Search results: 40.
The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill
Published: 6/4/2020, Volume: 75, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12950 | Cited by: 99
YANG SONG
I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor‐related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark‐adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.
Funding Value Adjustments
Published: 12/30/2018, Volume: 74, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12739 | Cited by: 164
LEIF ANDERSEN, DARRELL DUFFIE, YANG SONG
In this paper, we demonstrate that the funding value adjustments (FVAs) of major dealers are debt overhang costs to their shareholders. To maximize shareholder value, dealer quotations therefore adjust for FVAs. Our case studies include interest‐rate swap FVAs and violations of covered interest parity. Contrary to current valuation practice, FVAs are not themselves components of the market values of the positions being financed. Current dealer practice does, however, align incentives between trading desks and shareholders. We also establish a pecking order for preferred asset financing strategies and provide a new interpretation of the standard debit value adjustment.
Competition and Coalition among Underwriters: The Decision to Join a Syndicate
Published: 10/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00704.x | Cited by: 56
WEI‐LING SONG
This paper studies the decision of lead investment banks to organize hybrid syndicates (commercial banks participating as co‐managers) versus pure investment bank syndicates. The findings show that hybrid underwriting issues are more challenging to float. Compared to pure investment bank syndicates, hybrid syndicates serve clients that are smaller, have lower common stock rankings and less prior access to the capital markets, rely more on bank loans, and invest less capital but issue larger amounts, which indicates that commercial banks' participation enhances hybrid services. Moreover, lead investment banks tend to invite banks' participation when clients exhibit higher loyalty in reusing their services.
Persuading Investors: A Video‐Based Study
Published: 8/14/2025, Volume: 80, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13471 | Cited by: 28
ALLEN HU, SONG MA
Persuasive communication functions through not only content but also delivery—facial expression, tone of voice, and diction. This paper examines the persuasiveness of delivery in startup pitches. Using machine learning algorithms to process full pitch videos, we quantify persuasion in visual, vocal, and verbal dimensions. We find that positive (i.e., passionate, warm) pitches increase funding probability. However, conditional on funding, startups with higher levels of pitch positivity underperform. Women are more heavily judged on delivery when evaluated in single‐gender teams, but they are neglected when copitching in mixed‐gender teams. Using an experiment, we show that persuasion delivery works mainly through leading investors to form inaccurate beliefs.
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
Published: 8/2006, Volume: 61, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.x | Cited by: 190
FENGHUA SONG, ANJAN V. THAKOR
We examine corporate governance effectiveness when the CEO generates project ideas and the board of directors screens these ideas for approval. However, the precision of the board's screening information is controlled by the CEO. Moreover, both the CEO and the board have career concerns that interact. The board's career concerns cause it to distort its investment recommendation procyclically, whereas the CEO's career concerns cause her to sometimes reduce the precision of the board's information. Moreover, the CEO sometimes prefers a less able board, and this happens only during economic upturns, suggesting that corporate governance will be weaker during economic upturns.
Firm Age, Investment Opportunities, and Job Creation
Published: 4/13/2017, Volume: 72, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12495 | Cited by: 195
MANUEL ADELINO, SONG MA, DAVID ROBINSON
New firms are an important source of job creation, but the underlying economic mechanisms for why this is so are not well understood. Using an identification strategy that links shocks to local income to job creation in the nontradable sector, we ask whether job creation arises more through new firm creation or through the expansion of existing firms. We find that new firms account for the bulk of net employment creation in response to local investment opportunities. We also find significant gross job creation and destruction by existing firms, suggesting that positive local shocks accelerate churn.
Liquidity in a Market for Unique Assets: Specified Pool and To‐Be‐Announced Trading in the Mortgage‐Backed Securities Market
Published: 4/13/2017, Volume: 72, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12496 | Cited by: 48
PENGJIE GAO, PAUL SCHULTZ, ZHAOGANG SONG
Agency mortgage‐backed securities (MBS) trade simultaneously in a market for specified pools (SPs) and in the to‐be‐announced (TBA) forward market. TBA trading creates liquidity by allowing thousands of different MBS to be traded in a handful of TBA contracts. SPs that are eligible to be traded as TBAs have significantly lower trading costs than other SPs. We present evidence that TBA eligibility, in addition to characteristics of TBA‐eligible SPs, lowers trading costs. We show that dealers hedge SP inventory with TBA trades, and they are more likely to prearrange trades in SPs that are difficult to hedge.
The Real Determinants of Asset Sales
Published: 9/10/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01396.x | Cited by: 85
LIU YANG
I develop a dynamic structural model in which a firm makes rational decisions to buy or sell assets in the presence of productivity shocks. By identifying equilibrium asset prices, the model also examines the aggregate asset sales activity over the business cycle. It shows that changes in productivity, rather than productivity levels, affect decisions: Firms with rising productivity buy assets and firms with falling productivity downsize (“rising buys falling”). As such, industries in which firms have less persistent and more volatile productivity experience greater asset reallocation. Using plant‐level data from Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), I find strong support for the model's predictions.
Do Buyouts (Still) Create Value?
Published: 3/21/2011, Volume: 66, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01640.x | Cited by: 361
SHOURUN GUO, EDITH S. HOTCHKISS, WEIHONG SONG
We examine how leveraged buyouts from the most recent wave of public to private transactions created value. Buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006 are more conservatively priced and less levered than their predecessors from the 1980s. For deals with post‐buyout data available, median market‐ and risk‐adjusted returns to pre‐ (post‐) buyout capital invested are 72.5% (40.9%). In contrast, gains in operating performance are either comparable to or slightly exceed those observed for benchmark firms. Increases in industry valuation multiples and realized tax benefits from increasing leverage, while private, are each economically as important as operating gains in explaining realized returns.
Private Equity and Financial Stability: Evidence from Failed‐Bank Resolution in the Crisis
Published: 11/27/2024, Volume: 80, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13399 | Cited by: 10
EMILY JOHNSTON‐ROSS, SONG MA, MANJU PURI
This paper investigates the role of private equity (PE) in failed‐bank resolutions after the 2008 financial crisis, using proprietary Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation failed‐bank acquisition data. PE investors made substantial investments in underperforming and riskier failed banks, particularly in geographies where local banks were also distressed, filling the gap created by a weak, undercapitalized banking sector. Using a quasi‐random empirical design based on detailed bidding information, we show that PE‐acquired banks performed better ex post, with positive real effects for the local economy. Overall, PE investors played a positive role in stabilizing the financial system through their involvement in failed‐bank resolution.
Asset Pricing with Cohort‐Based Trading in MBS Markets
Published: 10/6/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13180 | Cited by: 16
NICOLA FUSARI, WEI LI, HAOYANG LIU, ZHAOGANG SONG
Agency mortgage‐backed securities (MBSs) with diverse characteristics are traded in parallel through individualized specified pool (SP) contracts and standardized to‐be‐announced (TBA) contracts with delivery flexibility. This parallel trading environment generates distinctive effects on MBS pricing and trading: (i) Although cheapest‐to‐deliver (CTD) issues are present in TBA trading and absent from SP trading by design, MBS heterogeneity associated with CTD discounts affects SP yields positively, with the effect stronger for lower‐value SPs; (ii) high selling pressure amplifies the effects of MBS heterogeneity on SP yields; and (iii) greater MBS heterogeneity dampens SP and TBA trading activities but increases their ratio.
The Term Structure of Covered Interest Rate Parity Violations
Published: 3/31/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13336 | Cited by: 19
PATRICK AUGUSTIN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, LUKAS SCHMID, DONGHO SONG
We quantify the impact of risk‐based and nonrisk‐based intermediary constraints (IC) on the term structure of covered interest rate parity (CIP) violations. Using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) inferred from interest rate swaps, we value currency derivatives. The wedge between model‐implied and observed derivative prices reflects the impact of nonrisk‐based IC because our SDF incorporates risk‐based IC. There is no wedge at short horizons, while the wedge accounts for 40% of long‐term CIP violations. Consistent with IC theory, the wedge correlates with the shadow cost of intermediary capital, and the SDF‐implied interest rate is a weighted average of collateralized and uncollateralized interest rates.
The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers
Published: 7/1990, Volume: 45, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05107.x | Cited by: 142
RENÉ M. STULZ, RALPH A. WALKLING, MOON H. SONG
This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple‐bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership.
Duration of Executive Compensation
Published: 11/10/2014, Volume: 69, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12085 | Cited by: 314
RADHAKRISHNAN GOPALAN, TODD MILBOURN, FENGHUA SONG, ANJAN V. THAKOR
Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.
Bad Credit, No Problem? Credit and Labor Market Consequences of Bad Credit Reports
Published: 6/25/2020, Volume: 75, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12954 | Cited by: 95
WILL DOBBIE, PAUL GOLDSMITH‐PINKHAM, NEALE MAHONEY, JAE SONG
We study the financial and labor market impacts of bad credit reports. Using difference‐in‐differences variation from the staggered removal of bankruptcy flags, we show that bankruptcy flag removal leads to economically large increases in credit limits and borrowing. Using administrative tax records linked to personal bankruptcy records, we estimate economically small effects of flag removal on employment and earnings outcomes. We rationalize these contrasting results by showing that, conditional on basic observables, “hidden” bankruptcy flags are strongly correlated with adverse credit market outcomes but have no predictive power for measures of job performance.
Information Diversity and Complementarities in Trading and Information Acquisition
Published: 7/23/2015, Volume: 70, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12226 | Cited by: 259
ITAY GOLDSTEIN, LIYAN YANG
We analyze a model in which different traders are informed of different fundamentals that affect the security value. We identify a source for strategic complementarities in trading and information acquisition: aggressive trading on information about one fundamental reduces uncertainty in trading on information about the other fundamental, encouraging more trading and information acquisition on that fundamental. This tends to amplify the effect of exogenous changes in the underlying information environment. Due to complementarities, greater diversity of information in the economy improves price informativeness. We discuss the relation between our model and recent financial phenomena and derive testable empirical implications.
The Price of Higher Order Catastrophe Insurance: The Case of VIX Options
Published: 10/18/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13182 | Cited by: 16
BJØRN ERAKER, AOXIANG YANG
We develop a tractable equilibrium pricing model to explain observed characteristics in equity returns, VIX futures, S&P 500 options, and VIX options data based on affine jump‐diffusive state dynamics and representative agents endowed with Duffie‐Epstein recursive preferences. Our calibrated model replicates consumption, dividends, and asset market data, including VIX futures returns, the average implied volatilities in SPX and VIX options, and first‐ and higher‐order moments of VIX options returns. We document a time variation in the shape of VIX‐option‐implied volatility and a time‐varying hedging relationship between VIX and SPX options that our model both captures.
Commodity Financialization and Information Transmission
Published: 7/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13165 | Cited by: 105
ITAY GOLDSTEIN, LIYAN YANG
We provide a model to understand the effects of commodity futures financialization on various market variables. We distinguish between financial speculators and financial hedgers and study their separate and combined effects on the informativeness of futures prices, the futures price bias, the comovement of futures prices with other markets, and the predictiveness of financial trading. We capture the interactions between commodity futures financialization and the real economy through spot prices and production decisions. A dynamic extension illustrates how key variables change over time in a period of acute financialization in a way that is consistent with observed empirical patterns.
Nonfundamental Speculation Revisited
Published: 8/28/2017, Volume: 72, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12548 | Cited by: 7
LIYAN YANG, HAOXIANG ZHU
We show that a linear pure strategy equilibrium may not exist in the model of Madrigal (1996), contrary to the claim of the original paper. This is because Madrigal's characterization of a pure strategy equilibrium omits a second‐order condition. If the nonfundamental speculator's information about noise trading is sufficiently precise, a linear pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. In parameter regions where a pure strategy equilibrium does exist, we identify a few calculation errors in Madrigal (1996) that result in misleading implications.
Signalling and the Pricing of New Issues
Published: 6/1989, Volume: 44, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb05063.x | Cited by: 800
MARK GRINBLATT, CHUAN YANG HWANG
This paper develops a signalling model with two signals, two attributes, and a continuum of signal levels and attribute types to explain new issue underpricing. Both the fraction of the new issue retained by the issuer and its offering price convey to investors the unobservable “intrinsic” value of the firm and the variance of its cash flows. Many of the model's comparative statics results are novel, empirically testable, and consistent with the existing empirical evidence on new issues. In particular, the degree of underpricing, which can be inferred from observable variables, is positively related to the firm's post‐issue share price.
Long‐Term Return Reversals: Overreaction or Taxes?
Published: 11/28/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01295.x | Cited by: 68
THOMAS J. GEORGE, CHUAN‐YANG HWANG
Long‐term reversals in U.S. stock returns are better explained as the rational reactions of investors to locked‐in capital gains than an irrational overreaction to news. Predictors of returns based on the overreaction hypothesis have no power, while those that measure locked‐in capital gains do, completely subsuming past returns measures that are traditionally used to predict long‐term returns. In data from Hong Kong, where investment income is not taxed, reversals are nonexistent, and returns are not forecastable either by traditional measures or by measures based on the capital gains lock‐in hypothesis that successfully predict U.S. returns.
The 52‐Week High and Momentum Investing
Published: 10/2004, Volume: 59, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00695.x | Cited by: 682
THOMAS J. GEORGE, CHUAN‐YANG HWANG
When coupled with a stock's current price, a readily available piece of information—the 52‐week high price–explains a large portion of the profits from momentum investing. Nearness to the 52‐week high dominates and improves upon the forecasting power of past returns (both individual and industry returns) for future returns. Future returns forecast using the 52‐week high do not reverse in the long run. These results indicate that short‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are largely separate phenomena, which presents a challenge to current theory that models these aspects of security returns as integrated components of the market's response to news.
Optimal Contracting, Corporate Finance, and Valuation with Inalienable Human Capital
Published: 3/25/2019, Volume: 74, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12761 | Cited by: 117
PATRICK BOLTON, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG
A risk‐averse entrepreneur with access to a profitable venture needs to raise funds from investors. She cannot indefinitely commit her human capital to the venture, which limits the firm's debt capacity, distorts investment and compensation, and constrains the entrepreneur's risk sharing. This puts dynamic liquidity and state‐contingent risk allocation at the center of corporate financial management. The firm balances mean‐variance investment efficiency and the preservation of financial slack. We show that in general the entrepreneur's net worth is overexposed to idiosyncratic risk and underexposed to systematic risk. These distortions are greater the closer the firm is to exhausting its debt capacity.
Rare Disasters, Financial Development, and Sovereign Debt
Published: 8/25/2022, Volume: 77, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13175 | Cited by: 33
SERGIO REBELO, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG
We propose a model of sovereign debt in which countries vary in their level of financial development, defined as the extent to which they can issue debt denominated in domestic currency in international capital markets. We show that low levels of financial development generate the “debt intolerance” phenomenon that plagues emerging markets: it reduces overall debt capacity, increases credit spreads, and limits the country's ability to smooth consumption.
Private and Public Merger Waves
Published: 9/10/2013, Volume: 68, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12055 | Cited by: 220
VOJISLAV MAKSIMOVIC, GORDON PHILLIPS, LIU YANG
We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.
Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital
Published: 5/7/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01554.x | Cited by: 260
YAEL V. HOCHBERG, ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, YANG LU
We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one‐standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one‐third. Entrants with established ties to target‐market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.
Whom You Know Matters: Venture Capital Networks and Investment Performance
Published: 1/11/2007, Volume: 62, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01207.x | Cited by: 1559
YAEL V. HOCHBERG, ALEXANDER LJUNGQVIST, YANG LU
Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm's‐length, spot market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational structure in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments. We find that better‐networked VC firms experience significantly better fund performance, as measured by the proportion of investments that are successfully exited through an IPO or a sale to another company. Similarly, the portfolio companies of better‐networked VCs are significantly more likely to survive to subsequent financing and eventual exit. We also provide initial evidence on the evolution of VC networks.
Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the China Foreign Share Discount
Published: 1/10/2008, Volume: 63, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01313.x | Cited by: 317
KALOK CHAN, ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ZHISHU YANG
We examine the effect of information asymmetry on equity prices in the local A‐ and foreign B‐share market in China. We construct measures of information asymmetry based on market microstructure models, and find that they explain a significant portion of cross‐sectional variation in B‐share discounts, even after controlling for other factors. On a univariate basis, the price impact measure and the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread in the A‐ and B‐share markets explains 44% and 46% of the variation in B‐share discounts. On a multivariate basis, both measures are far more statistically significant than any of the control variables.
Retail Financial Innovation and Stock Market Dynamics: The Case of Target Date Funds
Published: 6/26/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 5 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13258 | Cited by: 56
JONATHAN A. PARKER, ANTOINETTE SCHOAR, YANG SUN
Target date funds (TDFs) are designed to provide unsophisticated or inattentive investors with age‐appropriate exposures to different asset classes like stocks and bonds. The rise of TDFs has moved a significant share of retirement investors into macrocontrarian strategies that sell stocks after relatively good stock market performance. This rebalancing drives contrarian flows across equity mutual funds held by TDFs, stabilizing their funding, and reduces stock returns for stocks disproportionately held by these funds when stock market returns are relatively high. Continued growth in TDFs and similar investment products may dampen stock market volatility and increase the transmission of shocks across asset classes.
The Pollution Premium
Published: 4/10/2023, Volume: 78, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13217 | Cited by: 624
PO‐HSUAN HSU, KAI LI, CHI‐YANG TSOU
This paper studies the asset pricing implications of industrial pollution. A long‐short portfolio constructed from firms with high versus low toxic emission intensity within an industry generates an average annual return of 4.42%, which remains significant after controlling for risk factors. This pollution premium cannot be explained by existing systematic risks, investor preferences, market sentiment, political connections, or corporate governance. We propose and model a new systematic risk related to environmental policy uncertainty. We use the growth in environmental litigation penalties to measure regime change risk and find that it helps price the cross section of emission portfolios' returns.
Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide
Published: 3/7/2013, Volume: 68, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12012 | Cited by: 278
VIKAS AGARWAL, WEI JIANG, YUEHUA TANG, BAOZHONG YANG
This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.
On the Relative Pricing of Long‐Maturity Index Options and Collateralized Debt Obligations
Published: 11/19/2012, Volume: 67, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01779.x | Cited by: 74
PIERRE COLLIN‐DUFRESNE, ROBERT S. GOLDSTEIN, FAN YANG
We investigate a structural model of market and firm‐level dynamics in order to jointly price long‐dated S&P 500 index options and CDO tranches of corporate debt. We identify market dynamics from index option prices and idiosyncratic dynamics from the term structure of credit spreads. We find that all tranches can be well priced out‐of‐sample before the crisis. During the crisis, however, our model can capture senior tranche prices only if we allow for the possibility of a catastrophic jump. Thus, senior tranches are nonredundant assets that provide a unique window into the pricing of catastrophic risk.
Dynamic Banking and the Value of Deposits
Published: 4/23/2025, Volume: 80, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13454 | Cited by: 17
PATRICK BOLTON, YE LI, NENG WANG, JINQIANG YANG
We propose a theory of banking in which banks cannot perfectly control deposit flows. Facing uninsurable loan and deposit shocks, banks dynamically manage lending, wholesale funding, deposits, and equity. Deposits create value by lowering funding costs. However, when the bank is undercapitalized and at risk of breaching leverage requirements, the marginal value of deposits can turn negative as deposit inflows, by raising leverage, increase the likelihood of costly equity issuance. Banks' inability to fully control leverage distinguishes them from nondepository intermediaries. Our model suggests a reevaluation of leverage regulations and offers new perspectives on banking in a low‐interest‐rate environment.
Bank Competition Amid Digital Disruption: Implications for Financial Inclusion
Published: 5/17/2026, Volume: 81, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.70051 | Cited by: 2
ERICA XUEWEI JIANG, GLORIA YANG YU, JINYUAN ZHANG
We examine how digital disruption affects bank competition using the staggered rollout of 3G mobile networks. 3G expansion increased mobile banking adoption among tech‐savvy households, reducing branch networks—especially in younger counties. Banks' strategies diverged: Less branch‐reliant banks closed branches and competed on price, while more branch‐reliant banks maintained branches but raised spreads. A structural model shows that perceived digital service improvements among younger consumers drove these shifts, reducing welfare for older savers. Counterfactuals demonstrate that subsidizing adoption for older savers can cost‐effectively reduce these disparities, facilitating a smoother digital transition.
Leverage Is a Double‐Edged Sword
Published: 2/15/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 2 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13316 | Cited by: 21
AVANIDHAR SUBRAHMANYAM, KE TANG, JINGYUAN WANG, XUEWEI YANG
We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out‐of‐sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.
The Impact of Incentives and Communication Costs on Information Production and Use: Evidence from Bank Lending
Published: 7/23/2015, Volume: 70, Issue: 4 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12251 | Cited by: 177
JUN (QJ) QIAN, PHILIP E. STRAHAN, ZHISHU YANG
In 2002 and 2003, many Chinese banks implemented reforms that delegated authority to individual loan officers. The change followed China's entrance into the WTO and offers a plausibly exogenous shock to loan officer incentives to produce information. We find that the bank's internal risk rating becomes a stronger predictor of loan interest rates and ex post outcomes after reform. When the loan officer and the branch president who approves the loan work together longer, the rating also becomes more strongly related to loan prices and outcomes. Our results highlight how incentives and communication costs affect information production and use.
The Cost of Debt
Published: 11/9/2010, Volume: 65, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2010.01611.x | Cited by: 265
JULES H. Van BINSBERGEN, JOHN R. GRAHAM, JIE YANG
We use exogenous variation in tax benefit functions to estimate firm‐specific cost of debt functions that are conditional on company characteristics such as collateral, size, and book‐to‐market. By integrating the area between the benefit and cost functions, we estimate that the equilibrium net benefit of debt is 3.5% of asset value, resulting from an estimated gross benefit (cost) of debt equal to 10.4% (6.9%) of asset value. We find that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt.
Mandatory Portfolio Disclosure, Stock Liquidity, and Mutual Fund Performance
Published: 11/12/2015, Volume: 70, Issue: 6 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12245 | Cited by: 166
VIKAS AGARWAL, KEVIN A. MULLALLY, YUEHUA TANG, BAOZHONG YANG
We examine the impact of mandatory portfolio disclosure by mutual funds on stock liquidity and fund performance. We develop a model of informed trading with disclosure and test its predictions using the May 2004 SEC regulation requiring more frequent disclosure. Stocks with higher fund ownership, especially those held by more informed funds or subject to greater information asymmetry, experience larger increases in liquidity after the regulation change. More informed funds, especially those holding stocks with greater information asymmetry, experience greater performance deterioration after the regulation change. Overall, mandatory disclosure improves stock liquidity but imposes costs on informed investors.
Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply
Published: 12/20/2024, Volume: 80, Issue: 1 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13411 | Cited by: 16
HARRY COOPERMAN, DARRELL DUFFIE, STEPHAN LUCK, ZACHRY WANG, YILIN (DAVID) YANG
Corporate credit lines are drawn more heavily when funding markets are stressed. This elevates expected bank funding costs. We show that credit supply is dampened by the associated debt‐overhang cost to bank shareholders. Until 2022, this impact was reduced by linking the interest paid on lines to a credit‐sensitive reference rate like the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR). We show that transition to risk‐free reference rates may exacerbate this friction. The adverse impact on credit supply is offset if drawdowns are expected to be deposited at the same bank, which happened at some of the largest banks during the global financial crisis and COVID recession.
Nonstandard Errors
Published: 4/17/2024, Volume: 79, Issue: 3 | DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13337 | Cited by: 107
ALBERT J. MENKVELD, ANNA DREBER, FELIX HOLZMEISTER, JUERGEN HUBER, MAGNUS JOHANNESSON, MICHAEL KIRCHLER, SEBASTIAN NEUSÜß, MICHAEL RAZEN, UTZ WEITZEL, DAVID ABAD‐DÍAZ, MENACHEM (MENI) ABUDY, TOBIAS ADRIAN, YACINE AIT‐SAHALIA, OLIVIER AKMANSOY, JAMIE T. ALCOCK, VITALI ALEXEEV, ARASH ALOOSH, LIVIA AMATO, DIEGO AMAYA, JAMES J. ANGEL, ALEJANDRO T. AVETIKIAN, AMADEUS BACH, EDWIN BAIDOO, GAETAN BAKALLI, LI BAO, ANDREA BARBON, OKSANA BASHCHENKO, PARAMPREET C. BINDRA, GEIR H. BJØNNES, JEFFREY R. BLACK, BERNARD S. BLACK, DIMITAR BOGOEV, SANTIAGO BOHORQUEZ CORREA, OLEG BONDARENKO, CHARLES S. BOS, CIRIL BOSCH‐ROSA, ELIE BOURI, CHRISTIAN BROWNLEES, ANNA CALAMIA, VIET NGA CAO, GUNTHER CAPELLE‐BLANCARD, LAURA M. CAPERA ROMERO, MASSIMILIANO CAPORIN, ALLEN CARRION, TOLGA CASKURLU, BIDISHA CHAKRABARTY, JIAN CHEN, MIKHAIL CHERNOV, WILLIAM CHEUNG, LUDWIG B. CHINCARINI, TARUN CHORDIA, SHEUNG‐CHI CHOW, BENJAMIN CLAPHAM, JEAN‐EDOUARD COLLIARD, CAROLE COMERTON‐FORDE, EDWARD CURRAN, THONG DAO, WALE DARE, RYAN J. DAVIES, RICCARDO DE BLASIS, GIANLUCA F. DE NARD, FANY DECLERCK, OLEG DEEV, HANS DEGRYSE, SOLOMON Y. DEKU, CHRISTOPHE DESAGRE, MATHIJS A. VAN DIJK, CHUKWUMA DIM, THOMAS DIMPFL, YUN JIANG DONG, PHILIP A. DRUMMOND, TOM DUDDA, TEODOR DUEVSKI, ARIADNA DUMITRESCU, TEODOR DYAKOV, ANNE HAUBO DYHRBERG, MICHAŁ DZIELIŃSKI, ASLI EKSI, IZIDIN EL KALAK, SASKIA TER ELLEN, NICOLAS EUGSTER, MARTIN D. D. EVANS, MICHAEL FARRELL, ESTER FELEZ‐VINAS, GERARDO FERRARA, EL MEHDI FERROUHI, ANDREA FLORI, JONATHAN T. FLUHARTY‐JAIDEE, SEAN D. V. FOLEY, KINGSLEY Y. L. FONG, THIERRY FOUCAULT, TATIANA FRANUS, FRANCESCO FRANZONI, BART FRIJNS, MICHAEL FRÖMMEL, SERVANNA M. FU, SASCHA C. FÜLLBRUNN, BAOQING GAN, GE GAO, THOMAS P. GEHRIG, ROLAND GEMAYEL, DIRK GERRITSEN, JAVIER GIL‐BAZO, DUDLEY GILDER, LAWRENCE R. GLOSTEN, THOMAS GOMEZ, ARSENY GORBENKO, JOACHIM GRAMMIG, VINCENT GRÉGOIRE, UFUK GÜÇBILMEZ, BJÖRN HAGSTRÖMER, JULIEN HAMBUCKERS, ERIK HAPNES, JEFFREY H. HARRIS, LAWRENCE HARRIS, SIMON HARTMANN, JEAN‐BAPTISTE HASSE, NIKOLAUS HAUTSCH, XUE‐ZHONG (TONY) HE, DAVIDSON HEATH, SIMON HEDIGER, TERRENCE HENDERSHOTT, ANN MARIE HIBBERT, ERIK HJALMARSSON, SETH A. HOELSCHER, PETER HOFFMANN, CRAIG W. HOLDEN, ALEX R. HORENSTEIN, WENQIAN HUANG, DA HUANG, CHRISTOPHE HURLIN, KONRAD ILCZUK, ALEXEY IVASHCHENKO, SUBRAMANIAN R. IYER, HOSSEIN JAHANSHAHLOO, NAJI JALKH, CHARLES M. JONES, SIMON JURKATIS, PETRI JYLHÄ, ANDREAS T. KAECK, GABRIEL KAISER, ARZÉ KARAM, EGLE KARMAZIENE, BERNHARD KASSNER, MARKKU KAUSTIA, EKATERINA KAZAK, FEARGHAL KEARNEY, VINCENT VAN KERVEL, SAAD A. KHAN, MARTA K. KHOMYN, TONY KLEIN, OLGA KLEIN, ALEXANDER KLOS, MICHAEL KOETTER, ALEKSEY KOLOKOLOV, ROBERT A. KORAJCZYK, ROMAN KOZHAN, JAN P. KRAHNEN, PAUL KUHLE, AMY KWAN, QUENTIN LAJAUNIE, F. Y. ERIC C. LAM, MARIE LAMBERT, HUGUES LANGLOIS, JENS LAUSEN, TOBIAS LAUTER, MARKUS LEIPPOLD, VLADIMIR LEVIN, YIJIE LI, HUI LI, CHEE YOONG LIEW, THOMAS LINDNER, OLIVER LINTON, JIACHENG LIU, ANQI LIU, GUILLERMO LLORENTE, MATTHIJS LOF, ARIEL LOHR, FRANCIS LONGSTAFF, ALEJANDRO LOPEZ‐LIRA, SHAWN MANKAD, NICOLA MANO, ALEXIS MARCHAL, CHARLES MARTINEAU, FRANCESCO MAZZOLA, DEBRAH MELOSO, MICHAEL G. MI, ROXANA MIHET, VIJAY MOHAN, SOPHIE MOINAS, DAVID MOORE, LIANGYI MU, DMITRIY MURAVYEV, DERMOT MURPHY, GABOR NESZVEDA, CHRISTIAN NEUMEIER, ULF NIELSSON, MAHENDRARAJAH NIMALENDRAN, SVEN NOLTE, LARS L. NORDEN, PETER O'NEILL, KHALED OBAID, BERNT A. ØDEGAARD, PER ÖSTBERG, EMILIANO PAGNOTTA, MARCUS PAINTER, STEFAN PALAN, IMON J. PALIT, ANDREAS PARK, ROBERTO PASCUAL, PAOLO PASQUARIELLO, LUBOS PASTOR, VINAY PATEL, ANDREW J. PATTON, NEIL D. PEARSON, LORIANA PELIZZON, MICHELE PELLI, MATTHIAS PELSTER, CHRISTOPHE PÉRIGNON, CAMERON PFIFFER, RICHARD PHILIP, TOMÁŠ PLÍHAL, PUNEET PRAKASH, OLIVER‐ALEXANDER PRESS, TINA PRODROMOU, MARCEL PROKOPCZUK, TALIS PUTNINS, YA QIAN, GAURAV RAIZADA, DAVID RAKOWSKI, ANGELO RANALDO, LUCA REGIS, STEFAN REITZ, THOMAS RENAULT, REX W. RENJIE, ROBERTO RENO, STEVEN J. RIDDIOUGH, KALLE RINNE, PAUL RINTAMÄKI, RYAN RIORDAN, THOMAS RITTMANNSBERGER, IÑAKI RODRÍGUEZ LONGARELA, DOMINIK ROESCH, LAVINIA ROGNONE, BRIAN ROSEMAN, IOANID ROŞU, SAURABH ROY, NICOLAS RUDOLF, STEPHEN R. RUSH, KHALADDIN RZAYEV, ALEKSANDRA A. RZEŹNIK, ANTHONY SANFORD, HARIKUMAR SANKARAN, ASANI SARKAR, LUCIO SARNO, OLIVIER SCAILLET, STEFAN SCHARNOWSKI, KLAUS R. SCHENK‐HOPPÉ, ANDREA SCHERTLER, MICHAEL SCHNEIDER, FLORIAN SCHROEDER, NORMAN SCHÜRHOFF, PHILIPP SCHUSTER, MARCO A. SCHWARZ, MARK S. SEASHOLES, NORMAN J. SEEGER, OR SHACHAR, ANDRIY SHKILKO, JESSICA SHUI, MARIO SIKIC, GIORGIA SIMION, LEE A. SMALES, PAUL SÖDERLIND, ELVIRA SOJLI, KONSTANTIN SOKOLOV, JANTJE SÖNKSEN, LAIMA SPOKEVICIUTE, DENITSA STEFANOVA, MARTI G. SUBRAHMANYAM, BARNABAS SZASZI, OLEKSANDR TALAVERA, YUEHUA TANG, NICK TAYLOR, WING WAH THAM, ERIK THEISSEN, JULIAN THIMME, IAN TONKS, HAI TRAN, LUCA TRAPIN, ANDERS B. TROLLE, M. ANDREEA VADUVA, GIORGIO VALENTE, ROBERT A. VAN NESS, AURELIO VASQUEZ, THANOS VEROUSIS, PATRICK VERWIJMEREN, ANDERS VILHELMSSON, GRIGORY VILKOV, VLADIMIR VLADIMIROV, SEBASTIAN VOGEL, STEFAN VOIGT, WOLF WAGNER, THOMAS WALTHER, PATRICK WEISS, MICHEL VAN DER WEL, INGRID M. WERNER, P. JOAKIM WESTERHOLM, CHRISTIAN WESTHEIDE, HANS C. WIKA, EVERT WIPPLINGER, MICHAEL WOLF, CHRISTIAN C. P. WOLFF, LEONARD WOLK, WING‐KEUNG WONG, JAN WRAMPELMEYER, ZHEN‐XING WU, SHUO XIA, DACHENG XIU, KE XU, CAIHONG XU, PRADEEP K. YADAV, JOSÉ YAGÜE, CHENG YAN, ANTTI YANG, WOONGSUN YOO, WENJIA YU, YIHE YU, SHIHAO YU, BART Z. YUESHEN, DARYA YUFEROVA, MARCIN ZAMOJSKI, ABALFAZL ZAREEI, STEFAN M. ZEISBERGER, LU ZHANG, S. SARAH ZHANG, XIAOYU ZHANG, LU ZHAO, ZHUO ZHONG, Z. IVY ZHOU, CHEN ZHOU, XINGYU S. ZHU, MARIUS ZOICAN, REMCO ZWINKELS
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data‐generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence‐generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty—nonstandard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for more reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer‐review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.