives are value‐enhancing risk management tools, seniority for derivatives can lead to inefficiencies: it transfers credit risk to debtholders, even though this risk is borne more efficiently in the derivative market. Seniority for derivatives is efficient only if it provides sufficient cross‐netting benefits to derivative counterparties that provide hedging services.

Global Pricing of Carbon‐Transition Risk

Published: 8/26/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13272  |  Cited by: 854

PATRICK BOLTON, MARCIN KACPERCZYK

The energy transition away from fossil fuels exposes companies to carbon‐transition risk. Estimating the market‐based premium associated with carbon‐transition risk in a cross section of 14,400 firms in 77 countries, we find higher stock returns associated with higher levels and growth rates of carbon emissions in all sectors and most countries. Carbon premia related to emissions growth are greater for firms located in countries with lower economic development, larger energy sectors, and less inclusive political systems. Premia related to emission levels are higher in countries with stricter domestic climate policies. The latter have increased with investor awareness about climate change risk.

PORTFOLIO EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS IN THREE MOMENTS‐THE MULTIPERIOD CASE: COMMENT

Published: 3/1978,  Volume: 33,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1978.tb03413.x  |  Cited by: 0

Michael Granito, Patrick Walsh

Disappearing Call Delay and Dividend‐Protected Convertible Bonds

Published: 1/14/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12363  |  Cited by: 20

BRUCE D. GRUNDY, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN

Firms do not historically call their convertible bonds as soon as conversion can be forced. A number of explanations for the delay rely on the size of the dividends that bondholders forgo so long as they do not convert. We investigate an important change in convertible security design, namely, dividend protection of convertible bond issues. Dividend protection means that the conversion value of the convertible bond is unaffected by dividend payments and thus dividend‐related rationales for call delay become moot. We document that call delay is near zero for dividend‐protected convertible bonds.

Who Blinks in Volatile Markets, Individuals or Institutions?

Published: 10/2002,  Volume: 57,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.00484  |  Cited by: 217

Patrick J. Dennis, Deon Strickland

We investigate the relationship between the ownership structure and returns of firms on days when the absolute value of the market's return is two percent or more. We find that a firm's abnormal return on these days is related to the percentage of institutional ownership, that there is abnormally high turnover in the firm's shares on these days, and that this abnormal turnover is significantly related to the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. Taken together, these results are consistent with positive feedback herding behavior on the part of some institutions, particularly mutual and pension funds.

Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital

Published: 3/25/2019,  Volume: 74,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12761  |  Cited by: 116

PATRICK BOLTON, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG

A risk‐averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which limits the firm's debt capacity, distorts investment and compensation, and constrains the entrepreneur's risk sharing. This puts dynamic liquidity and state‐contingent risk allocation at the center of corporate financial management. The firm balances mean‐variance investment efficiency and the preservation of financial slack. We show that in general the entrepreneur's net worth is overexposed to idiosyncratic risk and underexposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the closer the firm is to exhausting its debt capacity.

Specification Tests for Portfolio Regression Parameter Stationarity and the Implications for Empirical Research

Published: 5/1979,  Volume: 34,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1979.tb02108.x  |  Cited by: 15

STANLEY J. KON, W. PATRICK LAU

A Unified Theory of Tobin's q, Corporate Investment, Financing, and Risk Management

Published: 9/21/2011,  Volume: 66,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01681.x  |  Cited by: 641

PATRICK BOLTON, HUI CHEN, NENG WANG

We propose a model of dynamic investment, financing, and risk management for financially constrained firms. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions. Our three main results are: (1) investment depends on the ratio of marginal q to the marginal value of liquidity, and the relation between investment and marginal q changes with the marginal source of funding; (2) optimal external financing and payout are characterized by an endogenous double‐barrier policy for the firm's cash‐capital ratio; and (3) liquidity management and derivatives hedging are complementary risk management tools.

Common Ownership Does Not Have Anticompetitive Effects in the Airline Industry

Published: 9/2022,  Volume: 77,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13176  |  Cited by: 88

PATRICK DENNIS, KRISTOPHER GERARDI, CAROLA SCHENONE

Institutions often own equity in multiple firms that compete in the same product market. Prior research has shown that these institutional “common owners” induce anticompetitive pricing behavior in the airline industry. This paper reevaluates this evidence and shows that the documented positive correlation between common ownership and airline ticket prices stems from the market share component of the common ownership measure, and not the ownership and control components. We further show that the results are sensitive to measures of investor control and to assumptions about equity holders' ownership and control during bankruptcy.

Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

Published: 2/1998,  Volume: 53,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/0022-1082.15240  |  Cited by: 501

Patrick Bolton, Ernst‐Ludwig Von Thadden

The paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free‐rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure.

The Credit Ratings Game

Published: 1/17/2012,  Volume: 67,  Issue: 1  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01708.x  |  Cited by: 701

PATRICK BOLTON, XAVIER FREIXAS, JOEL SHAPIRO

The collapse of AAA‐rated structured finance products in 2007 to 2008 has brought renewed attention to conflicts of interest in credit rating agencies (CRAs). We model competition among CRAs with three sources of conflicts: (1) CRAs conflict of understating risk to attract business, (2) issuers' ability to purchase only the most favorable ratings, and (3) the trusting nature of some investor clienteles. These conflicts create two distortions. First, competition can reduce efficiency, as it facilitates ratings shopping. Second, ratings are more likely to be inflated during booms and when investors are more trusting. We also discuss efficiency‐enhancing regulatory interventions.

Cream‐Skimming in Financial Markets

Published: 3/18/2016,  Volume: 71,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12385  |  Cited by: 138

PATRICK BOLTON, TANO SANTOS, JOSE A. SCHEINKMAN

We propose a model in which investors may choose to acquire costly information that identifies good assets and purchase these assets in opaque (OTC) markets. Uninformed investors access an asset pool that has been cream‐skimmed by informed investors. When the quality composition of assets for sale is fixed, there is too much information acquisition and the financial industry extracts excessive rents. In the presence of moral hazard in origination, the social value of information varies inversely with information acquisition. Low quality origination is associated with large rents in the financial sector. Equilibrium acquisition of information is generically inefficient.

Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits

Published: 4/23/2025,  Volume: 80,  Issue: 4  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13454  |  Cited by: 14

PATRICK BOLTON, YE LI, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG

We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low‐interest‐rate environment.

The Term Structure of Covered Interest Rate Parity Violations

Published: 3/31/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13336  |  Cited by: 18

PATRICK AUGUSTIN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, LUKAS SCHMID, DONGHO SONG

We quantify the impact of risk‐based and nonrisk‐based intermediary constraints (IC) on the term structure of covered interest rate parity (CIP) violations. Using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) inferred from interest rate swaps, we value currency derivatives. The wedge between model‐implied and observed derivative prices reflects the impact of nonrisk‐based IC because our SDF incorporates risk‐based IC. There is no wedge at short horizons, while the wedge accounts for 40% of long‐term CIP violations. Consistent with IC theory, the wedge correlates with the shadow cost of intermediary capital, and the SDF‐implied interest rate is a weighted average of collateralized and uncollateralized interest rates.

Time‐Series Variation in Dividend Pricing

Published: 12/1994,  Volume: 49,  Issue: 5  |  DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1994.tb04775.x  |  Cited by: 38

KENNETH M. EADES, PATRICK J. HESS, E. HAN KIM

Ex‐dividend day returns vary over time. The ex‐day returns of high‐yield stocks are persistently positive for some time periods and negative for others; in contrast, ex‐day returns of low‐yield stocks are always positive and less variable. We are unable to explain the variation with changes in the tax code, but we do find a strong effect for the introduction of negotiated commissions. We find evidence that corporate dividend capturing is affecting ex‐day returns and confirm the findings of Gordon and Bradford (1980) that the price of dividends is countercyclical.

The Behavior of Bid‐Ask Spreads and Volume in Options Markets during the Competition for Listings in 1999

Published: 11/7/2003,  Volume: 58,  Issue: 6  |  DOI: 10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00611.x  |  Cited by: 109

Patrick De Fontnouvelle, Raymond P. H. Fishe, Jeffrey H. Harris

AbstractIn August 1999, U.S. exchanges began to compete directly for order flow in many options that had been exclusively listed on another exchange, shifting 37% of option volume to multiple‐listing status by the end of September. Effective and quoted bid–ask spreads decrease significantly after multiple listings with spreads generally maintaining their initial lower levels 1 year later. These results hold for both time series and pooled regressions and are robust. We reject that economies of scale in market making cause the decrease in spreads and support the view that interexchange competition reduces option transaction costs.

Monetary Stimulus amidst the Infrastructure Investment Spree: Evidence from China's Loan‐Level Data

Published: 2/2023,  Volume: 78,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13204  |  Cited by: 63

KAIJI CHEN, HAOYU GAO, PATRICK HIGGINS, DANIEL F. WAGGONER, TAO ZHA

We study how a fiscal expansion via infrastructure investment influences the dynamic impacts of monetary stimulus on credit allocation. We develop a two‐stage approach and apply it to the Chinese economy with a confidential loan‐level data set that covers all sectors. We find that infrastructure investment significantly weakened monetary policy's transmission to credit allocated to private firms, while reinforcing the monetary effects on loans to state‐owned firms. This fiscal‐monetary interaction channel is key to understanding the preferential credit access enjoyed by state‐owned firms during the stimulus period. Consequently, monetary stimulus crowded out private investment and decreased capital allocation efficiency.

How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence from the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility

Published: 3/7/2013,  Volume: 68,  Issue: 2  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12011  |  Cited by: 144

BURCU DUYGAN‐BUMP, PATRICK PARKINSON, ERIC ROSENGREN, GUSTAVO A. SUAREZ, PAUL WILLEN

The events following Lehman's failure in 2008 and the current turmoil emanating from Europe highlight the structural vulnerabilities of short‐term credit markets and the role of central banks as back‐stop liquidity providers. The Federal Reserve's response to financial disruptions in the United States importantly included the creation of liquidity facilities. Using a differences‐in‐differences approach, we evaluate one of the most unusual of these interventions—the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility. We find that this facility helped stabilize asset outflows from money market funds and reduced asset‐backed commercial paper yields significantly.

Nonstandard Errors

Published: 4/17/2024,  Volume: 79,  Issue: 3  |  DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337  |  Cited by: 105

ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.